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ABSTRACT
VEGETARIANISM VERSUS ENVIRONMENTALISM
FEBRUARY 1996
DAVID B. WALLER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Vegetarianism is defined here as the view that the needless killing or eating of animals is
wrong. A number of environmental ethicists oppose animal liberation in general and
vegetarianism in particular. Many of their arguments are motivated by a concern that the
principles of animal liberation imply negative evaluations of life processes intimately associated
with the natural world, particularly pain, death, and predation. Environmentalists also charge that
animal liberation entails a distancing of humanity from nature in a manner that is untenable and,
to the extent that it is attempted, spiritually if not physically unhealthy.
Likewise, animal liberationists attack the philosophical foundations of environmentalism.
They argue that non-sentient life can have neither intrinsic value nor moral rights. Animal
liberationists fear that a realm of values which is too broad—including plants, rivers, ecosystems,
and any natural event—would prevent the animal liberation agenda from gaining a moral
foothold. Human activities such as hunting and eating animals can easily be swallowed up in
natural categories, the environmentalists' gateway to positive evaluation.
In the midst of the ongoing dispute between vegetarianism and environmentalism, this
dissertation comes to the defense of each against the other. I argue that each side in the dispute
makes the philosophical mistake of clinging to a monistic axiology. I argue also that vegetarianism
and environmentalism are interwoven as programs for practical change.
Neither mainstream animal liberationism nor mainstream environmentalism has done a
very good job of addressing the impact of its agenda on issues of interhuman justice. I examine
v
radical environmentalisms which have done exactly this. Two of these left-wing
environmentalisms, deep and social ecology, have failed both the animals and themselves by not
addressing animal welfare directly. A third, ecofeminism, will be shown to have done the best job
of articulating a coherent position which addresses all three concerns: environmentalism,
vegetarianism, and social justice.
I conclude by discussing previous visions of a humane, just, and environmentally sound
society. Most lack nothing in recommendations for ways in which humans and animals might live
apart. I argue that a successful program will reject that separation.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
DISCORD
1.1 Assumptions
The bulk of this dissertation is devoted to defending the proposition that vegetarianism,
environmentalism, and social justice are, despite mutual antagonisms, compatible. I begin with
three starting assumptions, two of which are formulated with the help of the Random House
Dictionary s definition of oppress. They are (1) that humanity, or some significant segment
thereof, is engaged in an unjustly harsh exercise ofpower over the other animals; (2) that some
segments of humanity are engaged in an unjustly harsh exercise ofpower over other segments; and
(3) that the environment is going to hell in a handbasket. When I say that these are my starting
assumptions, I mean that I am not going to spend much time arguing directly for them. I will do
little by way of trying to convince the reader that animals have rights, intrinsic value, inherent
worth, or are otherwise deserving of moral consideration; nor will I attempt to argue directly
either that social injustices are an integral part of the way business is done on this planet at this
time in history or that these injustices can and should be mitigated by changing at the most
fundamental level the way business is done; nor should any rational person need convincing that
we are in the midst of a global environmental crisis. One might expect my environmental
assumption to be that humanity, or some segment thereof, is engaged in an 'unjustly harsh
exercise of power' over the environment. This I believe to be too controversial to be left
unexamined; while it is easy to see that the environment is being systematically disappeared, it is
not widely accepted that one can be unjust to an ecosystem or to a tree or river.
The three major assumptions that are made are justified in the context of this dissertation,
which is about the philosophical and practical conflicts between the agendas of the animal
liberationists, the environmentalists, and all those concerned with social justice. Obviously, if one
believes that animals fall beyond the pale of moral concern, or if one believes that there is no
accordingly simpler, and the topic of this dissertation loses at least some of its interest. Further
simplification is available to those who do not think that environmental destruction presents at
least a practical problem. It is my belief, though, that we have entered a period of history where
most Westerners (my primary audience) are concerned about the environment, believe that there
is social injustice which should be rectified, and believe that one should treat animals in a manner
that can be called ethical.
While I will not argue directly for the three main assumptions on which this paper rests, I
do think it is proper to consider why I feel confident that the assumption regarding the oppression
of animals is a fair one. After all, this dissertation has been written from the vegetarian point of
view. In what follows, when I speak of 'anti-animal liberationists’ I should be taken as referring to
those who argue directly and conservatively against animals' having moral considerability—i.e.,
those who do not appeal to environmentalist principles or principles of social justice and who have
otherwise not expressed any particular commitments to such principles.
1-1-1 Anti-Animal Liberationists Believe in the Assumption
When I think about the task that an animal liberationist is confronted with when arguing
against those who staunchly defend the old view that animals are not morally considerable, 1 I am
reminded of Plato's Gorgias. In that dialogue, Socrates is out to convince Polus that it is better to
suffer wrong than to do wrong. While sometimes it is evident that Socrates believes that his task
is to change Polus' mind, at others Socrates is of the seemingly extraordinary opinion that
everyone really does believe as he, Socrates, does—only they do not realize it. Polus' own point of
view mirrors that of Socrates [474b 1]:
Polus. [...] Would you rather suffer wrong than do wrong?
1 How old this view is, or even whether it merits being referred to as the 'standard' view, is debatable. It
seems likely that most people, at most times, in most places—even post-Cartesian Europe—have had at
least some concern for the welfare of animals The disgust people evinced at the animal-torturings of
Cartesian disciples, the fact that the age of vivisection simultaneously heralded in the animal liberation
movement—these facts and more cast doubt on the idea that indifference to animal suffering is the 'old' way
and concern for animal suffering is new It is no doubt true, though, that the extent of concern for animals
has never been greater in the post-industrial revolution west than it is now
Socrates. Yes, and so would you and so would everybody.
Polus. On the contrary, neither you nor I nor anybody would make that choice.
2
Socrates and Polus are each convinced that the other person is suffering from cognitive
dissonance, or is willfully disbelieving what he 'really' believes. The attentive reader will find the
same problem plaguing anti-animal liberationists. They have a collective habit of distancing
themselves from the view that it is all right to inflict unnecessary cruelty on animals. Consider the
following remarks, all of which appear in anti-animal liberationist literature:
In considering the claim that scientific research violates animal rights, it is
important to distinguish between the truism that needless suffering should be
discouraged and the entirely different across-the-board claim that all use of
animals in research (or food) is wrong. 1
l do not believe it betrays undue sensitivity to find certain practices employed on
factory farms profoundly disturbing. To put no finer point on the matter, there
are practices afoot on them, pre-eminently in the cases of laying hens and veal
calves, of which we cannot be proud. 4
Until something like a consensus emerges, amongst philosophers and
psychologists concerning the nature of consciousness, and amongst ethologists
over the cognitive powers of animals, it may be wiser to continue to respond to
animals as if their mental states were conscious ones. 5
As soon as it is admitted that one should not unnecessarily harm an animal, which is an
admission that is either implicit or explicit in the writings of these three anti-animal liberationists,
then the animal liberationist critique of the current state of affairs gains a degree of legitimacy
which the above philosophers fail to appreciate.
1-1.2 Anti-Animal Liberationists Are on a Desperate Defensive
Another reason for thinking the assumption is a fair one is that we have entered a period
where the arguments against animal rights have taken on a desperately defensive tone. They tend
to be rehashed versions of old arguments, or based on wildly implausible assumptions, or just
2
Plato, Gorgias
, p 62
3
Levin, 'Animal Rights Evaluated,' p 12.
4
Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, p 22
5
Carruthers, p 192f
4to be rehashed versions of old arguments, or based on wildly implausible assumptions, or just
plain thoughtless. Here I present three relatively (for philosophy) recent arguments (or recent
appearances of old arguments) against various aspects of animal rights.
1. 1.2.1 Incommensurability
The first argument was brought to my attention in an article published some eighteen
years ago but has recently resurfaced. In that first article, Michael Levin wrote:
If animals are to be given consideration equal to that we give to man, consider the
case of a man and a wolf trapped on a mountaintop. It would, then, be wrong to
make a greater effort to rescue the man...Well, suppose we say that we owe some
consideration to animals, although not consideration equal to that we owe our
fellowman. Suppose the obligation is, say, one-one-hundredth as strong. Then if
a man and a pack of one hundred wolves were trapped on a mountaintop, it
would be wrong to make a greater effort to rescue the man.6
This, of course, is supposed to be a reductio of the animal rights position. It can be
represented as a modus tollens argument:
(1) If animals have rights, then either those rights are equal to or some
fraction of humans' rights.
(2) Those rights are not equal to human rights.
(3) Those rights are not some fraction of human rights.
(4) .'. Animals do not have rights.
Lines (2) and (3) are supposedly justified in the stories of the mountaintop. But Levin
over-interprets the import of his own stories. Imagine that what is on the mountaintop is not a
man and a wolf, but two people, one of which is a family member of yours. From the fact that it is
OK for you to rescue your family member instead of the other person, does it follow that the other
person's rights are not equal? The answer might actually be 'yes,' but it is not a very shocking 'yes.'
The non-family member just happens to lack a certain right with respect to you, namely a right that
you honor familial ties. The same is true in the case of a number of strangers versus one family
member. This is not to deny that a sufficient number of strangers presents one with a genuine
6
Levin, 'Animal Rights Evaluated,' p 15.
5moral dilemma (and the same might be true of a sufficient number of animals, especially animals
of certain kinds); it is only to say that the conflict is not one of rights simpliciter, and so the
resolution does not indicate that the 'losers' had no rights, or had rights too small to be bothered
with. They just did not have the kind of rights the recognition of which would have saved them in
that particular situation .
7
Carruthers tells what is essentially the same story, but like me he goes the extra step by
comparing what one should do if the choice were not between persons and animals but between
persons and persons . 8 He forgets, however, that considerations of family and friends (or
shipmates or fellow platoon members) call into Question the view that, where the choice is
between some number of human persons and another, 'the best thing to do would be to save as
many lives as possible .'9 Hence, he formulates a flawed reductio similar to Levin's.
There is a slight difference, though. Where Levin speaks of 'rights' in his article Carruthers
speaks of 'suffering’ and the 'value' of 'lives.' This difference is perhaps bridged by another article
of Levin's, published sixteen years after the first, in which he implies that the two are
interchangeable; he writes of 'the rights of the crocodiles, or their value as sentient beings .' 10 This
occurs in the context of his arguing that if, as Fulda claims in his defense of animals, animals have
rights (or value) but any human right (or value) is incommensurably greater, then animals
effectively have no rights (no value) at all. Levin would agree with Carruthers' protest that 'there
is no question of weighing up animal lives against the lives of humans ' 11 and that 'we find it
intuitively abhorrent that the lives or sufferings of animals should be weighed against the lives or
sufferings of human beings .' 12
7
This is why the classic dog-in-a-lifeboat problem is more complicated than people sometimes notice, each
person has different rights with respect to different boatmates. Until something about the passengers and the
dog and the relationship of each to the others are all known, the puzzle is too vague to be useful For
example, is one of the passengers a heinous war criminal9 (No dearth of those at this point in history.) Then
I believe many would rather throw him overboard than the dog On the other hand, the dog might just be
benefiting accidentally from what should be done with that particular passenger regardless.
8
Carruthers, p 9.
9
Carruthers, p. 9.
10
Levin, 'Reply to Fulda on Animal Rights,' p 112.
1
1
Carruthers, p 9
12
Carruthers, p 195.
6I beg to exclude myself from Carruther's 'we' and offer this little bit of science fiction by
way of explanation: Imagine an astronaut hopelessly adrift in space, as almost happened to the
Apollo 13 astronauts. Nearby there is a planet teeming with life, very diverse and beautiful.
There are no humans on the planet, nor anything else that would usually be regarded as a person.
Now, if a comet is heading in the general direction of the astronaut and the planet, which would
be better: that it destroy the life-filled planet, or that it destroy the astronaut? Value-wise it is
surely better that an astronaut with but a few days oxygen should die a little earlier than that an
entire biosphere should vanish.
But such arguments from crises have their limits. The entire range of human-animal
interactions cannot be subsumed under the vivisectionists' favorite your dog or your daughter'
problem. The preference for one's daughter is not informative about the proper relations
generally between humans and animals. This should not be surprising, since the same goes for 'a
convicted felon or your daughter.' There is hardly a case there for the use of convicts in the
laboratory.
1
1
1.1.2.2 Skepticism
The ghost of Descartes still haunts the animal rights debate. Somehow, Descartes'
conception of animals as mere machines which only appear to be terrorized, in pain, elated,
hungry, etc. still exercises a grip on the minds of philosophers. Among philosophers who have
tried to revamp Descartes in the light of another three hundred and fifty years of science and
philosophy are Peter Carruthers and David Hilbert. While the normative inference from 'no minds'
to 'no rights' has a good deal of plausibility (but see chapter 3), establishing the empirical claim
that animals have no minds is another thing altogether. Cartesians tend to settle for a speculative
picture of how animal physiology might work in the absence of an animal psychology. Hilbert and
13
It might also be worth remembering that the government and medical establishment have often enough
opted for the 'your daughter and your dog' approach, as in involuntary radiation and syphilis experiments.
The radiation experiments in the western part of the US have become a focus of the media For a brief but
informative discussion and disturbing photographs of the forty-year syphilis experiment on blacks in
Alabama see Spiegel, pp 63-66.
7Carruthers both appeal to the phenomenon of blindsight. People with blindsight can know that an
object is in their visual field without experiencing it visually. Hilbert and Carruthers both suggest
that animal minds might work like this. Another appeal, made by Carruthers, is to apparently
non-conscious but goal-oriented behavior that is more familiar, such as steering around double-
parked cars or doing the dishes while absorbed in a piece of music—activities that are so routine
that we do them more or less 'automatically.' 14
The problems with these views are, first, the extreme nature of the skepticism and,
second, the speculative nature of the theories that follow it. Cartesians begin by noticing that the
existence of animal minds is not logically entailed by either their behavior or by the fact that their
behavior is remarkably similar to our own, certainly conscious, behavior. However, this
observation not only fails to prove that animals do not have minds; it also fails to give us a reason
to seriously doubt that they do. Cartesian theories of animal psychology are themselves too
speculative to either prove their case or cause us to doubt that animals have minds.
1.1. 2.3 Fudging on 'Necessary Suffering'
The last of the desperate defenses I will look at is the defense from necessary suffering.
Many people think that eating meat is necessary for human health, although there are literally
hundreds of thousands of living counterexamples (not to mention all the vegetarians in history).
But there has also been less naive fudging with the concept of 'necessary,' and William Paton's
arguments for animal experimentation are a gold mine. His unflinching description and defense of
the use of the Draize test (wherein a human applies what is usually a compound for toiletries or
cosmetics to the eyes of a number of bound rabbits) ends with the following:
Two comments are often made in this context. The first is that we have enough
cosmetics and toiletries anyway, and do not need anymore: and looking round a
chemist's shop, that seems convincing. But it is worth recalling that that could
have been said about soap in the 1930's, when cracked hands and washerwoman's
dermatitis were familiar sights. It was only by being able to take advantage of
14
The fact that the examples are of 'routines' might affect the force of Carruthers' argument It may be that,
rather than giving us insight into how animals might function without consciousness, the non-conscious
character of routine behavior is a concomitant of complex consciousness that frees up the mind for yet
another task
8chemical advances that today's detergents are possible, along with all the other
improvements in means of care for sensitive or blemished skin. 15
Some concrete examples would have been helped Paton's case here. As it is, I find the last
sentence completely mystifying, as I have gotten the impression over the years that (1) the kind of
substances that are beneficial to the skin—simple plant and mineral oils—are not the sort that
need dripping into rabbit's eyes and (2) the pursuit of what Paton calls ’chemical advances' has
been fueled by the desire to make a cheaper, not a more healthful, detergent. Both of these
suspicions are bom out by the existence of more expensive, all-natural products, including the
ninety-nine cent bar of glycerin hand soap (see Figure 4.1). Such products give the lie to the
necessity of the Draize test. More importantly, for Paton to deem this use of animals ’needed’
effectively contradicts his periodic lip-service to the concerns of animal liberationists and indicates
that said lip-service is now required by the liberal climate.
The state of the anti-animal liberation right and its arguments is reminiscent of the
condition of the pro-slavery right in the post-Civil War era. The loss of the moral ’high ground’
inspired such ridiculous and obviously defensive writings as 'The Negro A Beast (1900), a racist
theological tract, [in which] author Chas. Carroll wrote, "All Scientific Investigation of the Subject
Proves the Negro to Be An Ape."’ 16 I believe that the anti-animal liberationists have also lost the
high ground and that the arguments above represent a similar kind of straw-grasping.
1.1.3 The Arguments for Animal Rights Have Already Been Given
Another reason for leaving off the argument for animal rights is that all the direct arguing
that can be done has been. Whether it is Singer's utilitarianism, Regan's deontology, Midgley's
Humeanism, or what have you, it seems that all the classic analytic theories have been brought to
bear on the animals issue, with more or less success. Indeed, even those who have general
criticisms against some particular line of argument sometimes acknowledge its power in the
l?
Paton, p 143.
16
Spiegel, p 32.
9animals' case (e.g., Benton on Regan, Adams on Singer). Furthermore, when a general theory of
ethics has the result of excluding animals from the moral universe, as in Rawlsian contractualism
or Habermasian communicative ethics, this is now widely taken to be a fault of the theory (as the
authors themselves admit).
This is not to say that any one from the first group of theories I mentioned has proven
sufficient in addressing the concerns of animal rights or welfare; they cannot be expected to do
any better with the animals issue than they have done in interhuman ethics. The point is that the
present author has no new theory, nor a new improvement on an old theory, to offer, and believes
that dramatic improvements will not be forthcoming anytime soon. Such are the limits of the
power of analytic ethics to describe, let alone revise, our beliefs about the proper treatment of each
other, whether human or animal.
1-1-4 A Thousand Words: The Limitations of Argument for the Assumption
One final reason for declining to argue the case for animals from scratch is that the best
argument might not be the familiar land with propositions, valid inferences, and conclusion. This
is the method used throughout this dissertation. However, to 'get on board' in the first place, to
develop a concern for animals, probably requires, in most cases at least, being confronted with the
particular facts about what is happening right now: facts about animals themselves and how they
naturally behave, facts about intensive rearing, facts about animal experiments, etc.
Furthermore, these facts are not fully accessible through the written word. While Singer's
report in Animal Liberation on the horrible abuses of animals was a bombshell in American
consciousness, the fact remains that such horrors can be explained away when people do not have
to confront them. The more limited the information, the easier it is to accept. This was the lesson
that Thatcher learned from the American experience in Vietnam and applied to the war in the
Falklands. As long as television cameras have immediate access to the battlefield so that citizens
are confronted with the ultimately indescribable reality of young Americans (and foreign soldiers
10
and civilians) having their limbs blown off right in front of them, just on the other side of the TV
window, it is questionable whether any war will enjoy popular support. Thatcher used this lesson
and kept a tight reign on media coverage. Reagan followed suit in Grenada; Bush ditto in Panama
and Iraq.
On the other hand, some good has come of this visual-visceral connection, too. It is
doubtful that the national interest in the famine in Ethiopia would have taken off if the media had
given the story in just words instead of showing us what was happening.
It seems to me that filtering out the visuals in favour of abstract argument imposes
unnatural limits on the animals' case, too—unnatural because our values are dependent to at least
some on naked emotional response. Unfortunately, Singer and Regan, as the two leading animal
liberation philosophers, have made it understood that the animal liberation rationale is divorced
from emotional appeals:
I have argued for it, appealing to reason rather than to emotion or sentiment. I
have chosen this path, not because I am unaware of the importance of kind
feelings and sentiments of respect toward other creatures, but because reason is
more universal and more compelling in its appeal. ..I do not think that an appeal
to sympathy and good-heartedness alone will convince most people of the
wrongness of speciesism .
17
The hotter (the more emotionally charged) we are, the more likely we are to
reach a mistaken moral conclusion, while the cooler (the calmer) we are, the
greater the chances that we will avoid making mistakes . 18
While I do not want to deny the relevance of impartiality and 'coolness' to moral
argument, I believe that Singer and Regan have taken a dangerously abstract road and, by not
giving the emotions their due, have made it seem as though our emotional responses to animals
are themselves irrelevant to the project of liberation. I agree with those ecofeminists who have
taken exception to the Singer/Regan line on emotions in ethics:
Certainly it is possible that a decision based on emotion alone may be morally
indefensible, but it is also possible that a decision based on reason alone may be
objectionable. Furthermore, the beings we are considering are not just animals;
they are Lassie the dog and the family's companion cat, bald eagles and bunnies,
snakes and skunks. Similarly, humans are not just humans; they are friends and
lovers, family and foe. The emotional force of kinship or closeness to another is a
17
Singer, Animal Liberation, p 243
lx
Regan, The Casefor Animal Rights, p 129.
11
crucial element in thinking about moral deliberations. To ignore the reality of this
influence in favor of some abstraction such as absolute equality may be not only
impossible, but undesirable
.
19
Singer himself offers examples of what I believe Gruen (and many of us, I am sure) would
call a 'decision based on reason alone' that is 'objectionable 1 :
If Fenelon s future writings really will bring wisdom and joy to thousands,
whereas my father's life is of no significance to anyone except him and me, I
ought to save Fenelon.. .If people in Chad and Cambodia are suffering from famine
and my money can help, I ought to give and go on giving until the sacrifices that I
and my family are making begin to match the benefits the recipients obtain from
my gifts.
Presumably Singer s family is doing well and he is not acting in accordance with his theory
of the virtue of impartiality. If he were to give up that theory he would not only be closer to the
truth but would also be rid of some measure of false guilt.
Those who wish to bring the emotions to bear on questions of ethics are not simply
butting heads with those who advocate pure impartiality. The former, it seems to me, have a view
which reflects the kind of character we like to encourage in our children. Most of us like to
nurture our children's affinity for animals and discourage cruelty. Moreover, we like to see our
children exhibit appreciation for animals' welfare not simply because this virtue is useful to the
improvement of the general happiness (the hedonistic utilitarian line on virtue), but because we
value that virtue in itself—else we should be indifferent between raising a child who has positive
sympathy for animals and raising a child who exhibits a dull impartiality between all individuals of
whatever species.
To bring this discussion of the relationship between ethics and emotional response to a
head: I believe that the direct analytic case for animal rights has done as good a job as can be
expected from the abstract, written word. I believe there is little to be gained by further direct
argument. On the other hand, I do believe that much more can be done by way of the
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Gruen, 'Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals,' in Gaard,
ed
, p 79 In the same collection Donovan connects the Singer/Regan view with a kind of 'coldly rational'
thinking that has helped ease the way for oppressions generally See Donovan, 'Animal Rights and Feminist
Theory,' in Gaard, pp 167-194
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Singer, The Expanding Circle
, p 153
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presentation of the situation itself. A good example of the kind of presentation I am talking about
is a booklet called The Story ofAnimal Cruelties Told by Photographs, which was put together by
the New England Anti-Vivisection Society way back in 1938. Callicott's claim that 'the pain and
suffering of research and agribusiness animals is not greater than that endured by free-living
wildlife as a consequence of predation, disease, starvation, and cold’21 begins to have an almost
offensive ring after we have been confronted with evidence such as the photograph bearing the
following caption:
LIVING DOG SPLIT IN THREE PARTS. With its spinal cord cut in two places, just
below the neck and about four inches above the tail, this dog is about to receive
an electric shock. His hindquarters and tail may be seen in the device, with the
vivisector holding the switch. Said the Washington Star of December 29, 1937,
"The dog could see, hear, smell and taste with its head, but it couldn't control the
movement of one of its paws from the brain."22
Other books featuring photographs of animal experiments, intensive rearing, and sports
include Monica Hutchings and Mavis Caver's Man's Dominion: Our Violation of the Animal World
(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970) and Marjorie Spiegel's The Dreaded Comparison: Human and
Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror, 1989). As an example of how such images cut to the chase I
offer the following comments by an anonymous participant at a conference on the overpopulation
of dogs and cats:
I'm not an animal control or humane professional. I'm a laborer, and I'm here
because I love animals. I've learned a lot. When you showed that poster before,
of the puppy in front of the pile of euthanized animals, I could hear a wave of
shock go through the room. I think that's a good poster. People in the public, like
me
—
you have to deal with this problem every working day
—
people like me can
drive by the shelters where this is all going on and never go into a place in our
lives. The members of the public need to see that. People may say it's shocking.
There are some fairly shocking pictures of AIDS patients. 23
21
Callicott, In Defense
, p 35.
22 New England Anti-Vivisection Society, p 5
23
Anchel, p 56.
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1.2 The Dissertation
Exposure to stomach-turning descriptions and imagery can awaken in us a sympathy for
animals, a longing for the mitigation of their condition, or even motivation to get directly involved
in movements for change. However, that is only a first step. We must then figure out just how to
respond.
If the literature on the subject is to be believed, we are immediately faced with serious
conflicts between three areas of concern: animal rights, environmental degradation, and social
justice. I believe that most people have at least some interest in at least one of these three areas.
I am interested in all three. Because I think that finding solutions to all three is important, I also
think that resolving the apparent conflicts between all three is important too, whether those
conflicts be practical or philosophical: How can we afford to maintain a natural environment
when there are more and more people to feed? How can we liberate millions upon millions of
beef cattle in light of the impact they would have on the environment in the pursuit of their
natural lives? How can we decry human predation and yet strive to protect Sumatran tigers?
How can we give the animals even a moment's concern when human beings all over the world are
hungry for bread and justice? How shall we value our own selves if we value the natural beauty of
a world which we cannot help but transform? These questions and more are raised and, I hope,
answered in this dissertation.
In a nutshell, the answer lies in making allies of enemies. Animal liberationists and
environmentalists have spent much time and many pages criticizing each other's agenda. I believe
that this almost exclusively antagonistic engagement has been a mistake. There are three things
worth noting in this dispute. First, animal liberationists and environmentalists have mutually
compatible main agendas. Second, they have at least some mutually supportive minor agendas
(e.g., preservation of the environment on which wild animals depend), and this makes them
natural political allies (would they but notice this and act accordingly). Third, and this is just the
fallout from the first point, their arguments against each others views tend to be either merely
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tangential to their own respective agendas or based on the most problematic aspects of what they
believe are the philosophical grounds of their own view.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 reveal this third point. In Chapters 2 and 3 I examine and criticize
the arguments of environmentalists against animal liberation. Many of the arguments are
motivated by a concern that the principles of animal liberation imply negative evaluations of life
processes intimately associated with the natural world, particularly pain, death, and predation. If
the fears of the environmentalists are justified, it seems that the animal liberation ethic entails a
preference for a predator-free world and an impossibly death-free world. Philosophically, this in
turn implies (on the face of it, anyway) the devaluation of predatory animals. The
environmentalists fear that the ultimate practical implication of animal liberation is that we should
eliminate predatory animals. At least one vegetarian philosopher would seem to confirm these
fears: Steve Sapontzis made his notoriety by condoning the rescue of rabbits from foxes. There is
the additional suspicion that animal liberation entails a distancing of humanity from nature in a
manner that is untenable and, to the extent that it is attempted, spiritually if not physically
unhealthy. These are all legitimate concerns; I hope to have answered them.
In Chapter 4 I examine and criticize the arguments of animal liberationists against
environmentalism. The main complainant here is Peter Singer, whose utilitarianism inspires him
with a skepticism with regard to non-sentient life's having any intrinsic value or rights. For Singer,
the fact that non-sentient beings have neither pleasures nor preferences is decisive. The
motivation behind the animal liberationist case against environmentalists is the fear that a realm
of values which is too broad—including plants, rivers, ecosystems, and any natural event—would
prevent the animal liberation agenda from gaining a moral foothold. Human activities such as
hunting and eating animals can easily be swallowed up in natural categories, the
environmentalists' gateway to positive evaluation. With this concern in mind I turn a critical eye
to a number of theories justifying nature's being a bearer of intrinsic value and explaining the basis
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for that claim. At the end of the three chapters we will have found that each side fails to argue
down the other, which is what one might expect of two positions so intertwined.
Neither mainstream animal liberationism nor mainstream environmentalism has done a
very good job of addressing the impact of its agenda on issues of interhuman justice. In Chapter 5
I examine radical environmentalisms which have done exactly this. 1 will show that two of these
left-wing environmentalisms, deep and social ecology, have failed both the animals and
themselves by not addressing animal welfare directly. A third, ecofeminism, will be shown to have
done the best job of articulating a coherent critical position which addresses all three concerns:
environmentalism, vegetarianism, and social justice. Furthermore, in embracing all three of these
causes, ecofeminism shows how each can derive strength from the other two. It is a powerful
combination.
The bulk of the dissertation is critical, and that critical tone creeps into the conclusion as
well. There 1 discuss visions of a humane, just, and environmentally sound society. Callicott's
attempt to assimilate Midgleys Humean analysis of animal rights into a unified
environmentalist/animal liberationist ethic is analyzed and found wanting. Taylor's Kantian
system of environmental ethics suffers a similar fate. The principle of ahimsa is examined, and
Jainism is rejected as a universal prescription for human-animal interaction. Veganism comes
under critical scrutiny and is tentatively rejected. While these last three views lack nothing in
recommendations for ways in which humans and animals might live apart, I conclude that our
threefold agenda demands that we of the animal and environmental left give more attention to the
question of how humans and animals can live together, with humans flourishing in their peculiar
role as the animal that loves the other animals.
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1*3 A Note on Method and a Definition
Sometimes an argument is embedded in rhetoric and redundant phraseology. Sometimes
it is mixed in with other arguments. This can create confusion for the reader and sometimes is the
product of the writer's own confusion.
In order to avoid error and to reveal as quickly and elegantly as possible the rationale and
assumptions that go into the arguments I will be examining, I often present semi-formal
interpretations of those arguments. For example, if someone argues that vegetarianism is wrong
because the Bible grants humankind mastery over the world, we can represent the argument as
follows:
(1) The Bible grants humankind mastery over the world.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .'. It is morally permissible to kill and eat animals.
These semi-formal interpretations will always be formally valid. If the above premises are
true, then by the force of logic the conclusion must be true as well. There are a number of such
arguments in each chapter. In order to avoid confusion, the reader should keep in mind that any
mention of 'line one,' 'premise (2),' 'the third premise,' etc. always refers to the argument
immediately preceding the discussion.
One final note. In this dissertation, the word 'vegetarianism' is used in its normative
sense: vegetarianism= ethical vegetarianism= the view that the needless killing or eating of
animals by humans is wrong. There are problems associated with words like 'needless,'
'unnecessary,' etc. Those problems are discussed in Chapter 5 in the sections on deep ecology and
the feminist argument against vegetarianism.
CHAPTER 2
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION
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Barrd Callicott on The Main Reasons for Formulating an Inrerspecies F.thir’
J. Baird Callicott has made some of the most important and substantive contributions to
the literature of environmental ethics. Among philosophers he is undoubtedly and justifiably one
of the most famous spokespersons for environmentalism. However, those environmentalists who
are also concerned with animal rights might be disappointed with some parts of Callicott’s oeuvre.
Ever since the publication of 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' (Environmental Ethics, vol. 1
[1979], pp. 71-81) Callicott has either ignored or been concerned to refute animal liberationism.
This trend continues in his most recently published book. Earth's Insights: A Survey of Ecological
Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994), in which Callicott criticizes David H. Bennett’s animal liberationist take on Australian
aboriginal ethics and then goes on to say that ’one reason for formulating an interspecies ethic may
be to abate practices that Westerners like Bennett consider cruel, but that is certainly not one of
the main reasons for doing so. The main reasons for formulating an interspedes ethic are to
preserve spedes, which the world is losing at an abnormal rate, and more generally to abate
practices destructive of other aspects of the environment 1 (p. 182f). A debate about what the main
reasons for formulating an environmental ethic are is bound to be fruitless; after all, Callicott can
hardly argue that the concern for animal suffering would not be one of Bennett's main reasons.
The most Callicott can do is argue that Bennett's concern should not be one of the chief motivators
for an environmental ethic. What most caught my attention in this passage is the subtle manner in
which Callicott succeeds in distancing himself from Westerners like Bennett' on the issue of
cruelty. This, together with what immediately follows the passage, Callicott's approving
comparison of aboriginal ethics with Aldo Leopold's pro-hunting land ethic, convinced me that it
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might be worthwhile to go back to Callicott's earlier writings and systematically lay out and
critique the arguments this eminent environmentalist musters against animal liberationism.
2-2 Arguments against the Liberation of Domestic Animalc
Callicott argues against the liberation of domestic animals in his essay 'Animal Liberation:
A Triangular Affair.' In that essay he is chiefly concerned with refuting Peter Singer, a utilitarian
and perhaps the best-known proponent of animal welfare. I will show that the bulk of Callicott’s
objections are easily translated into the language of hedonistic utilitarianism, the theory which
characterized Singer’s position at that time (having since been replaced by a preference-
satisfaction theory). If Callicott's objections are good, then the utilitarian animal argument for
animal liberation—which pretends to maximize happiness—is plagued with a serious self-
contradiction. Oddly, Callicott never quite makes this latter point, although it is entailed in some
of his arguments. Never mind: Callicott's utilitarian objections to utilitarian animal liberationism
depend on false suppositions about the goals and consequences of the latter.
2.2.1 The Argument from Incoherence
Callicott's first argument does not involve hedonistic considerations. It is based on an
alleged conceptual error on Singer's part. Here is a brief formalization of the argument.
(1) It is literally meaningless to suggest that domestic animals be liberated.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .•. It is not the case that we must liberate domestic animals.
According to Callicott, domestic animals are not by nature free. They have no repertoire
of natural behaviors which humans are frustrating by, among other things, keeping them in
cramped cages, feeding them via conveyor belt, and hooking them up to milking machines.
Domestic animals are creations of man. They are living artifacts, but artifacts
nevertheless. ...It would make as much sense to speak of the natural behavior of
tables and chairs. 1
1
Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), p 30. All further citations of
Callicott in this dissertation refer to this volume, which includes reprints of his articles on Singer and Regan
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Callicott contrasts the situation of cows, pigs, etc. with that of caged wild animals. He
claims that the situation of the latter parallels that of black slaves in America. Both are/were
metaphysically autonomous...by nature if not by convention free beings capable of
ving on their own... [retainable] only by a continuous counterforce, and only
temporarily. But this is not true of [domestic animals]. They have been bred to
docility, tractability, stupidity, and dependency
.
2
In other words, the apparent external subjection of domestic animals merely mirrors what
has been internalized by them through breeding. There is in fact a perfect match between their
internal state (a human-enforced replacement of their natural state) and the external conditions in
which they live. To paraphrase Callicott, they are by both nature and convention unfree beings
incapable of living on their own. There is in a barnyard pig nothing to set free.
The second premise is based on the principle of 'ought implies can.’ We are never
obligated to do the impossible (or the ’meaningless’). If it is impossible to liberate domesticated
animals, then we are not obligated to do so.
We should be suspicious of Callicott’s justification of the treatment of domesticated
animals. Callicott’s reasoning implies that any immoral act of oppression might be rendered moral
by sheer dint of being continued over a long enough stretch of time, due to certain effects the
continuance of that action might have. The imprisonment of cheetahs is wrong, but if instead of
liberating the cheetahs we keep them captive and breed the species into docility, stupidity,
tractability, and dependence, then within a few dozen generations we will find that a program
which was at its outset morally reprehensible is now morally acceptable—that is, if we accept
Callicott’s reasoning. I do not mean to suggest that a course of action which is wrong at a time t
cannot be right at time t+n, due to changes in context. It seems likely that in the imaginary
cheetah case the action at t+n is different from the action at t for important intrinsic reasons. In
particular, the action at t+n involves not the continued captivity of wild cheetahs but of
2
Callicott, p 30
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domesticated cheetahs. The goal of the breeeding program is to render immediate ’counterforce 1
redundant. Does that redundancy render the final product morally acceptable?
Internalized, unfelt control by another can be unjust. Were I to be imprisoned and
permanently brainwashed at time t+n into stupidity, docility, tractability, and dependence, it does
not follow that my continued captivity is not unjust. Indeed, the contrary is fairly obvious.
Also, even if I cannot be 'cured,' it does not follow that my 'keepers’ may do with me as
they will. Given that many domesticated animals are stupid, docile, tractable, and dependent, it
does not follow that they do not have wants, instincts, and experience of the fundamental
pleasures and pains that are the lot of sentient beings. Therefore, until we breed consciousness
out of them we may cause them to feel disaffected by beating them, confining them, putting them
in unstimulating environments, etc.3 Therefore, all is not 'by definition' well with domesticated
animals.
This indicates that Callicott’s reading of 'liberation' is too restricted. There is no need to
lend the word the same meaning in the case of chickens as in the case of a caged cheetah. The
latter should be free in the most literal sense; perhaps the former cannot be free in the same way.
But that hardly means that we should not liberate chickens from the tiny wire cage, the sunless
warehouse, the conveyor belt feeding routine, the assembly line slaughter. In at least this sense
domesticated animals can be liberated, and so the first premise of Callicott's argument is certainly
false.
2.2.2 Five Arguments from 'Practical Impossibility1
After Callicott argues that the goal of animal liberation is incoherent he claims that it is a
’practical impossibility.'
4 He offers five scenarios to show that this is the case. I will point out at
the start that not one of these scenarios entails anything that I would call a practical impossibility.
3
Even if we were to breed consciousness out of them, it would not follow that any and all subsequent
treatment would be acceptable. Singer would take exception to this, but I agree with Callicott and others
that consciousness does not exhaust moral value See Chapter 4
4
Callicott, p 30
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Rather, they are descriptions of the disastrous consequences that would arise were animal
liberation to be carried out on a global scale. Obviously, if these animal armageddons are to be
relevant to the debate, the liberation upon which they depend must be practicable.
I will compress these five arguments into one, with the first premise of the argument
(pages 30-35) giving us what Callicott believes are the five possible outcomes attendant upon the
successful liberation of domestic animals, any one of which is supposed to be unacceptable.
(1) If domestic animals are liberated, then either
(i) they will suffer and become extinct, or
(ii) their feral descendants will compete with humans and indigenous
wildlife for food and living space, or
(iii) their care will require clearing more land and bringing it into
agricultural production with further loss of wildlife habitat and
ecological destruction, or
(iv) they will cease to be bred and raised and will be rendered
deliberately extinct, or
(v) the human population will explode, causing ecological
catastrophe.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .-. Domesticated animals should not be liberated.
I will summarize the reasoning behind each scenario, (i) Domesticated animals are
unable to take care of themselves. If they were all set free one day, then they would have trouble
finding food (especially during the winter) and taking care of their young. The result is a great
deal of misery (hunger) and finally extinction (starvation), (ii) Or, if enough do survive so that
they give rise to feral descendants like the mustangs, then such creatures will be ’exotics’ in
relation to indigenous life. They will disturb native wildlife and become agricultural pests, (iii)
But of course, these scenarios are what will happen only if we just let domesticated animals loose
so that they must fend for themselves. We might take it upon ourselves to care for them. In that
case the tremendous amount of agricultural production required to maintain feed stocks for
rapidly growing populations of heifers, longhorns, Rhode Island Reds, etc., will necessarily result
in a tremendous increase in the rate of forest devastation and extinction of wild species, (iv) Or
we might be the care-takers of domestic species while at the same time ceasing to breed them.
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This way we avoid ecological devastation, but at the cost of eventually killing off the domestic
varieties, (v) And no matter what policy we pursue with respect to disposing of the domesticated
animals, the vegetarian diet prescribed by animal liberationism would yield 'an increase in the
efficiency of the conversion of solar energy from plant to human biomass,'5 which would permit a
devastating increase in the number of humans and the burden that they represent on natural
resources.
We must ask whether Callicotfs scenarios exhaust the possibilities of human action. If
not, is there an acceptable alternative which does not entail the conclusion? And if the scenarios
exhaust the possibilities for human action, does Callicott paint a realistic picture of the
consequences of those actions? Finally, if he does succeed in so doing, are these consequences
truly unacceptable? Do they really prove to us that liberating domestic animals would be a
mistake?
Scenario (i) is probably too pessimistic regarding the ability of domesticated animals to
adapt to new environments. Many such animals know enough about what to eat to survive.
Grazing animals, for example, hardly need to be taught to eat grass. Furthermore, for a lot of
these creatures reproduction and the care of young are pretty much instinctual affairs. Nor is
there any reason to propose that such animals be set free in their current location, which might be
too cold during the winter were it not for the rancher's bam or henhouse. So, I propose we reject
this scenario and move on to scenario (ii), which is similar but takes into account these
considerations.
Scenario (ii) seems to me to be a fair prediction of what would happen if all the
domesticated animals of the world were literally set free. True, some species might not survive (in
which case scenario (i) would retain its relevancy), but this is a matter on which it is difficult to
speculate. No doubt many populations of formerly domestic animals would give rise to feral
descendants, and these would of course bring tremendous change to their environments.
?
Callicott, p 34
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But a viable and responsible alternative to simply opening up all the cages and bams is
readily available. The extent of environmental change can be controlled by releasing the animals
onto restricted areas—in particular, onto reclaimed areas. The combination of limited food
resources and an introduction of (endangered, indigenous) nonhuman predators would keep this
kind of animal liberation from being ecologically catastrophic. By pointing out this alternative I
have shown (in what I hope is more than just a trivial way) three things: that we can reject
scenario (ii), that Callicott's scenarios do not exhaust the possibilities, and that of the possible
alternatives there is at least one which does not entail ecological disaster and hence does not
suggest that we must reject animal liberation.
Of course, this alternative begins to look like the caretaker approach described in scenario
(iii). Callicott suggests that scenario (iii) follows (if animal liberation is correct) from human
duties 'accumulated over thousands of years, to continue to house and feed as before their former
animal slaves (whom they had rendered genetically unfit to care for themselves ).’6 But since we
have already questioned the suggestion that these animals really are so unfit, this duty does not
obtain. So we can reject scenario (iii) as well.
This brings us to the strategy of simply ceasing to breed and raise these animals. This
differs from the alternative I presented to scenario (ii) in that the intended result is the eventual
extinction of domesticated animals. More would be required than just setting the animals free; we
would have to achieve negative population growth, presumably as soon as possible. So the two
sexes must be separated or at least one of them sterilized. This strategy is hardly 'practically
impossible,' in the usual sense of that expression. Carrying out such a program would be
relatively simple. Persons who raise these animals already exercise control over their
reproduction; exercising that control in such a way as to achieve extinction is hardly unimaginable.
In Callicott's sense of ’practically impossible,' this strategy obviously has no ecologically
devastating consequences. On the contrary, given the fact that deforestation is largely carried out
to produce animal feed this strategy is eminently ecologically responsible. Finally, it entails very
6
Callicott, p 31
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little suffering on the pan of the animals themselves (the only negatives for their welfare being
the lack of opponunity to raise young and, for the last few animals, a lack of companionship).
Callicott calls this policy 'ironic' in that 'the beneficiaries of a humane
destroyed in the process of being saved .'7
extension of conscience are
Yet, the goal of animal liberation need not be the continuance of outlandish, sickly forms
like the Pekinese. There is an oddness in the expression, but we would indeed be doing all sickly
future animals a favor by preventing their existence. Even humans sometimes benefit from
compassion by being destroyed-as in the case of those who seek the services of Dr. Kevorkian.
Ironic? Perhaps. But that tells us nothing about whether Kevorkian's practice is morally justified
or not. Irony is not a measure of injustice. I conclude that scenario (iv), being neither ecologically
destructive nor otherwise morally objectionable, is a viable policy. Its possibility renders
Callicott's argument suspect.
However, even if there are available to us two animal liberation strategies which do not
involve a gross amount of environmental damage being done by the animals themselves or on
their behalf (e.g, clear-cutting for the production of feed crops), there is still the question of
scenario (v). Scenario (v) is not an alternative to (i) through (iv) but rather attaches to each as an
integral part of the animal liberation program. If Callicott is correct when he argues that the
universal adoption of a human diet would itself result in ecological devastation, then it does not
matter, environmentally, which strategy we adopt with respect to disposing of domestic animals
themselves. Environmental ruin will surely be visited upon a vegetarian humanity.
Callicott s vision of an exploding population of vegetarians depends on viewing humans as
cogs in a vast biomass-conversion machine. The situation is much more complicated than this.
First of all, no matter what the diet of a given culture, the potential afforded by the earth does not
directly translate into human biomass because the distribution of non-human biomass as food for
humans is governed by complex economic relationships. Some people (the homeless) are starving
in the middle of the com belt and some (government officials and owners of capital) are thriving
7
Callicott, p 31.
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in the Horn of Africa. The potential afforded by the earth also does not directly translate into
human biomass because patterns of reproduction vary with economic and social conditions. It is
considered a truism at this point that reproductive rates in societies where women are able to take
advantage of educational and vocational opportunities tend to be lower than the same rates in
societies in which women are barred from education and careers. Indeed, I find it rather
implausible to suppose that my friends would all have had (on average) more children if everyone
in the world were vegetarian. I have witnessed the deliberative nature of their approach to having
children and Family Planning clinics are evidence that they are not unusual in so doing. I
suspect that Callicott would come to the same conclusion about his own friends. Why then does
he have this bleak outlook? I believe it is because we tend to buy into stereotypes about third-
world reproductive patterns without thinking about the conditions in which actual families live,
the way food is procured, the mortality rate among young people, etc.
Furthermore, even if Callicott could convince me that the dedication of arable land to
beef-destined grain was an effective population control, I would fail to why that practice should be
continued. War, heart disease, cancer, AIDS, and automobile accidents are all proving to be
especially effective population controls. I hardly expect to hear that Callicott has been lobbying to
end attempts at their eradication. Also, nothing prevents animal liberationists from adopting a
holistic strategy combining animal rights with the kind of traditional socialist program which, in
providing the same kind of education and career opportunities for everyone that Callicott and I
have enjoyed, will prove a much more effective population control than the current sacrifice of
grain to beef cattle.
I conclude that premise 2 is false. Interestingly, although Callicott couches his criticisms
of animal liberation and vegetarianism in ecological terms
—
presumably to persuade us that we
really do value the environment, and its destruction is an unacceptable consequence of including
animal welfare in the utilitarian calculus—he could easily have framed those criticisms in
traditional utilitarian terms. He might have argued as follows: Utilitarian animal liberation has as
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its theoretical goal the maximization of human and animal happiness. Its practical program would
inevitably frustrate that goal (because ecological devastation is painful for both animals and
humans). Therefore, animal liberation is hopelessly self-contradictory. I have already given
reasons to reject the second premise of even this argument. However, with a little work it might
yet be a strategy worthy of an environmentalist's attention.
23 Arguments against the Liberation of Wild Animals
As Callicott points out in his 'Review of Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights,' Regan is
Singers chief internecine rival in the field of animal welfare ethics.'8 Callicott's review is of
interest for two reasons. First, it gives him a chance to address Regan's deontological approach to
animal liberation, an appeal to rights rather than to utility. Also, and in contrast to his criticisms
of Singer, Callicott here concentrates on animal liberation as it applies to wild, rather than
domestic, animals.
Callicott begins with a brief summary of Regan's view.
According to Regan..., only those animals who have ’inherent value' have rights.
And only those who meet the 'subject-of-a-life criterion' have inherent value. To
be a subject-of-a-life involves, among other things, being self-conscious and
having the capacity to believe, desire, conceive the future, entertain goals, and act
deliberately. 9
Callicott believes that wild animals do not have rights. He employs the following reductio
(pp. 44 through 46) to make his case against Regan.
(1) We ought to protect humans' rights not to be preyed on by both human
and animal predators.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .'. We ought to protect animals' rights not to be preyed on by both human
and animal predators.
The first premise is supposed to not be very controversial and not particularly tied to
Regan's philosophy. Measures should certainly be taken to prevent humans from being food for
8
Callicott, p 39.
9
Callicott, p 39f.
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sharks, bacteria, etc. Premise 2, on the other hand, is supposed to reveal an 'Achilles heel’ in
Regan s expansionist strategy. If a human's right to be protected from predators is based on the
fact that she has inherent value,' then any being with inherent value must be granted that same
right. And if it is appropriate for us to protect the human's right, it is incumbent upon us to
protect the animal s right also. The animal is no different in the relevant respect. But that
conclusion seems ridiculous when we envision it in practice: forest rangers policing the woods
and keeping cougars, grizzlies, and wolves from feeding themselves (as Callicott notes, only
Sapontzis has come out in favor of such practices). If the conclusion of the argument is absurd,
and the first premise is common-sensical, then premise 2 must be false; yet Callicott would claim
that anyone with the rights-view is committed to it. Therefore, the rights-view must be wrong.
There are two ways to get Regan out of this muddle. First, we could try to show that the rights-
view does not entail the second premise. Second, we could try to show that the first premise is
false. I will do both.
Regan attempts to extricate himself out of premise 2 by advocating a policy of self-
determination for the animal 'nations.' Callicott offers no direct challenge to this strategy (instead
he settles for scoring a point with respect to Regan’s ironical use of Henry Beston's phraseology).
It is a not-uncommonly held view (to pursue the 'nations' analogy) that the United States has an
obligation to defend its citizens but none to protect the citizens of other countries 1 except in
unusual circumstances (and there is certainly nothing implausible about supposing that we might
in unusual circumstances have an obligation to protect a prey-animal, for example a member of an
endangered species). Similarly, we each have a prima facie obligation to protect our families from
harm, and a weaker obligation to protect the families of others. However, the weaker obligation
to protect other nations and families does not come with a greater license to do unnecessary harm.
So there seems to be nothing implausible about self-determination for animals, a policy which
respects the rights of predator and prey animals alike. This policy is compatible with the rights
view, so the rights view does not entail premise 2.
1
This is not to say that this view is correct
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Furthermore, I would argue that the first premise is false. Certainly we fellow-humans
ought to protect each other from being preyed on, but that can be true without our having a right
not to be preyed on. Humans have a right not to be preyed on by other humans, and with respect
to non-human predators we have a right to our fellow humans’ protection. However, this latter
nght is not grounded in a right to not be preyed upon by those same non-human predators. My
reason for rejecting the existence of such a right is simple. I believe that any right that a being X
has it has with respect to some being Y (X and Y may be identical, for I have a right to consider my
interests with at least as much regard as I consider the interests of others). Furthermore, Y must
be possessed of a degree of moral responsibility—a degree that most animals do not possess.
Therefore, most animals are not beings with respect to which I have a right not to be killed and
eaten.
Callicott explicitly rejects this view:
From the subject-of-a-life’s point of view his or her rights are equally and
indifferently violated upon being killed and eaten whether 'those' who do so are
human hunters or wolves. Regan's answer is that animals are not moral agents
and so can have none of the same duties moral agents have, including the duties
to respect the rights of other animals. The wolves who eat the caribou do no
moral wrong, though the harm they cause is real enough’ (p. 357). This answer is
not adequate. A wolf is an agent, not a natural force like a tidal wave or an
earthquake, since, as a mammal, it has all the capacities Regan claims for subjects-
of-a-life, though perhaps it is not a moral agent. An agent's moral competency is a
relevant consideration in redressing his or her offense, but it is not a relevant
consideration in protecting a patient's rights....
Imagine the authorities explaining to the parents of a small child
tortured and killed by a certifiably brain-damaged sadist that, even though he had
a history of this sort of thing he is not properly a moral agent and so can violate
no one's rights, and therefore has to be allowed to remain at large pursuing a
course of action to which he is impelled by drives he cannot control. 11
I am somewhat mystified by Callicott's motives in pointing out that the wolf is not like a
tidal wave. If a non-moral agent can violate one's rights 'from the subject-of-a-life's point of view,'
why not a non-agent? It is incumbent upon Callicott to answer this question. The usual
conception of moral agency is bipartite and exhaustive: there are moral agents and nonmoral
agents, and every agent is (at least with respect to a given act) either one or the other. Most adult
1
1
Callicott, p 44f.
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humans are moral agents; most animals are not; no tidal wave is a moral agent, although every
tidal wave is an agent ('one who, or that which, exerts power upon something and produces an
effect'
1
).
Callicott introduces a tripartite distinction: moral agents, nonmoral but rights-violating
agents, and nonmoral, non-rights-violating, nonagent, natural forces. He excludes the tidal wave
from the class of agents, and grants the wolf rights-violating agency by virtue of its being a
subject-of-a-life (something like a person). However, I fail to see how this distinction is relevant
to what Callicott asserts in the first sentence. If Callicott is right, and the issue of whether a
subject
-of-a-life's rights have been violated is one that is settled by consulting that subject's 'point-
of-view,' then it is itrelevant whether the violator is a moral agent, a nonmoral rights-violating
agent, or a non-rights-violating, nonagent, natural force. Callicott does not explain how
information about the violator would change what happened from the subject-of-a-life's point of
view. Without that explanation (and I cannot think of a plausible one myself), he cannot object to
premise one of the following argument, which I believe refutes his view regarding the rights-
violating abilities of wolves:
(1) If (la) a wolf can violate the rights of a subject-of-a-life from the subject-
of-a-life's point of view, then (lb) a tidal wave can violate the rights of a
subject-of-a-life from the subject-of-a-life's point of view.
(2) — (lb).
(3) ~(la).
Callicott s mistake rests on a confusion over the dual uses of the term 'agent' in
philosophy. Sometimes it has the use described above; sometimes, though, it means 'a self
(person, ego) who is capable of deliberate action.'" In the first sense, a tidal wave is an agent; in
the second sense, a tidal wave is not an agent. A wolf is an agent in both senses of the term, but
the second definition, like the first, does not imply anything about moral agency. A human is an
agent in both senses of the term, and is also a moral agent.
1
Angeles, p 5.
2
Angeles, p 5
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Callicott also oversimplifies the role of government in protecting its citizens. Here is a
formalization of the argument implied in the second paragraph.
( 1 ) If insane killers do not violate their victims' rights, then they should not
be locked up.
(2) Insane killers should be locked up.
(3) Insane killers do violate their victims' rights.
Callicott fails to persuade us that fine one is true. He claims that the reason insane killers
should be locked up is that 'if they remained free in society and continued to behave as before,
they would certainly violate the rights of other people.' 14 This merely assumes what is at issue.
Not every danger that the government proteas us from is a threat to our rights, and the
justification for locking up an insane killer need not go any deeper than that he or she is a danger
to other citizens—not to those citizens' rights. The justification for locking up an insane killer is
little different than that for eradicating smallpox or relocating any large, wild predator that
wanders into a suburb. The citizens at risk have a right to expea that administrative bodies will
take care of this danger to their lives, but this right is not grounded in some other right anyone has
against the smallpox virus or a wandering alligator (a common enough occurrence in my
hometown). Premise 1 is false. Insane killers should be locked up not for the reason that they
violate their viaims' rights, but for the simple reason that they do kill their viaims and may do so
again. To paraphrase Callicott, the moral competency of the agent is not a relevant consideration
in proteaing the patient.
Callicott believes that Regan's deontological approach to the liberation of wild animals
would prove in praaice as ecologically disastrous as Singer's utilitarian approach to the liberation
of domestic animals. Also similar to Callicott's attack on Singer is the availability of an argument
from self-contradiction: if we attempt to respea the rights of individuals, disastrous consequences
will ensue involving the ultimate violation of those very rights. Again, though, the argument goes
14
Callicott, p 45
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unnoticed by Callicott. And again it is just as well: we shall see that his arguments from
supposedly disastrous consequences are as unsound here as before.
In response to Regan's suggestion that environmentalists adopt his approach in order to
argue for the rights of the inanimate members of the biotic community Callicott argues the
following (p. 43).
(1) Respecting the rights of the individuals that make up the biotic
community would not preserve the community.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) We should not respect the rights of the individuals that make up the
biotic community.
Callicott offers the following by way of an explanation of (1):
If the right of individual whitetail deer to live unmolested were respected, the
biotic communities which they help to make up would not be preserved. On the
contrary, without some provision for 'thinning the herd’—a euphemism for killing
deer
—
plant members of some communities would be seriously damaged, some
beyond recovery...Perhaps [Regan] means that if the rights of each individual of
every species were simultaneously respected, then the community would be
preserved. But to attempt to safeguard the rights of each and every individual
member of an ecosystem would be to attempt to stop practically all trophic
processes beyond photosynthesis—and even then we would somehow have to
attempt to deal ethically with the individual life-threatening and hence rights-
violating competition among plants for sunlight. 15
I have already laid down the groundwork for my objection to Callicott's first premise. If
whitetail deer have a right to live unmolested, it is a right they hold against moral agents only. So
the presence of nonhuman predators in their community would be both an ecologically and
morally acceptable solution to the problem of overgrazing. 16 Construing premise 1 where
'individuals' includes even such things as plants is a bit more complicated. However, it is
important to see, again, that if plants have rights, those rights cannot be violated by most non-
human animals, which are typically not moral agents. And, of course, there is a life-threatening
15
Callicott, p. 43.
16
Seeing as how it is a right they hold against us, are we obligated to not introduce nonhuman predators into
their habitat (which would be a human action resulting—deliberately, no less!—in their being killed and
eaten)? I think not Not re-introducing predators would have bad effects for the deer—effects which are
traceable back to human activity (predator extermination, land development, etc ) in the past Also, the
predators themselves have rights against us which are similar to those of the white-tailed deer Their current
bad state is a also traceable back to human activity
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but no rights-violating competition among plants. Nor do wild animals and plants have a right to
our protection from other wild animals and plants. So, from a rights point of view, our obligation
to respect the rights of each individual member of the biotic community does not suggest a policy
of protecting those individuals from each other. Hence, line one seems to be false.
Callicott has failed to make the case against animal liberation. However, in attacking it he
never challenges the most fundamental terms of the debate. At best he offers utilitarian objections
to utilitarian arguments and deontological objections to deontological arguments. We must still
examine his positive theory of environmental ethics. It is possible that, in making the case for a
more radical approach to environmental ethics, he can sell us on a different scheme for evaluating
the relationship between humans and non-humans, one in which hunting and meat-eating are
acceptable. But that will be examined in Chapter 4. For now, let us turn to another Leopoldian
with still more arguments against animal liberation.
2.4 Rolston: The Argument from the Definition of 'Rights'
Holmes Rolston III is another prominent environmentalist opposed to animal liberation.
His articles have appeared in a number of anthologies, and he is the associate editor of
Environmental Ethics, the world's leading journal on the subject. Rolston devotes the second
chapter of his book Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988) to arguments against animal liberation. Some of these arguments
are similar to those of Callicott. Both authors follow in the footsteps of Leopold and have
essentially the same program: a defense of the environment linked to a defense of hunting.
Rolston's arguments can be broken down into arguments from the definition of 'rights' and
arguments from naturalistic axiology.
This first argument from the definition of 'rights' is derived from page 5 1
:
(1) Animals do not have rights.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) /. Animals should not be liberated.
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Rolston first explains what rights animals do have if they have any rights at all:
A citizen has a legal right to vote, assigned in laws. But we also think that natural
rights exist, regardless of law. Innocent persons have a natural right not to be
killed, no matter whether they have court access. Good laws should recognize
natural rights. Few legal rights have been assigned to animals (though there are
laws about animal welfare), so animal rights would seem to be natural rights...
When we say that persons have natural rights, we mean that there are
certain values in personality (characteristics in the nature of personhood) that
warrant protection with rights and that laws in culture ought to reflect these...But
if we take persons off the scene entirely, in the wilderness the mountain lion is
not violating the rights of the deer he slays. Animal rights are not natural in the
sense that they exist in spontaneous nature. Rights go with legitimate claims and
entitlements, but there are no titles and no laws that can be transgressed in the
wilderness
.
17
In the latter part of this passage Rolston seems to confuse natural rights with legal rights.
After all, the issue in natural rights is not whether there are 'no titles and no laws’ but whether
there should be such titles and laws (legal rights). So the fact that there are no titles and no laws
that can be transgressed in nature is irrelevant to the question of whether there are natural rights
in nature. Still, as I indicated in my criticisms of Callicott, I agree with Rolston that animals in the
wild do not (usually) violate each other's rights (exceptions might be found in other intelligent
and highly socialized species). This does not rule out the possibility that animals have rights
against humans. Rolston recognizes this but is not willing to grant that these would be natural
rights.
Any such rights emerge only with actual intervening in ecosystems. Such an
interruption-generated right would be artifactual, stronger than a legal right,
binding independently of law, but not natural . 18
Unfortunately, Rolston is rather unclear about just what it is that does make a natural
right natural. Elsewhere he seems to say that even natural rights are not really natural, being 'a
cultural discovery, really a convention, that works well to protect values associated with persons in
culture, [but] is not translating well to duties in an ecosystem .'
19
Perhaps the following remarks
are meant to illuminate what he is getting at:
17
Rolston, p 47f.
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It does seem odd to say that the [beached] whales had a right to [euthanized]
mercy killing or that the [beached] dolphins had a right to be nursed back to
health and then released, or that the seals and porpoises had a right to be
rescued. Ducks, dolphins, whales—we seem to be treating animals differently
from persons. We would at once say that persons had a right not to be shot at all
[the reference is to the banning of lead pellets for duck hunting; the lead can
poison a merely wounded duck]; a right to be warned of an impending flood; a
nght to be rescued, medically treated, and released; perhaps even, if doomed to
die, a right to a painless death.
211
The reason it seems odd to say that the seals and porpoises had a right to the beneficent
treatment mentioned is that it is odd to say that even a human has a right to such treatment. The
issue of what sorts of rights and duties attach to charity is notoriously difficult. Where people do
have such rights, those rights are held with respect to other persons, and not necessarily with
respect to all persons. Rights might also have to be indexed with other factors, such as time and
place. Right now I am typing at my desk in my apartment: There is nothing odd in asserting that
while the people living in my building have a right to my assistance in the event of a fire breaking
out two minutes from now, the people living in a similarly hazardous building in the next town do
not. And while it might be a matter of some controversy whether a beached pilot whale has a
right to be rescued by beachcombers, I think it should be less controversial to assert that it does
have a right not to be taunted and climbed on and treated like a tourist sight. We should not let
the problems of the rights of charity worry us out of a belief in animal rights.
Of course, not everything that looks on the surface like an act of charity really is. Rolston
discusses (p. 550 a controversy regarding a migrating antelope herd whose winter range may
have been reduced by human development. Should we or should we not supplement the available
food supply? Rolston writes: 'If human intervention, and not just the forces of natural selection,
are causing the deaths, that does seem to make a difference in the welfare claim.' But I would say
that it changes the very nature of the claim, which is not in the former case a welfare claim but a
claim of rectificatory justice.
I can only say that I see no substantial argument, only suggestive remarks and repeated
insistence, on Rolston's part for the claim that animals have no natural rights. And because he,
20
Rolston, p. 50
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like Callicott, does not consider that rights might have a fundamentally indexical character he
overstates the practical implications of our recognizing such rights inhering in nonhuman lives: 'If
all suffering introduces rights or welfare claims when moral agents come on the scene, a really
consistent animal ethics will dislike predation and seek to eliminate it.'21 What such an ethic will
dislike is, perhaps, predation generally, but especially human predation; what it will seek to
eliminate is human predation; and this is because the rights introduced when moral agents come
on the scene are rights with respect to those moral agents. Predatory animals will share in such
rights.
2.5 Arguments from Axiology
A more interesting argument, and one which is tied more intimately to Rolston’s general
theory of environmental ethics, takes as its starting point the rather startling claim that it is good
that animals kill and eat each other.
(1) Non-human predation is good.
(2) If (1), then (2b) human predation is good.
(3) If (2b), then (4).
(4) Animals should not be liberated.
As usual, one must search carefully through Rolston's platitudes to find a coherent
rationale for his premises. Rolston's most explicit justification for line one seems to be on p. 57:
Our attitude toward predation is not just that it is practically difficult to remove,
or that removing it is an impossible ideal. We [for 'we' read 'I, Rolston'] would
not want to take predation out of the system if we could (although we take
humans out of the predation system), because pain and pleasure are not the only
criteria of value, not even the principal ones...In the trophic pyramid the
omnivores and carnivores regularly and necessarily capture values by imposing
pain on others.
Meanwhile, predation does not all that obviously increase suffering. Slow
death by starvation or disease is not more pleasant than nearly instantaneous
death by tooth and claw. Predation prevents overpopulation from the surplus of
young and culls the aged and diseased.
21
Rolston, p. 56
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That killing has instrumental value for both the predators and the prey populations is not
in dispute. But the question is not 'is predation instrumentally good?', but 'is predation
intrinsically good?’ As an answer to this question the immediate material benefits of hunting will
not do; even murder has its rewards. Although Rolston has trouble keeping these two questions
distinct, he does have a naturalistic axiological principle that he thinks supports line one (p. 58):
In the struggle for life, for adaptive fit, many individuals will be losers; their
welfare must be sacrificed to predators or competitors. That is not satisfactory to
these individuals; their preferences are not satisfied. But we humans who observe
this system find such a system, where many natural kinds are interwoven into a
web of life, satisfactory [good?]—not just in the sense that we tolerate it but that
we see how it yields a flourishing of species, manifest in individuals.
It may seem unsatisfactory that innocent life has to suffer, and we may at
first wish for an ethical principle that protects innocent life...Ought suffering to
continue when humans do or can intervene in nature? That it ought not to
continue is a tender sentiment but so remote from the way the world is that we
must ask whether this is the way the world ought to be in a tougher, realistic
environmental ethic. A morally satisfactory fit must be a biologically satisfactory
fit. What ought to be is derived from what is.
Rolston’s macho posturing aside, predation is good, he seems to be claiming, because
predation happens. It is a biological reality, and in the realm of nature moral principles are
governed by biological facts. If it happens, it is good. This is the upshot of Rolston's nakedly
naturalistic ethics. I will save debate on this principle for Chapter 4; for now I would just like to
earmark it and move on to the second premise.
That the goodness of nonhuman predation provides a justification for human hunting
seems to be implied in the Rolston's remarks above to the effect that humans ought to implicate
themselves in the suffering that is found in the day-to-day operations of the nonhuman natural
world. The real issue, though, is the relationship between human hunting and 'biologically
satisfactory fitness.’ Human hunting behaviors are a morally satisfactory fit, according to Rolston,
because they are a biologically satisfactory fit. Is that plausible?
First we must ask what makes a behavior a biologically satisfactory fit? Is it that it
contributes to the survival of the species? Or is it that it does not contribute to the decline of the
species? Some behaviors have nothing to do with species survival. Others have nothing to do
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with species survival now, or perhaps may even be somewhat deleterious, but may be species-
savers in the event of a sudden change in environment (geological cataclysm, introduction of new
predators, etc.)- Likewise, behaviors that are advantageous now may be disadvantageous later.
As I will show in the next chapter, time will prove to make trouble for naturalistic ethics.
Suppose we grant that a biologically satisfactory fit just is a behavior that contributes to
the welfare of the species. Still nothing follows ethically unless we have already accepted
Rolston's naturalism. Surprisingly, if we have accepted Rolston's ethics, it then follows that
vegetarianism should itself bear the naturalistic stamp of approval, since there is every indication
that a balanced vegetarian diet is the most healthful. It would indeed seem odd for a naturalistic
ethic like Rolston's to endorse behaviors that contribute to human heart disease and cancer.
Because Rolston has overlooked this aspect—the effect of hunting on the welfare of the
hunter
—
premise 2 falters. Some nonhuman predation is good for some nonhumans; it is not good
(or, not as good as vegetarianism) for humans. One could also appeal to issues of character. Kant
is famous for having asserted that cruelty to animals is wrong because of the bad effects it has on
the character of the people involved. Regan makes a similar argument for the case against eating
what he would say are non-sentient animals. While these concerns may not make an airtight case
for vegetarianism, they raise issues that are peculiar to humans and in so doing cast doubt on the
claim that if nonhuman predation is good, then that is all we need to know to conclude that
human predation is good.
Another argument of Rolston's appeals to an axiological principle which is probably more
peculiar to his theory than is his general 'is to ought' approach. It is hinted at in the first premise
of my formalized version of his argument (p. 81f).
(1) The eating of animals by humans does not destroy values.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .'. Animals should not be liberated.
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The acceptance of premise one depends on Rolston’s claim that 'the eating of animals,
though it does destroy values, reallocates such values when humans gain nutrition and pleasure at
the sacrifice of animal lives.'22 This follows from Rolston's general picture of the axiology of
nature. He views the food chain as a ’trophic pyramid' (p. 82 and elsewhere) with carnivores at
the top not only in terms of diet but in terms of value. Humans of course are at the very top (the
system, Rolston tells us, is ’anthroapicaT). What happens when a wolf eats a caribou is that the
lower values of caribou life are transformed into the higher values of wolf life.
In nature, the pain-pleasure axis is not the only spectrum of value; indeed, it is
not the highest value in either human or nonhuman life. It might be said, for
instance, that knowing the meaning of life is more important for humans than
leading a painless life, that a life with courage and sacrificial charity in it, which
requires the presence of some pain, is a richer life than one without it. Similarly,
the evolution of a world with carnivorous mammals, primates, humans, and
culture is a richer world than one without them, and the presence of pain seems
to have been necessary for such evolution. In that sense, advanced values are
frequently built on suffering.
22
The reason such a world is richer is that 'lower organisms do not express the richness in
potential in the ecosystem as fully as do higher ones.'24 The point here seems to be that, while
organisms such as plants have value, organisms such as cheetahs have more value because they
have a wider behavioral repertoire: they locomote and perceive as well as eat and grow. But the
higher value which attaches to the lives of more complex organisms depends on the lower value of
less complex organisms.
We cannot admire ecosystems until we see them as places of value capture. ..One
can admire a peregrine falcon's flight or the gait of a cheetah, but locomotion
takes high energy funding. Muscles, nerves, and brains depend—several trophic
rungs down the pyramid—on plants (99.9 percent of the biomass) that soak up
the sunlight.
25
A human who can eat and take an education has more interest in eating than does
an elk, since all the ’upstairs’ values depend on the ’downstairs’ value.
26
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Thus, Rolston views predation as a simple transformation of the value attached to the prey
arnrnal mto the higher values associated with the predator animal. While this notion might be
metaphysically difficult, I would like to set aside those problems and instead address a
mathematical problem and a problem with Rolston's view of the food chain.
First, if it is true that the value associated with an eaten Thompson's gazelle is not
destroyed but rather is transferred and transformed into a higher value attached to the cheetah
who ate it, then a cheetah is a remarkably valuable creature indeed. Adult cheetahs are solitary
hunters. Suppose that a cheetah eats six gazelles each year. Suppose that the average cheetah
lives to be fifteen years old. If you do not find it problematic to conclude that a cheetah is nearly
eighty times more valuable than a gazelle, then consider the case of the great white shark. A
typical great white, besides eating voracious amounts of fish, will eat a number of seals and
dolphins. Are the values adhering to its penniped and cetacean victims transferred and
transformed into higher values associated with the great white shark?
This seems unlikely, and the case of the great white reveals the fundamental problem in
Rolston's picture of what we might call axiological transformation in nature: the theory seems to
have been based on a profoundly questionable hierarchical picture of the food 'pyramid.' As any
grade-schooler knows, the 'highest' forms are almost invariably eaten by some of the 'lowest'—and
not always after they have died of 'natural' causes. If we buy into Rolston's theory of ’value
capture,' what are we to say about such incidents? Perhaps they are tragic exceptions. Yet that
would not be, to borrow Rolston's own phraseology, a 'tough' or 'realistic' view.
All of these difficulties arise because Rolston views animals (including humans) as mere
vessels of value (a grizzly’s killing and eating a fawn should be 'seen simply as a value capture
within the wilds’27 ). This view is reminiscent of Singer's picture of animals as vessels of pain,
pleasure, and preference (see Chapter 4). What happens when an animal is killed is more than
just a trade-off of the value of the life of the prey for the value of the life of the predator. An
27
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individual has been erased from existence. And when a human being unnecessarily kills and eats
another animal, the minuses of greed, callousness, and gluttony must be factored into the
equation. To see how Rolston overlooks the significance of individual lives one need only read his
explanation of what is wrong with cannibalism:
Humans do not eat other humans because such events interrupt culture; they
destroy those superior ways in which humans live in the world. The eating of
other humans, even if this were shown to be an event in nature, would be
overridden by its cultural destructiveness. Cannibalism destroys interpersonal
relations. But in nature no such relations obtain, or can obtain. 28
These remarks point out another weakness in Rolston's scheme to elevate hunting. He
and I seem to share a common view: predation is more acceptable as the value of the creature
eaten is lower in proportion to the value of the creature doing the eating (it is better for me to eat
a chicken than a human; it is better for a shark to eat a tuna than a dolphin). On the basis of this
underlying principle, Rolston should embrace vegetarianism as the most efficient transformation of
lower values to higher values that humans can effect.
Imbedded within Rolston's remarks on page 83 is a somewhat different argument against
animal liberation:
(1) A world with carnivorous mammals is better than one without.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) .’. Animals should not be liberated.
First, it must be noted that premise 2 is true only if a world with more carnivores is better
than one with less, for the goal of animal liberation is not to eliminate all carnivores but to
'eliminate' one species of carnivore, Homo sapiens (by changing its diet).
Second, premise one has two readings, but I shall argue that neither will save it from
falsehood.
It might be read to mean something like the following: All other things being equal, a
world in which some of the animals (in particular, some mammals) eat other animals is better
28
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than a world in which none of the animals eat each other. Unless this is the case for the intrinsic
value of predation, it depends on the claim that predation is indeed intrinsically valuable. But that
is a difficult case to make. And 1 do not feel inclined to believe that a comparison of two such
worlds yields a judgment in favor of the world in which animals are run down and tom to pieces
in front of their fellow animals' eyes; a world in which prey animals know fears that are not known
in the other; a world in which the only pleasures differing from those in the other are the
pleasures of the hunt and the pleasures of the escape... Is the world without predators lacking?
Rolston himself refers to predation as a 'sad good,’ a 'painful good.' Aren't happy goods and
pleasurable goods better? If Rolston is right, then the best thing we could do for the inhabitants of
a predator-free world is teach them how to hunt, kill, and eat each other. But enough of this
absurdity.
A more reasonable reading of premise one goes something like this: All other things being
equal, a world with complex, intelligent, social animals is better than one without, and as a matter
of biological necessity complex, intelligent, social animals are carnivores. Therefore, a world with
carnivores is better than one without. That reading of line one is more reasonable, but it is also
false. Elephants, gorillas, and vegetarians are complex, intelligent, social animals, and they are
not carnivores.
Finally, we come to the following argument, which is hinted at on p. 91:
(1) For humans to kill no animals at all is in utter disharmony with the way
the world is made.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) The animals should not be liberated.
I will not dwell on the fact that vegetarians, too, are part of the world If it goes against
our inclinations (the way we are 'made') to needlessly kill and eat other animals then it goes
against the way the world is made, too. Rolston doubtlessly means that it goes against the way
the rest of the world is made. Still, he gives no argument for line one. He, like Callicott, is fixated
on the fact that some animals kill other animals for food. However, if humans' failure to kill and
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eat other animals is in utter disharmony with the world is made, then so are the eating habits of
elephants and gorillas.
Line two depends on the supposition that we are obligated to act in harmony with the way
the world is made. With that 1 have no quarrel, but admittedly it is a rather vague claim. What
does it mean? Perhaps it means that we are obligated to act in such a way as to mirror all the
natural activity we see around us. There is some plausibility in this inasmuch as people are
inclined to admire many kinds of animal behavior: the fidelity of the swan, the community of the
elephant, the merciful hunting methods of the tiger. At first glance this interpretation would seem
to support the idea that we should be omnivores, incorporating every kind of diet into ours and
hence maximally imitating the world around us. But this interpretation is untenable, for it saddles
us with the obligation to mirror every other kind of behavior as well, not just those associated with
eating. It is impossible for humans to behave in every way like every other animal, one paradox
being that eating everything that other animals eat would result in imitating no animal extant. So
this interpretation of acting in harmony with the way the world is made' must be rejected.
I believe that to act in harmony with the way the world is made is simply to act in a way
that is compatible with a healthy and beautiful world. This interpretation has the virtue of not
saddling us with the obligation of imitation for imitation's sake. Also, it does not commit us to an
a priori claim that animals themselves act in this way (it must be admitted that animals can be
environmentally destructive) . In the light of this interpretation of ’acting in harmony with the way
the world is made,’ line two is false. I have already pointed out in my comments on Callicott that
animal liberation is indeed compatible with a healthy and beautiful world.
CHAPTER 3
ORIGINS AND INDIANS: MORE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION
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lston and Hettinger: The Argument from the Past
In this chapter I am going to criticize arguments which appeal to indigenous or ancestral
lifestyles as evidence for the moral permissibility (or even the moral necessity) of hunting. I begin
with an argument that appears in Hettinger's article Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental
Ethics: Bambi Lovers versus Tree Huggers' (Environmental Ethics 16: 3-20, Spring 1994).
Hettinger subscribes to Rolston's views on environmental ethics. Rolston has written that 'the
rules for [eating animals] come from the ecosystems in which humans evolved,’ 1 but the most
straightforward argument from a Rolstonian view of human origins occurs on pp. 13-14 in
Hettinger (it seems to be derived from a combination of claims in Rolston's book and in his private
correspondence with Hettinger):
According to Rolston, we would not have evolved into human beings without the
evolution of the human mind and hand to hunt; if our ancestors had remained
herbivores, he suggests, there would have been no human culture. Thus, Rolston
holds, hunting and eating meat affirms human nature by participating in a process
that made us what we are. To reject our predatory history and still try to value
the human being isolates a product from its essential historical genesis. Rolston
repeatedly insists that the products and process of natural history are interrelated
in such a way that it is inappropriate to value the former and not the latter.
Furthermore, he argues, when the process that produces a product is essential to
the understanding of what that product is, one cannot consistently affirm the
value of the product while denying the value of the process that created it. One
might as well try to value the culture of Native American plains tribes while
rejecting their tradition of killing buffalo for food, clothing, and shelter.
Here is a line-by-line presentation of what I take to be the argument:
(1) If humans' ancestors had not hunted animals and eaten meat, humans
would not have evolved.
(2) If (1), then (2b)hunting animals and eating meat affirms human nature.
(3) If (2b), then (4).
(4) . .Vegetarianism is morally wrong (hunting animals and eating meat are
morally obligatory).
1
Rolston, p 8
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Premise 1 looks like a straightforward empirical claim needing no further explication
except for the word 'ancestors.' Does the term 'ancestors' refer to all biological ancestors of
humanity? Certainly not-there was no meat in the primordial sludge. Given Rolston’s views on
how the human hand and mind developed, 'ancestors' should probably refer here to some
relatively recent group whose hunting behavior can be credited with contributing in a relatively
direct way to the flexibility of the human hand and the honing of the human mind. Even given
that there might have existed such a group, there is another issue-a non-empirical issue-which
must be resolved, and of which Hettinger is aware:
One can imagine beings very much like us who came into existence without a
predatory past. However, if we assume that the basic features of a species'
evolutionary history are essential to what that species is, then these beings would
not be human. Viewed as responses to openings in ecological resource
relationships (’niche fillers’), species (including Homo sapiens ) are essentially tied
to their evolutionary history. 2
In other words, humans are by definition descendants of hunters and meat eaters, and
descendants of hunters and meat eaters would not have evolved if those prior hunters and meat
eaters had not existed (as hunters and meat eaters).
What does affirm mean in premise 2? Nothing in my dictionary or thesaurus seems to be
relevant. It seems to mean either 'indicates approval of or 'perpetuates.' This makes sense
inasmuch as Hettinger and Rolston's complaint seems to be that vegetarianism rejects or
transmogrifies human nature. The idea seems to be that since our ancestors' hunting and meat-
eating was an evolutionary precondition for humans as they exist today, to hunt and eat meat is to
participate 'in a process that made us what we are.' This participation is at the same time a
perpetuation of that process. Furthermore, participation in and perpetuation of that process serve
as indicators that one approves of the product (in this case, human beings) of that process.
Premise 3 condemns the hypocrisy of vegetarianism. Assuming that vegetarians value
human life, they act hypocritically by refusing to perform the actions which are dictated by a
2
Hettinger, pp 13-1 4n
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positive evaluation of humanity, it is incumbent on anyone who claims to value humanity that she
participate in and perpetuate the process which made all this (herself especially) possible.
Hettinger claims that the condemnation of human participation in predation by animal activists
suggests a hatred of nature;'3 his argument here indicates that it suggests as well a hatred of
humanity and self.
Now to the objections. First, Rolston's views on the relevance of hunting behaviors to the
development of the human hand and mind are suspect, and Hettinger would do well to investigate
the matter on his own He depends on Rolston for his information, and all Rolston has to say on
the subject is 'hunter-gatherer cultures are the earliest known.’4 As of this writing,
paleoanthropologists tend to believe that both of these adaptations have a close link to defensive
mechanisms, but nowhere have I read that hunting behaviors were also important in this regard.
If Rolston's theory held any water, one would expect for hunting behaviors to dominate among
other intelligent, opposable-thumbed animals—i.e., the rest of the primate family—yet they do
not. Furthermore, a species genetically, phenotypically, and behaviorally identical to Homo
sapiens could certainly have evolved without a predatory history. Hettinger's denial that they
would have been humans on purely definitional grounds is unconvincing-at least, until he can
show that the expressions ’essential' and 'essentially are doing some real work in his explication of
the concept of 'species.'
5
The plausibility of the second premise depends on (a)there being some one agreed-upon
thing (perhaps a collection of properties) called 'human nature’ and on (b)an equivocation
between human nature and human ancestors' nature.' I can see how doing what the ancestors of
humans did might 'affirm' those ancestors' nature, but I do not see how it would affirm human
nature—unless our nature were already like theirs with respect to the activity in question. If the
1
Hettinger, p 3
4
Rolston, p 80
I must take exception to Hettinger's explication —I do not understand what it means to say that a species is
'essentially tied to' past events both temporarily and genetically distant (its evolutionary history), nor do I
understand how that conception is supported by the notion that species are 'responses to openings in
ecological resource relationships.' What does 'essentially' mean in this context"7 What does 'tied to' mean"7
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activity in question were hunting, and we really were like then, in that respect (that is, were we
hunters like them), we would not be having this argument. I do no, know that there is any
agreement between myself and Hettinger regarding what human nature' is, and Hettinger would
have to explain how the property of 'Wiling other animals needlessly and eating their flesh' is a
part of it.
Premise 3 runs into that human nature problem again. The assumption is that, if hunting
and meat-eating affirm human nature, then refraining from these activities rejects human nature.
This assumption depends further on an especially narrow understanding of human nature, one
which includes strict adherence to past policy.
The idea that the past is somehow morally privileged dooms this argument from the
beginning. If Hettinger and Rolston are right in believing that 'when the process that produces a
product is essential to the understanding of what that product is, one cannot consistently affirm
the value of the product while denying the value of the process that created it,' then it seems that
since we value Elie Wiesel we should value the holocaust. Or, since I value my young socialist
friends who grew up in the former DDR I should value World War II and the Honecker regime.
That would be ridiculous.
The moral privileging of the past would have at least two more absurd consequences.
First, it would allow past generations to dictate the duties of future generations. Our adoption of
any given way of life (including, please note, vegetarianism) could, by virtue of that way of life
being the process that creates and molds future generations, have the effect of making it
incumbent upon those future generations to do as we do. Besides being an absurd consequence
for ethics, the resulting stagnation (assuming that most people do their duty) would also be
unfortunate for human development. Second, by making our duties dependent on what was done
before, it leaves philosophers like Rolston and Hettinger in the unfortunate position of having
their ethical views be refutable by new information about the past. Hence, we can imagine an
updated edition of Rolston's Environmental Ethics in which he argues that, since (we are
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supposing) new paleoanthropological finds indicate that the first humans subsisted on a diet of
nuts and berries, we must do the same. (A similar problem haunts Callicott's argument, as we will
see.)
3.2 Callicott: The Argument from the 'Savage'
Callicott argues that we must follow Leopold's prescription to reevaluate 'things unnatural,
tame, and confined in terms of things natural, wild, and free,’6 and that this
means, among other things, the reappraisal of the comparatively recent values
and concerns of "civilized" Homo sapiens in terms of those of our "savage"
ancestors....Savage people seem to have had, if the attitudes and values of
surviving tribal cultures are representative, something like an intuitive grasp of
ecological relationships and certainly a morally charged appreciation of eating
[my emphasis]. 7
Calhcott concludes that this reappraisal will reveal that the most morally responsible diet
consists of wild animals and wild plants—i.e., the traditional food of hunter-gatherer societies.8
Achieving that diet and lifestyle requires 'a shrinkage...of the domestic sphere;. ..a recrudescence of
wilderness and a renaissance of tribal cultural experience.'9 Here is a semiformal interpretation of
Callicott's argument:
(1) We should reevaluate things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms of
things natural, wild, and free.
(2) If (1), then (2b) we should reevaluate the values and concerns of
'civilized' human society in terms of the values and concerns of 'savage'
human society.
(3) If (2b), then (4).
(4) .‘. We should eat nothing but wild animals and wild plants.
Let's consider each premise in turn. In line one (and thereafter) Callicott is not simply
suggesting, by the expression 'reevaluate in terms of,' that natural things become the units in terms
of which we measure the value of unnatural things. After all, whether you evaluate, in the closing
6 Quoted from Leopold, p 9
7
Callicott, p. 34
8
Callicott, p 36
9
Callicott, p. 34
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days of 1994, the American dollar in terms of the Mexican peso (6) or the peso in terms of the
dollar (1/6), you still get the result that a dollar was six times as valuable as a peso. What
Calhcott means, of course, is that a natural thing x is more valuable than an unnatural thingy-
perhaps to the degree that x is more natural thany. Continuing in this train of thought, a wild
thing is better than a tame thing, and a free thing is better than a confined thing. By ’better’ or
'more valuable’ I mean (as I am sure Callicott does) 'intrinsically better' or 'of greater intrinsic
value' (intrinsic value being the kind of value that is not determined by usefulness). So, when
comparing the intrinsic values of wolves and poodles, we get the result that wolves are of greater
intrinsic value than poodles because wildness is better than tameness, freedom is better than
confinement, and naturalness is better than unnaturalness. We should probably note that an
operating assumption implicit in the premise is that our evaluations have been upside-down, so to
speak. We have been assuming not only that poodles are better than wolves, but that tameness is
better than wildness, confinement better than freedom, and unnaturalness better than naturalness.
The reevaluation Callicott is calling for requires a transposition of those evaluative assumptions.
The assumption in the second premise is that human society can be divided into two
kinds, ’civilized' and 'savage.' Making this division is tricky. On the face of it, the premise implies
that the values and concerns of civilized society are unnatural, tame, and confined, whereas the
values and concerns of savage society are natural, wild, and free. Now, what it would mean for a
value to be natural I am not at all sure. Perhaps what Calhcott means is that the things (and
qualities) which civilized society values are unnatural(-ness), tame(-ness), and confined(-ness).
Or perhaps he means that, since savage society is more natural than civilized society, its values
and concerns—whatever they might turn out to be—are better and should be emulated by the
civilized. Since it might be fair to say that what it values and is concerned with defines, in part,
any given society, the last two proposed interpretations might be practically equivalent: 'civilized'
society values and is concerned with things that are unnatural, tame, and confined; 'savage' society
values and is concerned with things that are natural, wild, and free.
The assumption in the third premise is that whether a human society values and is
concerned with things that are natural, wild, and free is a function (in pan) of the extent to which
wild animals and wild plants are eaten by members of that society. A hunting-gathering culture
which values and is concerned with eating wild animals and wild plants is more natural, more
wild, and more free than an agricultural, vegetarian culture (a culture that values and is concerned
with eating domesticated plants) and therefore is better. I am not sure whether the 'freedom' to
which Callicott refers translates, in the case of humans, to anything like political freedom. More
likely, the three words ’wild,’ ’natural,’ and ’free’ are simply evocative expressions referring to a
single property.
I have already discussed, in Chapter 2, some of the problems associated with the sort of
naturalistic axiology appealed to in the first premise. In this chapter I concentrate on questions
raised by premises two and three. Assuming that there is a tenable distinction between 'civilized'
and 'savage' societies, does the Leopoldian preference for the 'natural' over the 'unnatural' translate
into a prescription to adopt the diet of the so-called 'savage?'
There does seem to be a problem with drawing the distinction in terms of each society's
'values and concerns.' After all, 'civilized' society must be concerned with and value things natural,
wild, and free inasmuch as these are the raw materials for manufacturing things unnatural, tame,
and confined. 'Civilized' society might even intrinsically value things natural, wild, and free but
sacrifice them in order to manufacture things of greater instrumental value. It might be more to
the point to drop the comparison of 'values and concerns' and instead simply compare the people
or groups of people or cultures themselves. This alters the argument somewhat, but I believe it is a
change which Callicott would not consider unfair, for he also writes:
Leopold's prescription...does not stop...with a reappraisal of nonhuman domestic
animals in terms of their wild (or willed) counterparts; the human ones should be
similarly reappraised.
10
"'Callicott, p. 34.
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Callicott suggests not only that we should become more wild than we axe, but that we
once were more wild and some of us are more wild than others. These wilder people serve as
models which the res, of us should emulate. So who were/are these ’wild counterparts' in terms
of which 'we' human domestic animals should be reappraised?
Remarks of Callicott's such as the following in Part IV (’American Indian Environmental
Ethics’) of In Defense of the Land Ethic indicate that he is ready to offer up Native American
cultures as examples of the kind of ’savage' societies we should emulate:
I thus represent a romantic point of view; I argue that the North American
savages were indeed more noble than ’civilized’ Europeans, at least in their
outlook toward nature.
Callicott regards Native Americans, and indigenous peoples generally (what he calls
'surviving tribal cultures’), as natural, wild, and free phenomena of the son that Leopold approves.
Their environmental practices exhibit 'traditional patterns of human-nature interaction.' 12 With
this in mind, we can reformulate (2b) to read: ’...we should reevaluate Euro-American culture in
terms of Native American cultures’ (although any indigenous group will do).
I argue that Callicott cannot successfully appeal to Native American culture as evidence of
a blanket moral justification for hunting. I will offer two rather simple and even uninteresting
criticisms of his argument 1 '1
. The next section of this chapter begins with an analysis of what I
think is the deeper and more troubling problem with his argument: his conception of Native
Americans.
First, our revision of (2b) entails at least one important and questionable assumption:
Callicott is, in effect, asking us to buy into assumptions reminiscent of the Tylor-Redfield
’classical, unilinear evolutionary paradigm of culture’:
Two relevant corollaries of this theoretical posture are, first, that contemporary
nonliterate nonWestem societies are ’primitive’ in the literal sense that their
cultures closely resemble the cultures directly ancestral to contemporary
11
Callicott, p. 177.
12
Callicott, p. 94.
13
1 will forego the point that many indigenous cultures practice agriculture (com, for example, has been bred
for so many centuries that its origins in the wild are a matter of some dispute among botanists). Callicott
would no doubt argue that indigenous cultures which practice agriculture are not as natural as those which
do not
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civilizations and, second, that there exist universal
cultures at a given stage of development. 14
features that characterize all
Calhcott and coauthor Overholt do not make it clear what they think of this paradigm 15
.
m CaSe
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Callicott 's seem to demand that we consider as our model of humans'
proper ecological niche a specific kind of human culture which cannot, I argue, claim the title of
being the first, the original, human culture-at least, not without evidence which I do not think is
forthcoming anytime soon. Were the original humans omnivores? Three problems here are the
sparseness of the fossil record, the difficulty of deciding who will count as that first human culture,
and the difficulty of figuring out which patterns of behavior (so far as they can be determined
from the evidence) were natural and which were unnatural innovations. The success of Callicott’s
argument depends not only on this latter distinction but also on our being able to classify any
human activity as either one or the other.
If the original humans were actually herbivores, and meat-eating was introduced as a
cultural innovation, then we must drop the reference to Native Americans in the revised (2b), and
(3b) becomes: ’...we should eat nothing but wild plants.’ There is no reason to suppose that it is
more probable that humans always ate other animals. On the contrary: throughout our
biosphere s history hommids have been notoriously ill-equipped to bring down almost any sort of
arumal, or small. It is fair to ask if human hunting began with the development of certain
social structures and/or tools (weapons). It is no good speculating that perhaps the original
humans, like todays chimpanzees, ate easy prey like ants; this supposition will not support the
kind of big game hunting that Callicott wants to defend, since the latter activity may just be an
unnatural augmenting of the former—the ’fact' the humans ate ants would not justify the eating of
anything else, if we take Callicott's naturalism seriously. These questions—who will count as the
first humans, and was hunting a cultural innovation—become even more problematic in light of
14
Overholt and Callicott, p 5.
On p 9 they write: 'From the biological point of view there are no necessarily universal cultural
characteristics distributed species-wide, nor necessarily any distinctly primitive cultural universal as the
panprimitivists suppose.' The context, though, makes it unclear whether they are expressing their own view
or that of Dobzhansky
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Callicott's liberal views (with which 1 agree) regarding where (i.e, among which sorts of animals)
culture exists. The following remarks, together with the facts of human evolution, hint at the
problems faced in any attempt to specify the first human culture:
In the more flexible, more rapidly changing processes of cultural evolutioninformation is inherited by means of social communication, which among animalsmay take many different forms. Predatory animals, for example, veTofte^eachtheir young to hunt by demonstrative methods. Facial gestures, bod? languageand vocalization convey important "cultural" information among primates. 16
§ ’
Even if we grant Callicott the point that such a culture can be identified somewhere in the
human past, premise (3) of his argument is still weak. We would not have a model of proper
human ecological behavior outside of those areas in which the species originated. An ecological
mche is not just a diet; a creature's ecological niche is better thought of as a many-dimensional
volume in which the dimensions describe not only what the creature eats but also the geographic
and temporal locations of this and all the rest of its activities. So, for example, if we buy into the
concept (I do not, but Callicott must) of a ’proper’ ecological niche, then we find that a giraffe by
definition cannot fill its ’proper’ ecological niche in North America because it has none in that
particular place even if it could survive here. Similarly, human behaviors at a given place and
time will not serve as a model for such practices at all places and all times. To use a science-
fictiony example: Suppose that there is abundant life on Mars, and people want to go five there.
What is the morally responsible diet for humans on Mars, if we take 'morally responsible diet’ to
mean, after Callicott, the diet that the first humans ate’? The answer is not Martian animals, nor
is it Martian plants (perhaps the two categories would not even apply). Anything humans do on
Mars will of necessity be completely ecologically innovative—and the same was true of the first
Maori to sail to New Zealand six hundred years ago. If Callicott's argument were to succeed, then
it would prove too much—not only would we be morally obligated to stick with the diet of our
ancestors, but we would be morally obligated not to emigrate. Hence, not only would the Maori
16
Overholt and Callicott, p 8
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have been wrong to hunt the Moa to extinction,- but they would also have been wrong to eat
anything outside of their traditional Eastern Polynesian diet, and wrong even to have left home.
y do I offer these simple criticisms based on mere biological considerations? Because
Callicotfs argument is burdened by two assumptions which together make it the case that he
cannot help bu, approach the Native American as an almost strictly natural' phenomenon upon
which to construct an easily refuted naturalistic argument against vegetarianism. He weds the
Leopoldian formulation of the problem of environmental ethics with the assumption that
worthwhile study of Native American culture in this regard is exhausted by the study of how those
cultures conceptualize their immediate experience with non-human nature.
33 Native American Linguistics and Narratives
As noted above, Callicott believes that indigenous peoples are possessed of a sort of
intuitive grasp—versus rational or scientific knowledge-of their environment. Callicott devotes
part of his book to Native American thought, but what is the content of that thought? The answer
is indicated by the title of one of his essays, ’American Indian Land Wisdom' 18 (my emphasis).
Callicott invites us to consider certain conceptualizations of nature as definitive of the indigenous
persons experience as indigenous person. Nowhere does he make this more clear than in his
suggestions for tackling what he calls 'the uncertainties of the descriptive ethnological approach to
the verification of the hypothesis that there existed some sort of environmental wisdom among
traditional American Indians' 19—emphasis (mine) on the past.
His first suggestion is that we investigate historical documents which lie as close as
possible to the 'documentary horizon' (Native Americans' first appearance in written history). This
method is based on the two assumptions (1) that Native American wisdom is exhausted by certain
definitive conceptualizations of nature and (2) Native encounters with nature are more limited
now than they were in the past. These suggest the conclusion that Native wisdom is trapped in
Assuming that they did, and that they did not have a good reason for doing it.
18
Callicott, pp. 203-219.
19
Callicott, p. 212
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the past hence CaWcott’s endorsement of the historical approach, an approach predicated on the
further assumption that readier access to Native American wisdom is available through European
invaders of centuries ago (the source of any documents at the horizon) than through Native
Americans living today.
Callicott’s second suggestion is that we analyze Native American languages. There is no
denying the immense value of linguistic analysis to cross-cultural philosophical enterprises, but
Calhcott, by narrowly focusing on Native encounters with nature, cheats himself out of the
potential that lies within this method.
Overholt and I undertook a reexamination of HallowelTs analysis of Ojibwa
semantic categories with an eye to applying them to the question of an Ojibwaland wisdom. According to Hallowell, the formal Ojibwa linguistic distinction
etween animate and inanimate (analogous to gender distinctions in Romance
languages) does not cotrespond to scientifically informed Western intuitions. For
exmnple, some stones (flint), certain kinds of shells (the megis shell of the
Midewiwm for instance), thunder, various winds, and so on, as well as plants,
animals, and human beings fall into the animate linguistic class. Further, the
'
category of person, according to Hallowell, is not coextensive with the categoryhuman being in Ojibwa semantic distinctions as it is in English and other modem
Western languages. Animals, plants, stones, thunder, water, hills, and so on may
be persons in the Ojibwa linguistic organization of experience.20
Callicott then goes on to claim that this personhood of non-human entities is naturally
attached to their being included in social relations and hence being of ethical concern. However,
these considerations will not suffice for an understanding of Native American environmentalist
ethics. Nor will they go very far as an explanation of why those ecological attitudes and practices
are so different from those of Euro-America. It is all too evident that my acknowledgment of your
personhood is no guarantee of my treating you equitably nor even of my believing that I should.
Callicott seems to think otherwise, as is again indicated in his comments on Lakota
culture:
To speculate briefly on other Plains cultures, if the Lakota world view familiar to
everyone from Black Elk Speaks survives critical scrutiny, then the Sioux pictured
nature as more like a vast extended family than a congeries of societies. Such a
world view appears to be corroborated by the Lakota mythic materials collected in
the 1890s by James R. Walker. An environmental wisdom is certainly immediately
inferablefrom such a representation [my emphasis] but it would not be very
20
Callicott, p 214
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Callicott’s characterization of his remarks here as 'brief speculation' is puzzling since
according to the method he employs in explicating Ojibwa land wisdom’ his work on Lakota
environmentalism is almost done, if we do not need an account of Ojibwa inter-human ethics in
order to understand Ojibwa environmentalism (we need only know that non-humans can be
persons, too), then we should not need an account of Lakota family relationships in order to
understand Lakota environmentalism (we need only know that non-humans can be family
members, too).
Callicott's descriptions of Native 'land wisdom' suffer from a lack of content, and I believe
that this lack arises in part from a failure to appreciate fully the material (and especially the
social) contexts in which Native environmentalist beliefs and practices appear. I am no
sociologist, but I suspect it would be a similarly hopeless task to understand western
environmentalist destruction without investigating western interhuman relationships, including
economic relationships and their competitive structure. I suspect that the same holds true for the
environmental destruction in eastern Europe; one must understand the dynamics of interpersonal
relationships (including economic relationships), concepts of interpersonal rights and obligations,
the traditional Marxist attitude toward nature, and the dynamics of bureaucracy. If we focus
exclusively on a culture s conceptualizations of nature, then we can only pretend to understand
that culture's relationship with the environment.
If all I seem to be doing is pointing out an oversight of Callicott's, I suspect that Callicott
would deny this and deny that material considerations are essential in these kinds of investigations
(although he does admit now and then their usefulness). Callicott explicitly subscribes (p. 20 in
Overholt and Callicott) to Stephen Tyler's conception of culture, given on p. 3 of the latter's
Cognitive Anthropology.
It is assumed [in cognitive anthropology] that each people has a unique system
for perceiving and organizing material phenomena—things, events, behavior, and
21
Callicott, p 216.
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emotions (Goodenough, 1957). The object of study is not these material^~a lhe,n'elves. the way they are organized in the minds of men.
material phenomena!
m phen°mena; ***« «*»“« organizations of
All of the cognitive anthropologist's eggs are in the taxonomical basket. No doubt I should
leave it up to the anthropologists to decide what makes a culture a culture, but I cannot restrain a
naive urge to question the fruitfulness of any project which aims to understand a culture
exclusively through what comes down to (at least in Callicott’s case) linguistic analysis. If the
anthropologist does not know anything about the material experiences of a culture, how much can
she claim to know when she claims to know how those material phenomena are organized in the
minds of the participants in that culture?
Parenthetically, we can see a similar problem haunting claims such as the following in
Overholt and Callicott’s book, Clothed-in-Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an Ojibwa World
View (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982):
[Ojibwa] narratives certainly reflect and affirm a fundamentally economic
relationship between human persons and animal, plant, and mineral persons.
Animals, plants, and minerals are not, however, rightless resources, as is the case
in Western economic assumptions. They are as it were trading partners with
human beings, and are pictured as profiting, from their own point of view, from
exchange with human beings.22
No one who has read or heard these Ojibwa narratives will deny the contrast with
Western economic assumptions, but neither can we deny a similar contrast between some
traditional English and German narratives (just break open your dusty copy of Grimm's) and
Western economic assumptions. The information about a culture available in a culture's
narratives, when not supplemented with knowledge about the material existence of the members
of that culture, is limited. Speaking for myself, I do not find the Ojibwa narratives so different
from some of our own in the appearance of animal persons, the moral content, and the use of the
narratives in 'the child's enculturation by elders.'23 This similarity accounts for the fact that an
audience of Ojibwa listeners reacted positively, rather than expressing puzzlement, when John
22
Overholt and Callicott, p 155
23 Mary B Black-Rogers, in Overholt and Callicott, p xv
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Rogers—Chief Snow Cloud—regaled them with the story of Red Riding Hood. 24 Furthermore, it
is difficult for the uninformed reader to know just how the moral lessons within the tales might
differ (in this case, with respect to ethics and the environment) from the moral lessons in English
and German tales. It seems to me that knowing the moral of a story one has never heard before
reqmres at least some idea of the direction in which the storyteller is inclined to go. It is easy, I
think, for a non-Indian to find morals in Indian stories not very different from those told in non-
Indian society. This should not be mistaken for a claim that the Ojibwa regard their tales in the
same way Euro-Americans regard, say, the story of the Three Billy Goats Gruff. Whether the
Ojibwa stories are regarded as fact or fiction, and whether that distinction is of any consequence
to the listeners, are examples of the kind of deep and interesting questions that remain. I only
suggest that the tales themselves are not terribly strong evidence for the foreignness of Ojibwa
culture nor even for an Ojibwa environmental ethic—although I do believe that, once someone
knows more about the actual living conditions and material relationships of the Ojibwa, she will
be convinced on both counts.
3.4 The Rest of the Storv
I think that the fixation on Native American cultures' ecological activity—when those
cultures are regarded at all—is all too common in Euro-American culture. Typically, non-Indians
are possessed of images of that activity: the phenomenon of subsistence hunting of buffalo by
Plains cultures is widely known, and of course there is the 'weeping Indian' image of the 1970s
environmentalist campaign. We also have images of the Native relationship with white America:
'the first Thanksgiving,' the Little Big Horn, Wounded Knee, leaders like Chief Joseph and Sitting
Bull, and, yes, even John Wayne movies. Such images—whether veridical or dangerously
mythological and even racist—of these two facets of the Native American experience almost
exhaust the non-Indian's conception of all that is Indian. For many non-Indians the Indian is a
two-dimensional cartoon. What is missing, or at best is uncommon, is a third kind of image: that
24
Rogers, p 124f.
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of Native American relationships with each other. While there are such icons as the 'chief; the
squaw; the 'papoose,' and the brave,' there is a paucity of images-real or imagined-of activity
and attitudes within the community.
It is easy for a distortion of, or over-emphasis on, the first image to arise in the absence of
the third. A classic case of this was the 'weeping Indian' television ads of two decades ago: a
Native American man in traditional dress surveys environmental havoc. A tear runs down his
cheek. The image should be ambiguous, but it is not. It should cause us to consider both the
destruction of his environment and the destruction of his people, but it does not. We should think
for a moment that he might be weeping in memory of all the cultural destruction that was
predicated on land theft and environmental recklessness—the destruction of people and
interpersonal relationships, the disease, the genocide, the boarding school terrorism, the theft of
language, alcoholism, unemployment, etc.—but we do not. No, we see immediately that the
Indian weeps because white people don't pick up after themselves. This advertisement is
representative of the way in which environmentalism has marginalized the Indian.
Hettinger's claim (already noted above) that vegetarians cannot 'value the culture of
Native American plains tribes while rejecting their tradition of killing buffalo for food, clothing,
and shelter' is another example of how environmentalists over-emphasize the first image (the
ecological image) at the expense of the third (the social image). Hettinger is relying on the
assumption that buffalo consumption is the be-all and end-all of Plains cultures.
The lack of a more holistic appreciation of Native American society endangers even the
kind of direct cross-cultural research which Richard Brandt engaged in for his book Hopi Ethics.
Brandt makes an error which complements Callicott's: he goes directly to the source—the Hopi
themselves—but with absolutely no appreciation of the general metaphysical and evaluative
principles underlying the ethical judgments of the Hopi he was studying. Hence he does not know
what to make of Hopi (as well as Navajo) disregard for domesticated sheep and dogs when Hopi
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respect for animals and nature was otherwise evident. Consequently, he cannot help but see a
contradiction where there is none . 25
I do not mean to disparage the value of the analysis of language and narratives. It is, for
example, interesting and probably instructive that Native creation myths diverge from our own
the way they do. In Indian creation myths we see a characterization of the given world order
fundamentally different from that most common in the west; unlike the product of egoistic and
paternalistic gods of the Bible and of Greek myth, the Indian world is often seen as the product of
a very positive, collaborative, creative effort:
As [Earthmaker and Coyote] floated along, they saw something like a bird's nest.
"Well, that is very small,” said Earthmaker. "It is small. If it were larger, I could
fix it. But it is too small. I wonder how I can stretch it a little! What is the best
way? How shall I make it larger?" So saying, he prepared it.
When all the ropes were stretched, he said, "Well, sing, you who were the
finder of this earth, this mud! ’In the long, long ago, Robin-Man made the world,
stuck earth together, making this world ." 1 Then Robin sang and his world-making
song sounded sweet. After the ropes were all stretched, he kept singing; then,
after a time, he ceased.
Then Earthmaker spoke to Coyote also. "Do you sing too," he said...
Then Earthmaker sang..., until by and by he ceased. "Now," he said, "it
would be well if the world were a little larger. Let us stretch it!"-"Stop!" said
Coyote. "I speak wisely. This world ought to be painted with something, so that
it may look pretty. What do you two think?"....26
Navajo myths tell of the emergence of First Man and First Woman from the lower worlds
to make this world a good one for the Navajo. 2 ' The Lakota story of creation is concerned with
the councils of the elemental gods (Rock, Sky, and Earth—Inyan, Skan, and Maka) as they
collaborate together on the make-up of the world . 28 The role and value of cooperative behavior
here is starkly different from that evident in the Theogony. There, cooperation merely serves (is
25
Reichard attributes Hopi maltreatment of such animals to 'contempt for a non-contributing, hence
despised, form of life' (Reichard, p 143)—The vast majority of dogs in a Hopi or Navajo community are not
working dogs. Sheep are only a little more respected because 'they furnish the daily meal' (ibid ). Sheep can
be contrasted with wild animals in that the former have very little power of their own, living entirely as they
do off the care of humans Therefore, we should not be too surprised to see them and other domesticated
food animals, as well as dogs, presenting something of a challenge to Hopi values, which have their
foundations in an egalitarian view of the responsibilities that humans and animals share—foundations to
which Brandt is oblivious.
26
Roland B Dixon, Maidu Texts (American Ethnological Society), IV, p. 4ff cited in Radin, p 239f
27
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subservient to, competition, as in the 'pattnersWps' of Gaia md Kronos (against Ouranos); Gaia,
Rheia and Zeus (against Kronos); Zeus, Kottos, Briateos and Gyes (against Kronos); Gaia and
Typhoeus (against Zeus); and of course the whole Olympian pantheon (against the Titans). The
Hesiodic view of a malevolent earth begins a tradition continuing through Thucydides (see the
Melian Dialogue) and Plato (see Callicles' speech in the Gorgias), further still through Hobbes, up
to Spencer and Nietzsche and beyond: the propensity to see nature as, in Tennyson’s phrase, ‘red
in tooth and claw’-i.e., a vicious competition. This seems to be in contrast with the spirit of
these Indian creation myths. Likewise the Indian myths contrast with the Biblical world of a God
jealous of his immortality and his knowledge, and humans who immediately fall into deceit and
murder.
But we need more than this. Having criticized Callicott for not exhibiting an appreciation
of the material facts involved in Indian environmental ethics, I will undertake in this section to
give just a few examples of the kinds of information which, wedded to what he says about Ojibwa
and Lakota language, give a better indication of the nature of Indian environmental ethics-in
particular, an indication of how it is part of an ethics which includes duties to other human
persons.
3.4.1 Ojibwa Persons
Even Hallowell, the source of much of Callicott's information on Ojibwa linguistics,
recognizes a gap between linguistic taxomonies and ethics:
The entire psychological field in which [the Ojibwa] live and act is not only
unified through their conception of the nature and role of 'persons' in their
universe, but by the sanctioned moral values which guide the relations of
’persons.'^
9
A concrete example of Hallowell’s holistic approach is his explication of the role of
grandfathers. Knowing that the Ojibwa regard some non-human entities as 'grandfathers’ does not
tell us much about the Ojibwas relationship to those non-human entities until we know something
2>
Hallowell, p. 386.
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about the role of grandfathers in Ojibwa society. As it turns out, grandfathers have a powerful and
positive role:
The kinship term grandfather'... is not only applied to human persons but to
spiritual beings who are persons of a category other than human. In fact, when
the collective plural our grandfathers' is used, the reference is primarily to
persons of this latter class. ...Furthermore, both sets of grandfathers can be said to
be functionally as well as terminologically equivalent in certain respects. The
other-than-human grandfathers are sources of power to human beings through
the 'blessings they bestow, i.e., a sharing of their power which enhances the
power of human beings. A child is always given a name by an old man, i.e., a
terminological grandfather. It is a matter of indifference whether he is a blood
relative or not. This name carries with it a special blessing because it has
reference to a dream of the human grandfather in which he obtained power from
one or more of the other-than-human grandfathers. In other words, the relation
between a human child and a human grandfather is functionally patterned in the
same way as the relation between human beings and grandfathers of an other-
than-human class . 10
Given Callicott's general point that some non-humans count for the Ojibwa as persons,
what other features of interhuman relationships in Ojibwa culture might help us to get a grip on
Ojibwa environmentalism? For one thing, the Ojibwa seem to share with other Native American
cultures an emphasis on the value of sharing—which seems to be more than just supererogatory:
When my friend Chief Berens once fell ill he could not explain it. Then he
recalled that he had overlooked one man when he had passed around a bottle of
whiskey. He believed this man was offended and had bewitched him. Since there
was no objective evidence of this, it illustrates the extreme sensitivity of an
individual to the principle of sharing, operating through feelings of guilt .
31
There is also a marked identification of self with community:
Strangers, when they met, always asked one another, 'Waenaesh k'dodaem?’
(What is your totem?); only afterwards did they ask, 'Waenaesh keen?' (Who are
you?) The question and answer reflected the nature and importance of the
individual and corporate sense of identity...When asked of their identity men and
women might answer 'Zaugee,' or 'Zaugeewinini,' meaning i am of the People of
the River Mouth,' or 'Pottawotomi,' which means 'I am of the People of the
Keepers of the Fire,' or 'Menominee—I am of the People of the Wild Rice'... 32
That identification of self with community is consistent with the way in which the desires
of the community take precedence over the leadership, rather than the other way around.
The act of leading is without compulsion. The followers follow freely and are at
liberty to withdraw.. ..A leader is chosen by consensus for his foresight to lead the
30
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way In the exercise of leadership, a leader did not act upon his own initiative
th™“f
rS that concerned the community, he was expected to seek and rely upon
commvX“
COnSiStinS °f ‘he 'eading me" and WOme" °f the
Just as a war leader had no control over the outcome of a battle, neither had hemuch control or authority over his warriors. By custom he asked and invited
warnors to join his expedition. The warriors invited could either refuse or accentA sufficient number of warriors subscribing to the war party to ensure success wasa form of permission; too few accepting was a form of denying permission 34
The fact that the Ojibwa regard some non-humans as persons should not lead us hastily to
conclude that the Ojibwa have an environmentalist outlook. If that is all we know, then we as yet
have no case against the hypothesis that they might yet be laissez faire capitalists, dedicated
Hobbesians like Ayn Rand. In that case the Ojibwa society would be an environmental nightmare.
This would seem not to be the case-although the point of researching Ojibwa inter-human ethics
is not to find out that there is such a thing as Ojibwa environmentalism (there are far less oblique
methods), but to understand Ojibwa attitudes toward the environment (and maybe even our own)
much better.
3.4.2 Lakota Families
Whether some person A's recognition that some other person B is related to her will have
any particularly remarkable effect on A's attitude toward B is an open question. Different cultures
place different amounts of significance on the various sorts of family relations. So the fact that the
Lakota regard all living things as related will not settle the question 'what is the nature of Lakota
attitudes toward the environment?' However, that fact might take on a much greater significance
when put alongside information about what the Lakota regard as proper treatment of even the
most distant of relatives.
I knew a well-educated Indian who had come back to his reservation after
working for many years in a big city. With his life savings he opened a cafeteria
and gas station. All day long the cars lined up. “Hey, Uncle, fill her up. I can’t
pay, but you are rich; you let me have it free.” And the same thing over at the
33
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cafeteria: “Say, Uncle, let me have one of them barbecued-beef sandwiches Don’tbother to wnte up a bill for a relation of yours...”
He couldn’t say “no” to a poor relative, and the whole reservation wasjust one big mass of poor relatives...We aren’t divided up into separate, neat littleanuhes Pa Ma kids, and to hell with everybody else. The whole damn tribe isone big family; that s our kind of reality .'1
I once heard of an Indian who lost a leg in an industrial accident. He got about
fifteen thousand dollars in insurance money. In no time his place was overrun
with more than a hundred hungry relatives...The fun lasted a few weeks then the
money was gone. That man had no regrets. He said he wished he’d lose his other
leg so that he could start all over again
.
36
Old Uncle would sometimes leave a heifer or steer in front of a poor cousin’s
ouse. He used to tell me, ‘There’s more to food than just passing through yourbody. There are spints in the food, watching over it. If you are stingy, that spirit
will go away thinking hhat bastard is so tight, I’ll leave.’ But if you share your
food with others, this good spirit will always stay around.” I was brought up to
regard food as something sacred . 37
Even now, among traditionals, as long as one person eats, all other relatives eat
too. Nobody saves up money because there is always some poor relative saying,
Kanji, I need five bucks for food and gas,” and he will not be refused as long as
there is one single dollar left. Feeding every comer is still a sacred duty.. .Fourth
and fifth cousins still claim relationship and the privileges that go with it. Free
enterprise has no future on the res .
38
Hence,
...We are lousy raw material from which to form a capitalist
.
39
Non-humans-as-relatives is an intriguing notion but limited in the amount of information
it conveys. However, once we have an idea of the communitarian sorts of social relations which
attach to being related in Dakota society, we might have a better idea of the underpinnings of
Dakota environmentalism. Perhaps this is illustrated in the idea that animals, too, are believed to
give to their relatives; it is believed that a successfully hunted animal allows itself to be killed and
has thus given itself to the Dakota as food.
35 Fame Deer, p 34
3h Fame Deer, p. 34f
37 Lame Deer, p 36.
38 Crow Dog, p 12f.
39 Lame Deer, p. 35 Of course, there is the formidable task of squaring these last two statements with the
recent successes of a number of Native enterprises, including the Foxwoods Casino
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3.5 Some Concluding Remarks
This might be an appropriate point at which to return to Hettinger, who claimed that
vegetarians cannot Value the culture of Native American plains tribes while rejecting their
tradition of killing buffalo for food, clothing, and shelter.' Perhaps one of the lessons to be found
in material such as was referred to in section 3.4 is that there has been a lot more going on in
Plains cultures than just the killing of buffalo. While there are points of friction between some
animal liberationists and Native Americans (particularly regarding the continuation of traditional
hunting), there is much more for animal liberationists os animal liberationists to value in Native
cultures: a cooperative (or symbiotic) rather than competitive conception of nature, a cooperative
rather than competitive ethic, and an inclusion of animals and other non-humans into the realms
of personhood and morality. The stake that both animal liberationists and environmentalists have
in the adoption of a cooperative ethic is the subject of Chapter 5. The inclusion of non-humans
and especially non-animals into the moral realm presents challenges for Westerners; these
challenges are examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
THE WORTH OF NON-SENTIENT LIFE, NATURAL OBJECTS, AND ECOSYSTEMS
4-1 Plant Life: An Argument against Vegetarianism
Not seeing the clear line between sentient and non-sentient beings that Singer
does, I find the logic underlying vegetarianism leading me, as it led Samuel
Butler's Erewhonians, to abstain from plant life as well, at which point the whole
enterprise becomes absurd. 1
I doubt if anyone can be a practicing vegetarian in America these days without hearing the
following remarks (or something like them) sooner or later, usually coming from the other side of
his or her bowl of salad at mealtime: 'So you don't eat animals; but you do eat plants. Plants, like
animals, are living things—how do you justify killing and eating them?'
The mock indignation and air of self-congratulation which invariably accompany this
question make it plain that the speaker does not expect the requested information but rather
believes that he or she has delivered an original and decisive argument against vegetarianism.
I believe that the argument is supposed to function as a sort of reductio, and I suspect that it is
driven by the assumption that the vegetarian's moral evaluation of plants reproduces in miniature
the meat-eater's evaluation of food animals (as well as plants). In this section I will try to explain
and refute this argument. However, I do not want a result of that refutation to be a vegetarian
attitude toward plants which mirrors the meat-eater’s dismissive stance with respect to food
animals. As we will see in this chapter, that attitude would preclude a rapprochement between
animal liberation and environmentalism. Therefore, I will examine arguments for and against the
claim that the only beings who matter in ethics are conscious beings—namely, some animals. The
ensuing discussion will focus on the merits of plants as morally considerable beings and then lead
us into a look at attempts to include other non-sentient entities such as mountains and entire
ecosystems in a moral calculus.
1 Rodman, p 107
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First let us begin with the reductio. One way to express it more completely would be as
follows:
(1) [ex hypothesi ] Vegetarianism is true.
(2) If (1), then (2b) it is wrong for humans to kill and eat non-human life.
(3) If (2b), then (4).
(4) .-. It is wrong to kill and eat plants.
On this interpretation, the non-vegetarian is simply demanding consistency of the
vegetarian with respect to the latter's attitude toward other forms of life. Since the non-vegetarian
knows that (4) is unacceptable to the vegetarian, he thinks he has shown the latter that (1) must
be false. The non-vegetarian sees a clear line demarcating the value of human life on the one
hand and that of all other life on the other. If it is wrong to eat any particular thing on the other
side of the line, then it is wrong to eat everything on that side of the line. (In my experience, the
non-vegetarian believes he is the first to bring to my attention the fact that plants are alive.) The
consequent, of course, is ridiculous; therefore, it is not wrong to eat any particular thing on that
side of the line.
Line (2) is false. It is based on an exaggerated interpretation of ethical vegetarianism. It
is satirical, and its presence in any argument pulls the rug out from under the project of a reductio
showing any other premise (here, the first premise) to be false. Better to stick to a
straightforward argument from the same assumptions about the relative value of human life and
all other life:
(1) If it is wrong to eat animals, then it is wrong to eat plants.
(2) It is not wrong to eat plants.
(3) .-. It is not wrong to eat animals.
Since the argument is valid, and line (2) is obviously true (or generally true!—see below),
the only thing to contest here is the truth of (1). There have been traditions in philosophy—still
alive today—which lend line (1) plausibility, so it is worth examining.
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The justification for line ( 1 ) rests, again, on the ability to parse the world, value-wise, into
humans on the one hand and all else on the other. Kant does this explicitly in the Groundwork of
the Metaphysic of Morals.
Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but on nature, have none theless, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are
rr
qUTly Ca ltd th ',ngS - Rational bcin*s - the other hand, are called personsbecause their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves.2
With this distinction in mind, Kant is able to contrast the sort of value mere things have (a
price, and hence exchangeability) from the kind of value rational beings have (dignify, indicating
non-exchangeability). 3 What determines the 'price' of a thing? Reference to human needs and
wants. Note the consistency between these remarks and the following passage from the Lectures
on Ethics:
All animals have the faculty of using their powers according to will. But this will
is not free. It is necessitated through the incitement of stimuli, and the actions of
animals involve a bruta necessitas. If the will of all beings were so bound to
sensuous impulse, the world would possess no value. 4
Of course, all this supports Kant's famous passages 'Duties Towards Animals and Spirits'
and 'Duties Towards Inanimate Objects' (Lectures on Ethics, pp. 239-241), in which he explicitly
claims that 'all duties towards animals, towards immaterial beings, and towards inanimate objects
are aimed indirectly at our duties towards mankind' (p. 241). These passages have been much
noted by animal liberationists. Here I merely wish to point out the clean line Kant draws between
humans and everything else, a line which leaves animals with exactly as much moral shelter from
our diet as plants, and which would serve nicely as the justification for line (1) above. The
justification would go something like this: Since animals and plants have the same kind of worth
(value as means only), if it is wrong to use one of these as food, then it must be wrong to use the
other. In the Kantian system, animals have the same moral significance (or insignificance) as
plants.
2
Kant, Groundwork
, p 96
1
Kant, Groundwork, p 102.
4
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, p 121
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No one in the debate with which this dissertation is concerned subscribes to the extreme
anthropocentric
5
ethic presented by Kant in the passages noted above, and, when hard-pressed,
neither does the more conservative non-vegetarian. The latter is usually against needless cruelty
to at least some kinds of animals (and because of the animal's pain, rather than because of the
effects on the character of the person, which was Kant's only concern). 1 believe that most non-
vegetarians would consider this Kantian justification of line (1) too extreme.
Another justification of line (1), and the one to which I suspect Callicott subscribes when
he endorses Butler's anti-vegetarian satire in Erewhon? is based on a Sorites (or slide) argument.
otherwise known as Wang’s paradox. Dummet gives a succinct description of these sorts of
arguments.
Consider the following inductive argument:
0 is small;
If n is small, n + 1 is small.
Therefore, every number is small.
...It is a paradox, since we can evidently find interpretations of 'small' under which
the conclusion is patently false and the premises apparently true. It is, in fact, a
version of the ancient Greek paradox of the heap. If you have a heap of sand, you
still have a heap of sand if you remove one grain; it follows, by repeated
applications, that a single grain of sand makes a heap, and, further, that, by
removing even that one grain, you will still have a heap. Wang's paradox is
merely the contraposition of this, where 'n is small' is interpreted to mean 'n
grains of sand are too few to make a heap.'7
In the case of line (1) the idea is that animals and plants share enough characteristics so
that, at some point, the distinction between animals and plants (like the distinction between heaps
and non-heaps) is vague. While the Sorites argument against vegetarianism goes as far back,
reportedly, as Solon, and in any case far back enough to be a topic of Porphyry's Abstinence, the
modem foundation for the argument is laid down by La Mettrie's attack on Descartes' dualism
(Kant's view, sketched above, depends on the latter). La Mettrie saw humans as differing only in
5 Or 'spirit-centric,' if we keep in mind all the sorts of beings (angels, God) Kant would have us include the
moral sphere
6
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degree from animals, and both of these groups as differing only in degree from plants (see
L Homme machine and L'Homme plante).
There are two traditional paths to the view that the differences between animals and
plants are only a matter of degree. One is via the belief that God has filled the world with every
possible kind of creature (the rationale being that the world's missing anything it could
accomodate would constitute an imperfection). That level of ontological saturation might lead
one to suppose that every creature has a close 'neighbor' in terms of attributes (e.g., people are
rather ape-like, apes are rather aye aye-like, aye ayes are rather possum-like, etc.), so that the
world's creatures would, if you could line them up, exhibit a kind of continuity (not necessarily
linear one might imagine a many-dimensional grid of resemblances such that each being would
have a number of neighbors it closely resembles but in different respects). This view preceded the
development of the theory of evolution. It did, however, continue to exert some influence on the
latter throughout the eighteenth century, when scientists postulated a world saturated with
’missing links’ and predicted the existence of as-yet undiscovered species.9 The other path to the
differences-are-only-a-matter-of-degree view is through some belief about evolution. La Mettrie
held something like this; that nature creates every creature imaginable and only the fit survive.
This is not so far from one or two of the basic tenets of evolution as it is accepted today, but
differs mainly in the idea that the world is saturated with fit creatures. Something like this or the
following consideration is probably what is underlying the modem non-vegetarian's attempt at the
Sontes argument: we are related, by virtue of evolution, to animals and all animals are related to
plants (our nearest common relative lived about three billion years ago).
We can then divide these various possible justifications of line (1) into two main groups:
justifications based on resemblance (the continuity view) and justifications based on relatedness
(the evolutionary view). The power of the Sorites objection is directly proportional to the depth
of ethical vegetarianism's commitment to either resemblance or relatedness as reasons for
’
See Stephen Jay Gould's essay 'Bathybius and Eozoon,' in Gould, pp 236-244
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prohibiting the killing and eating of other animals. However, if the Sorites objection is well-
founded, then the import is more extreme than just the prohibition of plants in the diet. Minerals,
too, are beings,' and the Great Chain of Being includes them on the far end. If a prohibition on
animals slides into a prohibition on plants, then a prohibition on plants slides into a prohibition on
minerals, so that we are left with the diet of Abaris, who 'demonstrated the most extreme form of
Pythagorean doctrine by refusing to eat any food at all.' 10
4-2 Responses to the Slide Arwimpm
In deference to the ancient character of the argument, we should first look at Porphyry's
responses. He appeals to approximately seven characteristics which distinguish plant food from
meat and which justify drawing a moral boundary between them (pp. 71, 72, 127, 139):
(1) Animals have souls; plants do not.
(2) Meat entails theft; fruit does not.
(3) Meat entails destruction; fruit does not.
(4) Animals are not our property; plants are.
(5) Meat is more difficult to obtain than is fruit.
(6) Meat entails luxurious destruction for the sake of pleasure; fruit does not.
(7) Meat entails an injustice to a kindred creature; fruit does not.
Now, some of these criteria do not appear to be all that relevant. The justification for (4),
that we sow and cultivate [plants], and nourish them by other attentions which we pay to them,'
is as applicable to animals as it is to plants, and Sorabji tells us that it 'should not be taken as a
general justification, or it would sanction our eating our children.' 11 The problem with (2) and
(3) is that they are peculiarly aimed at fruit; the fruit will be dropped to the ground if it is not
taken, and gathering it does not entail the destruction of the tree. But this distinction is worthless
to those of us who do not feel that frugivorousness is morally obligatory. The truth of line (5) is a
wholly empirical matter, and it changes from time to time, place to place, and individual to
individual (e.g., contrast the availability of vegetables in my case with the case of a Laplander; the
10
Hughes, ’The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans,' p. 208
1
1
Sorabji, p 103
implications of this difference are discussed in both the preceding and following chapters). It is
wholly too flimsy a ground for making the distinction.
It seems to me that (1) (substitute 'minds' for ’souls’) and (6) (meat is an unnecessary part
of most persons’ diets) u remain the cornerstones of ethical vegetarianism, with something like (7)
becoming more popular with the resurgence of interest in Humean ethics (e.g., see the discussion
of Mary Midgley in Chapter 6). Of course, justifications like (7) are exactly what the Sorites
objection targets if the emphasis is on ’kindredness’ simpliciter (which it seems to be in Porphyry).
But we could instead put the emphasis on shared capacity for consciousness. On this reading, (7)
differs from (1) in that (1) implies only an axiological preference for animal life, whereas (7)
points out the insensitivity to shared experience (eating animals instead of plants is not just wrong
because the former have souls and the latter do not, but also because their having souls implies
that there is a kind of betrayal involved).
Ethical vegetarians—whether they be Kantians like Regan or utilitarians like Singer—do
not believe that the fact that animals resemble us more than plants do is what makes it wrong to
kill or eat the former. Rather, it is wrong to kill or eat animals because they possess a certain
quality, and that is consciousness. True, they resemble us in this respect, but this accidental fact is
not what is relevant. A conscious cauliflower, even if it does not resemble us very much at all,
should be spared the salad bowl.
Similarly, conscious life (as it so happens here on Earth) is more closely related to us than
is non-conscious life, but it is not the closeness of the relation that is decisive; rather, what is
decisive just is the simple fact that some animals are conscious (this is not to say that relatedness
is wholly irrelevant in ethics). Were we to discover a descendant of ancient ferns, or a wholly
unrelated life form from another planet, which had the attribute of consciousness, the theories of
philosophers like Regan and Singer would have no trouble accommodating prohibitions on killing
or eating them. So line (1), on whichever justification, is false.
12 • *
But see the section in Chapter 5 on ’A Feminist Argument Against Vegetarianism 1
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Finally, we can follow Judith Thompson and question the form of the slide argument
itself.
We are asked to notice that the development of a human being from conceptionough birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a line tochoose a point m this development and say 'before this point the thing is not aperson, after this point it is a person' is to make an arbitrary choice a^hoice for
the" fetus i
hC natUrC °f
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We had better say k is
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a Person from the moment of
conception. But this conclusion does not follow. Similar things might be said
about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does nof follow that
acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say that they are. 13
Similarly, while it might be possible to lay out a fairly rich scale of degree of consciousness
(e.g., people, dolphins, crocodiles, ants, oysters...), most of the creatures that we call 'plants'
(some forms of photosynthetic zooplankton might challenge our categories, but not disastrously
so) certainly have no consciousness whatsoever, and the slide problem-if it is a problem-^an
only target those who elect to eat some animals and not others and base the distinction on more
subtle grades of consciousness. Unfortunately, that would include the most visible proponents of
ethical vegetarianism, Singer and Regan. They find nothing intrinsically wrong with killing or
eating oysters or even turkeys. This will cause them some trouble, as we will see in this chapter.
A final response to the slide argument is to remind the non-vegetarian that if the slide
argument is valid at all, it is valid in both directions, serving also in a reductio against the claim
that we should not eat people. After all, the resemblance between animals and plants that the
anti-vegetarian depends upon is as nothing compared to the resemblance between animals and
humans. The argument would go something like this:
(1) It is wrong to eat people.
(2) If it is wrong to eat people, then it is wrong to eat animals.
(3) If it is wrong to eat animals, then it is wrong to eat plants.
(4) .'. It is wrong to eat plants.
13
Thompson, p 1
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The argument is valid. The conclusion is false. The second and third premises are
propped up by the same kind of slide argument on which the anti-vegetarian reductio depends; if
that kind of slide argument is sound, then line one must be false. Clearly, it is not. Equally clear
is that we should reject anti-vegetarian arguments based on the suspect reasoning of the slide.
43 Challenging the Consciousness Crirerinn
In any case, the animal liberationist's distinction between what constitutes acceptable
treatment of plants and acceptable treatment of animals is generally based on consciousness. But
then it seems perfectly sensible for the non-vegetarian to say, ’Okay, I see that the criterion of
conciousness saves you from the Sorites objection inasmuch as it constitutes a neat enough and
important division between plants and animals. Even if there is a dense spectrum of consciousness
among animals, plants are certainly not conscious. So, excluding all animals from your diet would
seem to get you off the hook. But why or how does plants' lack of consciousness give you license
to treat them as you will?’ This question may at first seem too comical to warrant attention. But it
will have to be taken up in the light of cases such as the following:
In the 1880s a tunnel was cut through a giant sequoia in what is now Yosemite
National Park. Driving through the Wawona tree, formerly in horse and buggy
and later by car, amused and impressed millions. The tree was perhaps the most
photographed in the world. On holidays there was a waiting line. The giant blew
over in the snowstorms of 1968-69, weakened by the tunnel, although it had long
stood despite it. Some have proposed that the Park Service cut more drive-
through sequoias, but the rangers have refused, saying that one was enough and
that to do so is an indignity to a majestic sequoia . ...Is it wrong (or just silly) to
mutilate a sequoia to excite tourists? 14 [My emphasis.]
4.3.1 Arguments for the Consciousness Criterion: Preference Utilitarianism
As a sometimes hedonistic-, sometimes preference-utilitarian, Singer is committed to the
view that non-sentient life of whatever species is (of itself) ethically irrelevant (except, of course,
where it influences the happiness or preference-satisfaction of sentient life). He explicitly argues
14
Rolston, p 95f.
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against the non-considerability of non-sentient life. The argument is tied to a method for figuring
out what the right thing to do is in any given situation.
hnagine that I have to decide whether to keep a dinner appointment with threefriends or to visit my father, who has just phoned to say that he is ill and must
stay m bed...I can arrive at an impartial decision by imagining myself in the
position of my friends if I break the appointment, and of my father, if I fail to visithim. There are also my own preferences to take into account. [My emphasis.]
By imagining ourselves in the position of others...and taking on their tastes and
preferences, we can often arrive at a reasonably confident verdict about which
action will satisfy more preferences. 15 [My emphasis.]
Let me pause here for a moment. At this point we might say, 'Well, now, it is a simple
matter to see how plants must be taken into account. We just imagine ourselves in the position of,
say, a tree about to be cut down. Imagining what it is like to be such a tree, I find that there is at
least one preference (the tree's) against cutting the tree down. Right?’ Singer disagrees.
There is a genuine difficulty in understanding how chopping down a tree can
matter to the tree if the tree can feel nothing. The same is true of quarrying a
mountain. Certainly imagining myself in the position of the tree or mountain will
not help me to see why their destruction is wrong; for such imagining yields a
perfect blank. [My emphases.]
An argument here can be formalized as follows:
(1) We cannot imagine ourselves in the position of a non-sentient being
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) • • Nothing we do to non-sentient beings can be wrong in itself.
The justification for line (1) is that there is nothing it is like to be a non-sentient being,
and if there is nothing it is like to be a being, then there is nothing to imagine when one puts
oneself in that being's position. I will have more to say about this line of reasoning in my
discussion of Taylor, below. For now, I would like to focus on line (2). The justification for this
premise would seem to be that (i) only preferences count in moral calculation and (ii) the kind of
beings whose positions we cannot imagine being in just are the kind of beings which have no
preferences to take into account.
1
5
Singer, The Expanding Circle
, p 101
16
Singer, Ihe Expanding Circle
, p 123.
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Ironically, Graham uses Singer's appeal to epistemic difficulties in a challenge to Singer's
own theory. We cannot even know what it is like to be an animal, says Graham (we can only
know what some particular animal experiences are like), and so we cannot put ourselves into the
position of an animal. Furthermore, Graham claims (based on research on vervet monkeys) that
some animals do not know what it is like to be themselves.
Suppose you try, Singerlike, to grasp what it is like to be a vervet. You say to
yourself, Despite the strain, I have a pretty good idea what it is like to be a
vervet. Do you? How can you? If Cheney and Seyfanh are right, you cannot
grasp what it is like to be a vervet because vervets themselves don’it know what itThey dont/hmk of themselves as being conscious; they fail to recognize
t at there is anything it is like to be them. And you can’t know what it is like tobe X when X itself can’t know what it is like to be X. 17
If successful, Graham’s argument undermines Singer’s second premise by defeating (ii);
vervets (assuming Cheney and Seyfarth are right) certainly have preferences, but they are at the
same time beings in whose position we cannot imagine being. However, here I think Graham is
making a mistake. I think that monkeys do know what it is like to be a monkey; what they don't
know is that they know that. In his review of Graham's book, Matthews captures this distinction
in his proposal for two senses of ’know,’ a strong sense and a weak sense, in the context of ’know
what it is like to be an F.’
Perhaps a hen [or a vervet] could not, in the strong sense, know what it is like to
be a hen unless the hen could have the thought, This is what it is like to be a hen.'
And perhaps the hen, having no concept of a hen and no way of referring to its
own conscious experience, could not have that thought.
Still, someone might want to say, there is a weak sense of ’know’ in
which—so long as there is such a thing as what it is like to be an F—F's are, in
general, in an ideal position to know what it is like to be one.. .So, in the weak
sense of know, a hen would know what it is like to be a hen, and the application
of (K) [if an F does not know what it is like to be an F, then no one else can know
what it is like to be an F] to hens could not be used in a successful modus ponens
argument for the conclusion, 'No one else can know what it is like to be a hen.' 18
So, perhaps justification (ii) of line (2) remains intact. But we have yet to challenge the
plausibility of the first premise.
17
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18
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Paul Taylor argues for a 'respea for nature; and in so doing suggests that we can, contrary
to line (1 ) and its many proponents, take the point of view of non-sentient forms of life.
Scientists who have made careful studies of particular plants and animalswhether m the field or in laboratories, have often acquired a knowledge of their
Wh TldeKntlfiable ‘"‘“"duals. Close observation over
sublet S onX
0 “ apprec,ati0" of the “lique 'personalities' of their
ubjects...As ne becomes more and more familiar with the organism and itshavior, one becomes fully sensitive to the particular way it is living out its life
it
116 fascinated ^ ^ even experience some involvementvmh its good and bad fortunes (that is, with the occurrence of environmental
conditions favorable or unfavorable to the realization of its good). The organismcomes to mean something to one as a unique, irreplaceable individual The final
Doim of ' a
S PTO
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u
iS the achievement of a genuine understanding of itsp int view and, with that understanding, an ability to 'take' that point of view
onceiving of it as a center of life, one is able to look at the worldfrom its
perspective... J
When considered from an ethical point of view, a teleological center of life is an
ntity whose world can be viewed from the perspective of its life. We can
conceive of a teleological center of life as a being whose standpoint we can take in
making judgments about what events in the world are good or evil, desirable or
undesirable...The entity itself need not have any (conscious) interest in what ishappemng to it for such judgments to be meaningful and true. 19
The place of teleological processes in axiology will be considered in later sections of this
chapter. Here I want to focus on Taylor’s attempt to open up the possibility (which he thinks we
actually realize) of taking the point of view of a non-sentient life form.
As things stand, Taylor just seems to be butting heads with Graham and Singer. We must
ask What would it be like to 'look at the world’ from the ’perspective' of a non-conscious object?'
One way to find an answer is to consider counterfactuals like 'how would I look at the world if I
were [say] a tree?’ Or 'how would / like being cut down if / were a tree?' By imagining the
nearest possible worlds in which I am a tree, I might be able to get some idea of what it is to be
'inside' a tree's life. Now, if worlds in which I am a tree are all worlds in which I am in every
respect like a tree, then we again come up against Graham's principle that there is nothing that it
is like to be non-conscious. So perhaps we should look to worlds in which I am conscious but
otherwise enough like a tree to appreciate my treeish existence. But wait; there probably are no
l;
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worlds in which I am a tree (unless I have been changed into one?). It is hard to say what would
entitle us to assert a correspondence between me In this world and my supposed tree counterpan
in the other. Let us settle for worlds in which trees are conscious enough so that we can
meaningfully say that there is something it is like to be such a tree. Presumably, we humans in the
actual world can imagine what some of the experiences of trees in (let us call it) the tree world are
like. But that was not the problem! What about the trees in this world? Can the trees in the tree
world serve as 'diplomats; communicating to us imperfectly (as diplomats will) what it is like to
be a tree in this world? The conscious trees of the tree world cannot know what it is like to be an
unconscious actual-world tree, since there is nothing that it is like to be an actual world tree. So
the diplomats will have no message to deliver.
Perhaps another way to discover the tree perspective is to imagine myself with fewer and
fewer of my human and animal attributes, until all that is left is something like a vegetable (note
that this procedure might buy into the concept of a Great Chain of Being). I imagine myself
unable to move, unable to communicate, unable to perceive, unable to think... But then, as Singer
suggests, I come to the point where I draw a blank, just as I do when I try to imagine what it
would be like to be in a coma.
This hurdle is as much a problem for Singer as it is for the tree-sympathizer. For if the
reason non-sentient life can be discounted morally is that we draw such a blank when we try to
imagine what it would be like to be a non-sentient life form, then it seems that we could, on the
same reasoning, discount people in comas as well. You cannot imagine what it is like to be a
person in a coma, temporary or not. But it would be wrong to discount such people, certainly
people who might yet recover
;
20
and this means that our inability to imagine ourselves in others'
20
The question of whether people in comatose states count morally highlights the distinction between
Singer's former hedonistic utilitarianism and his more recent preference utilitarianism Although both
theories would seem to discount people in permanent comas (which I think is wrong, but will not argue for
here), the hedonistic theory has an easier time accommodating our intuitions regarding the temporarily
comatose, who have no preferences but might yet experience some pleasure.
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positions is no reason to discount them. So, even if line (1) is true, line (2) must be false-^ven if
justification (ii) is true, and people in comas do not have preferences.
I am sympathetic to Taylor's position. However, I can only conclude a, this point that he
is speaking somewhat loosely when he writes of our being able to look at the world from the
perspective of non-conscious life. 1 base this judgment not only on the difficulties noted above but
on Taylor’s own restrictions on what this means:
is to be noted that we need not be falsely anthropomorphizing when we
conceive of individual plants and animals in this manner. Understanding them asteleological centers of life does not necessitate 'reading into’ them huma!
characteristics We need not, for example, consider them to have
consciousness.
There are other reasons to read Taylor as writing loosely, and I will get into these on the
section on teleology below.
At any rate, we have come to the end of what essentially is a kind of other minds problem,
a problem more suited for a dissertation on the philosophy of mind. Perhaps we should leave the
test of putting ourselves in other species’ shoes. Let us turn next to an argument which does not
demand that we enter the minds of other beings.
On page 124 of The Expanding Circle Singer presents an argument which can be
formalized as follows:
(1) Non-sentient beings have no preferences.
(2) If (1), then (2b)non-sentient beings have no interests.
(3) If (2b), then (3b)nothing we do matters to them.
(4) If (3b), then nothing we do to non-sentient beings can be wrong in itself.
(5) .-. Nothing we do to non-sentient beings can be wrong in itself.
Consider a rock. A rock has no thoughts and therefore no desires with respect to its fate.
Therefore, it can have no interest in that fate. If that is so, then I cannot offend the rock or in any
way abuse it, for no action of mine can violate the rock's wishes. If it is impossible for me to do
21
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anything to a rock which, from the rock's 'point-of-view,' is
the rock can be wrong in itself (it might yet be wrong with
which do have preferences).
wrong, then no act of mine involving
respect to the consequences to beings
One of the problems with Singer’s presentations of his arguments is that neither he nor
any other proponent of preference utilitarianism so far as I have been able to discover offers a
substantive account of what it means to have a preference. Perhaps this would not be a problem
were no, the issue this distinction between the preference 'haves' and 'have-nots'-who otherwise
share so many characteristics. Although my main criticisms of Singer's position on the moral
considerability of plant life do not depend on the controversial assertion that plants, let alone
rocks, have preferences, a case can be made that the possibility that some non-sentient life might
have preferences should not be dismissed out of hand.
What does it mean for a person P to have a preference? If it means, at the very least, that
P has a propositional attitude, then not only is it impossible for plants to have preferences, but
also any creature which cannot think in terms of propositions. Consider a dog’s preference for the
sofa over the floor. Since the dog cannot grasp the proposition 'that I sleep on the floor’ nor ’that I
sleep on the sofa,' it is a stretch to say that the dog’s acting out his preference exhibits an attitude
toward those abstract objects (the propositions ). 22 Singer wants to allow that dogs have
preferences. So, Singer must agree that a preference is not a propositional attitude—although no
doubt preferences can be described in terms of propositional attitudes.
Perhaps a preference is a disposition to act. It would seem meaningless to ascribe
preferences to people if they did not generally act or be disposed to act in accordance with them.
But this is where the prerequisite of sentience appears suspect. Singer does not think that
earthworms are sentient. But they certainly act. After a heavy rain, earthworms are disposed to
crawl to the surface. Does it seem farfetched to suggest that earthworms prefer to be on, rather
22
The expression ’propositional attitude’ ’suggests that knowing what someone believes, etc. is a matter of
identifying an abstract object of their thought, rather than understanding his or her orientation towards more
worldly objects.’ Blackburn, p. 307
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than in, soaked earth? Bu, perhaps what is happening here is just that Singer is mistaken about
the sentience of earthworms. Let us talk of plants. The plant on my desk prefers the sunlight.
How do 1 know this? Because it moves toward the sunlight even in the course of the day
(sunflowers are an even more dramatic example). Now, i, might be argued that, when I speak
thus of plants, 1 am anthropomorphizing. This may very well be true, but people do read and
write in this way, and until Singer or someone in his stead gives a meaningful account of what a
preference is, it is difficult (for me, at least) to know how to evaluate the charge of
anthropomorphizing and what to make of line one.
I have said that what is missing is a meaningful account of the concept of preference.
Singer makes one attempt, but it is not very heartfelt. He suggests that 'we make the plausible
move of taking a person's interests to be what, on balance and after reflection on all the relevant
facts, a person prefers.'23 Now, what does Singer mean by ’a person’s interests’? There are at least
two ways of taking this expression, perhaps brought out by considering a dog's attraction to
antifreeze. Antifreeze is sweet, and many dogs take an interest in it: they want to drink it. But
drinking antifreeze is not in my dog’s interest, in the sense that it would be harmful to his welfare.
My dog Prefers what is in his (what I will call) desire-interest but not what is in his (what I will
call) welfare-interest—my dog prefers to drink the anti-freeze. We might wish to assert that, if the
dog knew that drinking the antifreeze would kill him, then 'on balance and after reflection on the
relevant facts' he would certainly prefer not to drink the antifreeze. This is not necessarily true.
The dog might be suicidal, and after careful reflection decide that he would rather die. Suicide is
often in a person's desire- interest but usually not in a person's welfare-interest.
This distinction between kinds of interest is crucial (it is noted by Kantor and hinted at by
Goodpaster and marks the prima facie distinction between welfare- and hedonistic-utilitarianism).
If a being has no preferences, then it certainly follows that she has no desire-interests, but it does
not follow that she has no welfare-interests. One case is that of a patient in a coma. Such a
23
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person has no preferences, and hence no desire-interests, but does have welfare-interests (all
things being equal, a cure for her condition would be in her welfare-interest). If the move from
preferences to interests in Singer's line two is a move to desire-interests, then the premise may
very well be true, but in that case coma patients must be inc.uded among those beings of whom
we can say they have no interests; we will then see how they fare at the argument's end. if the
move is to welfare-interests (thus protecting comatose patients), the premise is false.
One can see the same confusion between these two kinds of interest in an argument of
Rollin's:
Although plants, bacteria, viruses, and cells in culture are alive and may be said to
nnrtT^’
ls no reas°n to believe that they have interests. That is, there is
j
6 ° ence that these things have any awareness or consciousness
Matters’ to the^V^^^ that^ ^ thwartin§ these needsmatters em anymore than getting oil matters to a car. 24
If a being has no desire-interests, then it may be fair to conclude that nothing we do
matters to it. The same may be true of a being with no welfare-interests. If one has no welfare-
interests, then one is either dead or non-existent (the entailment does not go in the other
direction; it may be that having one's reputation besmirched after death is against one’s welfare-
interests). So premise three looks safe no matter which kind of interests we are speaking of. Here
I would like to point out that something like (3b), (4), and (5) constitute a shortened form of the
argument, appearing on p. 123 of The Expanding Circle. The identical argument is given by Rollin
in Intrinsic Value for Nature—
-An Incoherent Basis for Environmental Concern' (Free Inquiry,
Spring 1993). 25
Line four of Singer's argument is false. Some actions which will not disaffect any
conscious beings do strike us as morally problematic. One example is the case of the patient in a
coma. If we assume that the patient has no family or friends and that the hospital staff will not be
^Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, p 42.
’
’Humans are morally considerable because what we do matters to them
,
this is also the case with animals
And such mattering gives sense to the notion of intrinsic or inherent value—conscious beings can
(inherently) value or disvalue what happens to them, even if no one else does' (p. 20) My criticisms of
Singer's fourth premise are addressed to Rollin's argument as well
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saddened by his death, then line four (fields the conclusion that killing him is not wrong in itself
Note that 1 have not stiptdated that the patient is in a •persistent vegetative state.' Nothing about
Ime four implies that we must take the patient's possible future recovery into accotui, » tad
done something which will go against his htture preferences (as might be the case if we
tattoo his forehead instead). I conclude that Singer's argument is not sound.
A real-life example of a moraUy wrong action which retains its wrongness even if we
were to
discount the preferences of conscious beings is the desecration of a beached grey whale's body in
Humboldt County, California, which occurred in the late eighties. Some might say that the only
thing that makes it wrong to carve obscene graftal into a dead whale's body is that such
vandalism is offensive to other people. If this is true, then a mere hardemng of the sensibilities of
the rest of the community would have sufficed to make the action permissible instead of
forbidden. I find this highly implausible, and indeed it is a suggestion which brings out a general
problem for preference utilitarianism: the theory cannot account for the fact that we evaluate
preferences themselves. A preference for the vandalization of graves is one that should not be
fulfilled, even in a world where most people have that preference.
4 '3 '2 ft^uments for the Consciousness Criterion: Hedonistic Utilitarianism
Singer's conversion to preference utilitarianism signified a change in his axiology but not a
significant one. The problems that plague preference utilitarianism are foreshadowed in Singer's
previous hedonistic utilitarianism. Consider a line of reasoning which eventually is used to argue
against the moral considerability of plants in Animal Liberation.
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at
all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a
meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a
stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests
because it cannot suffer.
^
Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any
difference to its welfare. 27
26
See note 2 1
.
27 r •
Singer, Animal Liberation, p 7f.
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If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing
there is nothins to bp tatpn intn 28g e ke into account.
I believe that this hedonistic argument can be formalized as follows:
enjoyment or happiness,
( 1 ) Non-sentient beings do not have the capacity for suffering and enjoyment.
(2) If (1), then (2b) non-sentient beings have no interests.
(3) If (2b), then (4).
(4) Nothing we do to non-sentient beings can be wrong in itself.
Line (2) exhibits a confusion between pleasure and welfare, a confusion reminiscent of the
problem I mentioned above about the distinction between the two kinds of interest. A patient in a
coma cannot suffer, but that is not to say that nothing we do to her can disaffect her welfare
interests. So, line (2) seems to be false. Furthermore, while plants may not be capable of
conscious suffering, it should strike us as unnatural to say that their welfare cannot be disaffected,
since plants (like coma patients) can fare well or ill, live or die. If Singer were correct, then it
would make no sense for us to say of an office plant, 'It is doing well.' It does make sense, and
because plants are living things, there is good reason to think that such talk runs deeper than the
anthropomorphising in 'My car is sick.'
4-3 -3 Arguments for the Consciousness Criterion: Deontology
Utilitarianism and rights-based (or Kantian or deontological) theories have much in
common when it comes to the exclusion of non-sentient life and natural objects from direct ethical
concern. Deontologists disagree with the utilitarian's emphasis on pleasure or preference
satisfaction but share the latter's exclusive concern with sentient forms of life. Indeed, Kant and
Rawls, the towering figures of deontology, exclude not only non-sentient beings but most sentient
beings (all non-human animals) as well, what with their emphasis on rationality. 29 However,
28
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29 •
‘
Habermas' discourse ethics is substantially different from the theories of Kant and Rawls but is still heavily
indebted to both and has similar problems, particularly with respect to non-humans Admirably, this inspires
some self-criticism. See Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p 21 Of.
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deontological theories are in a, leas, one respect more flexible on the issue of who counts morally:
the concept of a right' is abstract enough to not preclude anything from possessing rights:
taft'demmd'
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The exclusions arise from the selection of criteria (rationality, in the tradition under
discussion) on which a given theory bases rights. Nevertheless, some philosophers still argue that
it is incoherent to attribute rights to plants and non-human animals. 31 Disappointingly, this
includes Paul Taylor. While his book Respectfor Nature is devoted to an environmental ethical
theory based on Kant (especially the Groundwork), and while he rejects Kant's view that apparent
duties to non-humans are always indirect duties to humans, Taylor nevertheless argues (1) that it
is logically inconceivable for animals and plants to have rights and (2) even if we could put
together a nghts-based analysis of our duties to animals and plants such an analysis would be
undesirable because it would be confusing. Taylor claims that
There are four aspects of moral rights that make it conceptually impossible for
either animals or plants to be bearers of moral rights, (a) A bearer of moral rights
is assumed to be a member of the community of moral agents, (b) There is a
connection between being a bearer of moral rights and having self-respect such
that, if it is inconceivable for something to have self-respect it is inconceivable for
it to be a bearer of moral rights, (c) It must make sense to say that a being is able
to choose to exercise or to enjoy a right if it makes sense to say it has that right,
(d) A bearer of moral rights has certain second-order entitlements in virtue of its
moral rights.
This argument is not going to fly because the first three criteria exclude so-called 'marginal
cases, such as children and coma patients, of whom it does make sense to say that they have
rights. The second-order entitlements Taylor refers to in the fourth criterion include such things
as the right to redress. He claims that 'society cannot—logically cannot
—
give recognition to such
30
Angeles, p 263 f.
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1 am speaking here about moral rights. Stone, Shrader-Frechette, and others have argued that, since legal
rights are a matter of convention, the only obstacle in the way of legal rights for plants and animals is the
novelty of the concept.
32
Taylor, Respectfor Nature, p 246.
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entitlements' to animals and plants. Here Taylor is at odds with his own theory of environmental
ethics, which includes an account of and a call for restitutive justice for nonhuman life.
Taylor offers no substantive support for his claim that using the language of rights with
respect to non-humans would be confusing. He says that such language is not necessary if we
adopt his view that non-humans do have inherent worth.
'If mid animals and plants have inherent
worth, the duties we owe to them are owed them as their due.® Now, if that does no, sound like
animals and plants have rights, what does? To deliberately avoid the language of rights seems to
me, in the light of claims such as this, to introduce a confusion. It is an arbitrary restriction on
language and is motivated by Taylor's desire to separate the spheres of interhuman and
environmental ethics. Such a division is as untenable as separating the spheres of intermale and
male-female ethics. I will say more about the connections between interhuman ethics and
environmental ethics in the next chapter. Taylor's positive views about the inherent worth of non-
sentient life are discussed in later sections of the current chapter.
Tom Regan, the preeminent deontologist in the philosophical arm of the animal rights
movement, is admirably open-minded about the possibility of rights for non-sentient life. He
avoids the project of restricting moral considerability by confining himself to the study of sufficient
conditions for establishing that something is a rights-holder. Ironically, while Regan lacks the kind
of complex theory of duties to non-sentient beings that Taylor has developed, Regan, like Taylor,
believes that it is possible that such beings have moral standing but also (and this is where he and
Taylor part company) rights. 34
4.4 Consciousness Does Not Exhaust Value—Three Arguments
In embracing first hedonistic utilitarianism and then preference utilitarianism Singer
rejects Kant's rationality criterion for moral considerability and puts in its place a broader but
33
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related criterion, that of consciousness. Is conscious experience ail that we value? Robert Nozick
asks a hypothetical question designed to show that it is not:
uppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience
y u desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so thatyou would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend orreadmg an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank with
electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for lifepreprogramming your life's experiences?
Until one finds a satisfactory answer [to the question of what matters for people
other than their experiences], and determines that this answer does not also apply
o amm
u
als
’
one cannot reasonably claim that only the felt experiences of animals
limit what we may do to them. 5
Now, all that Nozick's thought experiment shows is that experience alone, without
vendicality, might not be as valuable as experience with veridicality. It does not show us that our
material existence has value, only that consciousness plus the reality of the conscious experience
(whatever that reality might consist of) may be more valuable than consciousness alone.
Therefore, Nozick's thought experiment does not argue for the value of material existence without
consciousness e.g., plant life. However, it does argue against our axiology's being exhausted by
consciousness alone, and so points us in the right direction.
G. E. Moore placed conscious experiences at the pinnacle of his axiology. Nevertheless he
thought that the hedonistic utilitarians were wrong to suppose that only conscious experience has
intrinsic value, as evidenced by his response to Sidgwick:
’No one,’ says Prof. Sidgwick, ’would consider it rational to aim at the production
of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible contemplation of it by
human beings.’ Well, I may say at once, that I, for one, do consider this
rational...Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful
as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire—mountains,
rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon.. .And then imagine the ugliest
world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing
everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as
far as may be, without one redeeming feature.. .Supposing them quite apart from
any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is
better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it
not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the
other?
36
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Moore's rhetorical question strikes me as being very friendly to environmental philosophy,
and it is puzzling that, while other aspects of his ethics are commented on by environmental
philosophers, this passage has up to now been ignored. This may be because the problem is cast
in the context of purely aesthetic values, and the case Moore is making has been widely criticized
in that context. However, a similar thought experiment of Richard Routley's side-steps some of
those issues and does not depend (as Moore's seems to) on our imagining ourselves having God-
like powers of world creation but no access to the world created.
The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do
what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not
likely to harm himself irreparably...
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism...
The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about
him, eliminating as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but
painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible
according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is
wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard
Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of
corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).37
There is no need to criticize here the principle Routley describes. I only wish to point out
that, even if the others in (1) include all conscious beings, imagining the last person to be also the
last sentient being (all 'higher' animals are extinct) makes the principle (call it in this case basic
sentient chauvinism) not very friendly to the remaining plant life on the planet. As would Singer's
utilitarianism in a similar setting, it fails to rule out the permissibility of wanton destruction so
long as the last sentient being is not harming herself. For her own pleasure she may destroy
everything from lobsters to redwoods.
Now some may want to stick to their guns and say, ’So what if she destroys the remaining
non-sentient life? Even if we grant that she is experiencing pleasure in something bad, so long as
17
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there is p.easure
.here, rha, is all rhar counts.’ Bur anyone who says this contradicts herself. For if
the last person's pleasure is (1) pleasure in the bad, or is (2) a bad kind of p.easure, then there
obviously is something of value besides pleasure-namely, whatever she would appeal to in
justifying the claim that the pleasure is a bad pleasure. The appeal must be to something other
than pleasure.
Most people find the behavior of the last person unacceptable. Routte/s story seems to
prove that we do and should value nonhuman and even non-sentiem life, and for having done so it
will remain a landmark of environmental philosophy. But it is one thing to make that case, and
quite another to give a substantive explanation of why we value or should value non-sentient life
The Value of Plants as Part of a Valuable Environment
The no-rights-for-plants view is attractive in that it allows vegetarians something to eat;
the ascription of rights to plants would seem to leave us in the position of Abaris. However, in a
most ironic twist, some of the veiy people who do believe that plants have moral standing are not
animal liberation extremists, as one might expect, but rather are opposed to vegetarianism. These
include the environmentalists I have been discussing in the last two chapters: Leopold, Callicott,
Rolston, and Hettinger.
Now, there can be no doubt that cutting a stand of trees could be wrong to the extent that
doing so would contribute to the erosion of the fields of a small farm, the family owners of which
rely on those fields for both food and income. And cutting down too many trees in a forest creates
dangers for those animals who rely on the trees for food or shelter (or who rely on the animals
who rely on the trees...), and to that extent may be (prima facie) wrong. All are agreed on the
first count, and animal liberationists and other pro-environment types would agree on the second
count. But could cutting down a tree be wrong in itself, without reference to the pains caused to
humans or at least other sentient life? Leopold evidently thinks so.
Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the
despoliation of land is not only inexpedient but wrong.
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All ethi's so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is amember of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him tocompete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-perate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for)
I he land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community toinclude soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of thend-commumty to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for hisfellow-members, and also respect for the community as such. 38
1 here is a latent tension in Leopold's view between the good of the community and the
good of the individual, which I will address shortly. (This tension is unnoticed by his principle
exponent, Callicott, who concentrates his attention on Leopold's rule: 'A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise. ). But notice that among the individual members of the community Leopold
counts plants. He does not go into his reasoning veiy deeply, and Callicott likewise never explains
on what basis plants might have value in themselves—that is, beyond being 'overwhelmingly
important to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic communities.'40 This sounds more
like instrumental value, although Callicott makes it plain that he does believe plants have intrinsic
value.
The land ethic, it should be emphasized, as Leopold has sketched it, provides for
the rights of nonhuman natural beings to a share in the life processes of the biotic
community.
Concern for animal (and plant) rights and well-being is as fundamental to the
land ethic as to the humane ethic. 41
I see little substantive basis for the intrinsic value of either plants or animals or even
human beings in Leopold's writings, and less in Callicott's truncated version, so I am somewhat
mystified by the above claims. Leopold does claim (above) that the land ethic ’implies respect
for.. .fellow-members, but what is the basis of that respect? Both Leopold and Callicott emphasize
the importance and value of communities, and use that value as a basis for measuring the value of
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all else (with the value of a creature or activity being determined by how it affects the
enwronment as a whole,. The following passage proves a good exam ple of the qualified rights
granted to plants and animals by Leopold:
whPth
22
’
000
^
§her plantS 311(1 animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtfule er more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to
faT^hT T-
Creatures are members of the biotic community and if(as I believers stabihty depends on its integrity, they are entitled to
And, in turn, by Callicott:
The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and everymember of the biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, take
note, human individuals) is relative, to be assessed in accordance with the
particular relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold called 'land.'43
A confusion between two very different accounts of the value of individuals is imbedded
in Leopold and Callicott's writings. I will explain what these two different accounts are and show
that neither will suffice to establish the intrinsic value or rights of individual members of the biotic
community.
4-5 -l The Individual Members Constitute the Summum Bonum
Animals and plants (and fungi and monerans and viruses) not only affect the
environment, but in fact define its complex makeup. They constitute the environment being
affected. Are we entitled to infer from the fact that the environment has positive intrinsic value
that each part of it has positive intrinsic value as well?
It is an ancient opinion, going back at least as far as Plato's Timaeus, that the world might
be good and yet contain much which is evil. Plato has Timaeus say that 'the world is beautiful and
its maker good’ [29a3], and yet the subordinate gods built into human beings feelings which he
describes as 'terrible and necessary,' such as 'pleasure, the chief incitement to wrong,' hence
'polluting the divine element' [69d3] with our 'worse part’ [69e5] or ’base part' [71el]. And while
42
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Plato would have us believe that the perfection and uniqueness of the world is due in part to its
containing all intelligible beings' [31a3], his low opinion of women and animals as particulars is
well-advertised in the same dialogue [90eS-92c5]. Existence as a woman or animal is supposed to
be a punishment for the folly of a man, reincarnated into a 'lower' form.
These two threads, implicit in the Timaeus, are taken up in many cultures as the explicit
problem of evil, famously by Christian philosophers from Augustine to Aquinas to Leibniz. What
interests us here is not their theodicies but the fact that these philosophers affirm not only the
goodness of God but also the goodness of God's creation. Yet the existence of evil in that creation
is not usually denied. These philosophers do not argue that the world is good, and so all its pans
are good also. Nor do they excuse the creator by arguing that there just happens to be more good
than evil in the world, and so the value of the world is, thankfully, a positive sum of all the value
and disvalue of the good and evil. Rather, they all try to explain the role of evil—ugliness, pain,
sin—as a bad but necessary part of the good whole (the best possible world).
This phenomenon of ’mixed goods' was studied explicitly by Brentano, Moore, and
Chisholm in their work on aesthetics and axiology: one cannot conclude that something has
positive intrinsic value from nothing more than the fact that it is part of something which does. A
simple case is that of shame. You might think that someone's feeling shame for some wrong-doing
is good, but you would be mistaken to conclude that the pain which is involved in that person's
feeling shame must itself be good. Consider a more complex case, that of a just war. A person
might feel that the allied effort against Germany in Word War II was a good thing, but that does
not commit her to the view that each casualty—civilian, allied or axis soldier—was a good thing.
So Callicott is mistaken when he explicitly asserts that, 'If nature as a whole is good, then pain and
death are also good,'44 and when he implicitly assumes that the intrinsic value of the whole of
nature is sufficient to establish the intrinsic value of its plant-life parts.
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4 '5 '2~ Individual Members Contribute Causally to the Realization of the Summum
Perhaps animals and plants (and humans) have a rights claim which is dependent on an
extrinsic, contingent condition-namely, their contribution to the stability, integrity, and beauty of
the biotic community. This strategy is problematic, and we should notice that it is not new. Mill's
analysis of nghts in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism has the same form. He defines a right as
'something that society ought to defend me in the possession of.'45 Why ought it? The answer is
m the interest of utility. 1 That is, to figure out which rights we should have we must figure out
which entitlements would maximize the general happiness. Thus, Mill turns the question of which
moral rights do we have (the deontologist’s question) into the question of which moral rights
should we have (an empirical question, given utilitarianism's axiological assumption). Similarly,
Leopold and Callicott's view of the summum bonum suggests a theoiy basing rights on utility with
respect to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. To figure out which rights
humans, animals, and plants should have we must first figure out which entitlements would
maximize the preservation of the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. But this
calculation comes out differently day to day, year to year, place to place and (what's worse)
person to person. That is because the biotic community is inherently unstable and geographically
heterogeneous. The moral rights I have today might not be the same as the moral rights you have
today, or the moral rights I have in five years. It all depends on how you and I (or I and five-
years-later I) and our actions stand in relation at that time and in that place to the preservation of
the biotic community at that time and in that place (for example, killing or corralling a wild horse
in North America might have been the right thing to do 500 years ago due to the fact that horses
were unknown here at that time—they were disrupting the biotic community they invaded; but
now the mustangs are an integral part, if anything is, of their biotic community, and killing or
corralling them is now itself a disruption of that community). Such radically contingent 'rights' are
not really rights at all.
45
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4 -5 -3 More Difficulties for the Leopold /Callicott Theory
There are other problems with identifying the preservation of the beauty, integrity, and
stability of the biotic community as the summum bonum. Neither Leopold, nor Callicott, nor
Rolston, nor Hettinger explains what the terms mean in this context. The puzzles associated with
beauty and subjectivity are just one problem, and perhaps not even the biggest. Perhaps the
question of beauty is irrelevant in environmental ethics; do we really want to base the summum
bonum on our conceptions of beauty, which after all vary notoriously from person to person,
culture to culture? Furthermore, the biotic community might be stable in some sense of the word,
but it is also saturated with instability in other senses (e.g., mutation, geographical relocation,
natural extinction, constant climatic change). I frankly have no idea what quality of nature
integrity is supposed to pick out. The problem with these last two expressions is that they are so
dependent on context.
Even the expression 'biotic community' is troublesome. Leopold and Callicott use it as
though they are speaking of the entire biosphere. If so, one might say that, given the kind of
cataclysmic changes that the biosphere has survived in the past, it is impossible for humans to do
anything but small-time, short-term ’damage' to it. It would 'recover,' to be as beautiful and stable
as ever, with perhaps spectacular new populations of animals and plants evolving from whatever
survives our tenure (even if we succeed in destroying all large mammals, birds, fish, amphibians,
reptiles, trees, etc., there is little chance of the entire insect, diatom, fungus, bacteria, or protozoa
populations going extinct; they would serve as the gene pool from which, as at the beginning,
more complex forms of life would evolve). Alternatively, even if humans were to somehow
destroy every non-human organism and start living off of Star Trek-like 'food replicators,' the
biosphere would remain intact; it would simply consist of one species. It would be in many
respects stable, and no doubt many would find it beautiful.
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Perhaps these are quibbles. They might indeed be trifling if Leopold were offering a
theory of environmental ethics outside of the ethics of human-animal and human-human
interaction, but he is not. Rather, he is suggesting an expansion (analogous to the expansion of lay
morality to encompass women and minorities and to some extent non-human animals) of ethics.
If the preservation of the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is to be put
forward as the measure of all actions, then some care must be taken in the understanding of its
terms.
To return to the main issue: There is little question that Leopold and Callicott believe that
individual plants and animals have intrinsic value. However, they have focused most of their
attention on the claim that the biotic community has intrinsic value. Callicott has yet to present
an explanation of how the intrinsic value of individual plants or animals can be inferred from the
intrinsic value of the whole of nature. The best he establishes is that individuals are valuable as
means to or parts of the whole of nature. But this only hints at either a kind of instrumental value
or an indefinite (whether positive or negative we do not know) intrinsic value. In our quest for
elucidation on the matter of plants' rights or intrinsic value we should turn to other
environmentalist philosophers.
4.6 Telos and The Intrinsic Value of Organisms
Rolston bases the value of non-sentient life on the fact that every biological organism
changes the world in a non-accidental way.
The genetic set is a normative set-, it distinguishes between what is and what ought
to be. This does not mean that the organism is a moral system, for there are no
moral agents in nature apart from persons, but that the organism is an axiological
system, an evaluative system. So it grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and
resists death. We can say that the physical state the organism seeks, idealized in
its programmatic form, is a valued state...
A moral agent in deciding his or her behavior ought to take account of the
consequences for other evaluative systems.
46 [Emphases in the original.]
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Rolston does seem to contradict himself when he says both that 'being an organism is
sufficient for [being the sort of thing that commands our moral attention ]'47 and 'an organism
cannot be a good kind without situated environmental fitness.'4* Somehow the latter criterion
leads him to conclude that 'Plasmodium vivax (a mosquito-borne microbe that causes malaria) is a
bad organism and.. .its situated environmental fitness in the human ecology is bad .'49 Rolston, like
Leopold and Calhcott, offers a holistic account of environmental ethics, and it suffers from some of
the problems already mentioned above (in the discussion of integrity and stability). However, he
also offers a relatively substantive, teleological account of the value of non-sentient individuals.
Taylor (and also Goodpaster, Arbor, and Bernstein) has similarly teleological criteria for
establishing the value of non-sentient organisms. Notably, these criteria do not depend on our
being able to take the point of view of such organisms.
We recognize objects and events occurring in [the organism’s] life as being
beneficent, maleficent, or indifferent. The first are occurrences which increase its
powers to preserve its existence and realize its good. The second decrease or
destroy those powers. The third have neither of these effects on the entity. 5"
The goal of these philosophers is to dethrone the property of being conscious as the locus
of value and put in its stead the property of being alive. The goal-directedness of biological
processes is supposed to provide an even more fundamental account of the value of that property.
The property of being alive is not an arbitrary criterion of value; rather, being alive entails having
a telos, and having a telos entails having a good, namely the realization of that telos, and therefore
(pace Singer and Regan) an interest.
Trees, like animals and other plants, but unlike machines, have end-states which
are not decided by human beings. Given the right conditions and barring
interference they will in the course of natural events reach this state. There is
nothing mysterious or improper about insisting that whatever helps trees achieve
their natural end-state is in their interest .
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In the face of their obvious tendencies to maintain and heal themselves, it is very
^SlngS52 °f imereS,S °n th€^ °f^ (and plams 8enerally)'in
The interest principle either grows to fit what we might call a 'life principle’ or
requires an arbitrary stipulation of psychological capacities (for desires, wants
etc.)... [My emphasis.]
Trees, are organisms that naturally develop and have within themselves the
capability of repairing damage and adapting, to at least some extent to
unfavourable surroundings. It is quite natural, indeed virtually automatic to
think of a tree's career in teleological terms, in which its life is viewed as ajourney to reach a fully mature state...
I suggest we take talk of a tree or plant as suffering harm as a result of
eing subjected to less than adequate water, seriously and unmetaphorically and
that we explicate this harm in terms of the lack of water hindering the natural
development of the tree.
The implications of this view are drawn out explicitly by Arbor, who condemns the
practice of bonsai and sees a ’similarity between this perversion of normal development and the
methods used to stunt and deform the feet of Chinese women .’55 Borrowing from the section
called Violation of Telos' in Rollin’s book Animal Rights and Human Morality, those who extend a
teleological basis of value to plants might indict not only topiary (analogously to Rollin’s
arguments against the cropping of animals' tails and ears for show), the art of trimming plants into
whimsiccal shapes, but also any breeding project which has a similar effect (analogously to Rollin's
case against the deliberate breeding of defects in dogs, for example the foreshortened faces of
bulldogs, or the accidental but accepted perpetuation of those defects which are genetically linked
to some other desired characteristic, for example the link between coat color and deafness in
Dalmations).
Resistance to the view presented by these philosophers is sometimes based on an
argument appealing to an analogy between non-sentient life and machines (hence the reference to
machines in Arbor, above). The argument is that the operations of non-sentient life are not
significantly different from the operations of machinery. A plant is like a car, neither knowing nor
52
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caring how, why, nor whether it runs. Just as cars have no purposes of their own, neither do
plants. It is no use trying to figure out the telos of a car, except metaphorically and with reference
to the goals of sentient beings. Rollin presents a reductio along these lines. 56 It can be
formalized as follows:
(1) Ecosystems have interests, since they behave in a homeostatic way and
restore states of equilibrium.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) Thermostats and toilets have interests.
The reductio presumably applies to individual plants as well. Suspicion is cast on the first
premise because, after all, thermostats and toilets do behave in the manner described and, if that
were all that were needed to establish that something has interests, then they too would have
interests, and the second premise would be unassailable.
Obviously, if the life view is to win out over the consciousness view, its adherents must be
able to defeat the mechanist view of nature—the view that holds that the physical world is just a
great machine humming along—which is behind this identification of the biological processes of
plants (and non-consdous animals) with the merely physical processes of machines. They must
point out some characteristic which distinguishes life from non-life in a non-trivial, ethically
relevant way. Unfortunately, two of the environmentalists previously mentioned appeal to exactly
the sort of characteristics that fall victim to Rollin's reductio: Goodpaster quotes Sayre in saying
that 'the typifying mark of a living system...appears to be its persistent state of low entropy,
sustained by metabolic processes for accumulating energy, and maintained in equilibrium with its
environment by homeostatic feedback processes.'57 And Kantor (although he argues against
plants' rights, he argues for their interests) says that 'they have self-regulating and homeostatic
functions which preserve the 'integrity' of the organism.' But Kantor also points out the following:
In the case of cars...functions...are defined in terms of human needs and
wants...That is, a car is doing well if it is functioning well, and it is functioning if
it is getting us to where we want to go in ways that we would like to
56
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go-comfortably or quickly or efficiently. On the other hand, we can say that aplant is doing well without having to refer back to human needs or wants even iftheir doing well runs contrary to our wants (e.g., the mold on my bread may bedoing well and the poison ivy on my path may be flourishing ). 58
Arbor would agree, for he says that machines do not have 'end-states which are not
decided by human beings .'59 Rolston has a similar view:
A car has no nature of its own; it does not exist by nature. An automobile is a
means to human good...Cars have no self-generating or self-defending
tendencies...When a human steps out of a car, she takes all the purposes, needs,
programs, interests of the car away with her, all of which she gave to the car in
the first place.
But none of this is true when a human walks away from a deer or a
delphinium. The car does not 'need' spark plugs except as a locution for, 'I need
spark plugs for my car'...Machines have an end only mediately as the extrasomatic
products of human systems...
The values that attach to machines are therefore entirely instrumental,
derivative from the persons who have created these instruments. But the values
that attach to organisms result from their nonderivative, genuine autonomy
(though environmentally situated) as spontaneous natural systems. The
standards of performance, of excellence, are in the organism itself, relative to its
reference frame
.
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Bernstein says simply that artifacts do not 'naturally develop [nor] have within themselves
the capability of repairing damage .'61
The thread running through all these distinctions between living animals and plants and
non-living artifacts is the fact that living things do not only exhibit teleological processes, but their
goals are their own. These two facts together distinguish them from artifacts, some of which
exhibit the former, but none of which can claim the latter. Does this save the environmentalists
from Rollin's reductio? Remember that we want the distinction between life and non-life to be
both non-trivial and ethically relevant. Now, the fact that the goals of machines are strictly our
own whereas living things can have goals of their own is not trivial. But is it ethically relevant?
Rollin would certainly answer 'no.' He does recognize this distinction himself, as evidenced in the
following remarks:
The telos of a thermostat is to regulate the temperature in a room; the telos of a
car is to run. Connected with this telos are needs; the car needs oil, gas,
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antifreeze, air in its tires, and so forth. Must we assert, then, that cars fall within
the scope of moral concern...?
There is, happily, a difference between an animal and a machine
between spider and car. The telos of a spider is its own...The telos of a car is
extrinsic to it, imposed by the mind and hand of man.62
But Rollin does not believe that the possession of one's own telos is sufficient for moral
considerability, for he then says that 'even more important than having an intrinsic versus an
extrinsic telos is that the needs of the animal fall into that special category of needs we call
interests. 1 1 have already criticized the claim that the interests-view of moral considerability
excludes plants (section 4.3.1, above).
Animal liberationists who think that the extrinsic/intrinsic telos distinction (to borrow
Rollin's terminology) runs with the non-life/life distinction and the morally non-
considerable/considerable distinction must figure out what to do about an argument of Callicott's
which would use that first distinction to exclude domesticated animals from moral consideration:
Domestic animals are creations of man. They are living artifacts, but artifacts
nevertheless, and they constitute yet another mode of extension of the works of
man into the ecosystem...There is thus something profoundly incoherent (and
insensitive as well) in the complaint of some animal liberationists that the 'natural
behavior' of chickens and bobby calves is cruelly frustrated on factory farms. It
would make almost as much sense to speak of the natural behavior of tables and
chairs.
64
Callicott could bring Kantor's point about cars to bear on domesticated animals. The
functions of dairy cattle, veal calves, broiler hens, etc., are defined in terms of human needs and
wants. After Rolston we can say that there are no veal calves in nature, and 'my veal calf needs a
smaller pen' is really just shorthand for 'I need a smaller pen for my veal calf.'
This view about the goods of domesticated animals is not correct. Domesticated animals
are unlike machines in that even if they are bred to fit our purposes, they are never entirely
without interests of their own. They seem to have dual roles; the 'needs' of a dairy cow might,
inasmuch as she is a dairy cow, require reference to human needs or desires, but the needs of that
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same cow, inasmuch as she is a cow, do not. In this way, domesticated animals and plants
distinguish themselves from machines.
It seems that the property of 'having a telos of one's own’ might be underwriting the
judgments of those who think the consciousness criterion is too narrow to pick out all the morally
relevant beings in this world.
4.7 A Multitude of Tele
Up to this point we have seen that the environmentalists have not denied that machines
have tele, only that they do not have tele of their own. If machines can have tele, or
intendonality, at all and therefore, as Val Plumwood puts it, 'can outrun extensional description,'
then what about entities that are not machines but are also not what we usually think of as
biological life? Plumwood claims that
there is an extended family of teleological concepts, and while some of these may
require meta-levels of consciousness and may apply only to so-called higher
animals, others can be applied without any anthropomorphism to non-conscious
beings. Notions of growth, of flourishing, for example, are implicitly teleological
and do not presuppose consciousness; some, concepts such as function,
directionality and goal-directedness of a self-maintaining kind, are applicable to
natural systems and processes generally. Mountains, for example, present
themselves as the products of a lengthy unfolding natural process, having a
certain sort of history and direction as part of this process, and with a certain kind
of potential for change. 65
Earlier in this chapter I expressed my concern that the vegetarian refutation of the Sorites
objection not have the result that the animal liberationist attitude toward non-sentient life mirror
the meat-eater's dismissive attitude toward food animals. Plumwood goes a step further, wanting
to avoid replacing 'the dualism of reason and nature by a new dualism of the organic/mechanical,
in which moral and value status is achieved against an excluded and alien class in the form of the
inorganic and mechanical world.'66 Now, distinctions are an indispensable feature of language,
and it would be pointless to argue against Plumwood simply on the basis of her introduction of the
teleological/non-teleologieal dualism, as if her intent were to escape dualisms altogether.
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However, she also implies another dualism, one that is unnecessary and mistaken: that of the
artifact/non-artifact, with the distinction being based on the criterion of 'having a telos of one’s
own. Note the contrast between her discussions of a stone and of a soda bottle:
We already have much of the vocabulary of natural agency: That stone doesn't
want to come,' says the mason of one that is indeed a being thoroughly embedded
m the context and mysterious history of its place, and which anyway says 'no' to
our endeavours with its weight . 67
The Coca Cola bottle when individuated as part of a human instrumental context
is not (or not without a further context) framed intentionally, and we can neither
hinder nor assist its journey. Unless it is individuated as an artifact, that is,
subsumed within a context of human agency and intentionality (in which case it is
subject to the considerations of interhuman ethics), there is no obvious intentional
context to place it in .
68
Plumwood's view gives us the means to reject the second premise of Rollin's reductio, but
as far as that goes it is no different from the views of most of the philosophers previously
discussed. The only difference is that she has a broader view of which sorts of being can have a
telos, making it easier to include ecosystems and non-organic things. So far, the only other
philosopher I have discovered arriving at such a broad axiology through any similar foundation for
value (though not going quite so far as to attribute tele to natural objects) is Rolston.
It is likewise shortsighted to say that the only value in the system is its production
of life, although this is of greatest moment within it. True, the astronomical and
geological phases are precursors to life, but that does not reduce them to mere
instrumental value. Nature is not inert and passive until acted upon by life and
mind. Neither sentience nor consciousness are necessary for inventive processes
to occur...
Impressed with the display of life and personality on Earth, we correctly
attach most of our ethical concern to persons and to organisms; but we may
incorrectly assume that mere things are beyond appropriate and inappropriate
consideration.
A 'mere thing' can, however, be something to be respected, the project of
projective nature. Crystals, volcanoes, geysers, headlands, rivers, springs, moons,
cirques, paternoster lakes, buttes, mesas, canyons—these also are among the
natural kinds. They do not have organic integrity or individuality; they are
constantly being built, altered, their identity in flux. But they are recognizably
different from their background and surroundings. They may have striking
particularity, symmetry, harmony, grace, story, spatiotemporal unity and
continuity, even though they are also diffuse, partial, broken. They do not have
wills or interests but rather headings, trajectories, traits, successions, beginnings,
endings, cycles, which give them a tectonic integrity. They can be projects
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(products) of quality. The question now is not 'Can they suffer?' or 'Is it alive?'
but 'What deserves appreciation ?'69
The downside of Plumwood's view is that it includes a new dualism paralleling Callicott's
distinction between wild nature and domesticated nature and is uncomfortably reminiscent of his
disdain for the latter. I find no significant difference between the intrinsic natures of the rock and
of the soda bottle. Each has a physical structure which is basically an amalgamation of minerals.
The soda bottle takes on the further characteristic of being a soda bottle only in relation to human
purposes. It is possible to consider the soda bottle as a mineral thing (like a rock) without that
reference to human purposes. So that I do not seem to be just butting heads with Plumwood,
consider a less obvious artifact a Paleolithic scraping tool. Most of us could pick one of these up
and not even realize it was anything more than a rock. But that is precisely the point; it is a rock.
The scraping tool and the soda bottle, no less than the dairy cow, have dual identities, only one of
which requires references to human goals. Rolston (perhaps inconsistently—remember what he
said about machines' having only instrumental value) seems to recognize this when, after
hypothesizing two realms of value, the cultural/urban on the one hand and the natural/wild on
the other, he writes:
A domain of hybrid values is generated under the simultaneous control of both
foci, a resultant of integrated influences from nature and culture...This happens
when human labor and craft put natural properties to use in culture, mixing the
two to good effect in agricultural, industrial, scientific, medical, and technological
applications...Examples might include landscaping a home, taking penicillin, or
going skiing...
Perhaps, strictly speaking, there are no purely urban values, since some
contribution of natural properties can be noticed in every cultural activity (the
muscles that move the violinist's arm at the symphony). Even in town we never
cease to reside in nature. Also, strictly speaking, humans may have no access to
purely wild values, since even a wilderness is enjoyed with cultural supports
(Gore-Tex jackets, matches, bird guides, the training in botany that permits hikers
to understand where they are). We cannot revert entirely to nature and remain
human . 70
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It would seem odd to exclude, from Plumwood's otherwise inclusive realm of value, those
parts of nature which have merely suffered the misfortune of having been modified by humans
and put to use by them (or modified and put to use by chimpanzees, bees, beavers, or dung
beetles, for that matter). Indeed, the rejection of artifacts from that realm would grant a redoubt
to the human/nature dualism which Plumwood is concerned to criticize; it tries to mark in (for
example) the multifaceted character of a stone scraping tool a certain boundary between humanity
and nature where in fact the boundaries are hazy and the continuities certain.
One might be concerned about a certain contrast between artifacts like the soda bottle on
the one hand and scraping tools or the posts of post and beam houses on the other. In the latter,
there is a history and process at the end of which the old identity is still retained and visible. How
does that apply to the glass soda bottle? I would say that here we must avoid being misled by our
macroscopic prejudices. The fusion of lime, soda, and silica tells no less a history than the
chopping of wood and the fitting of beams and posts, and if the old identity in the former is not
readily visible to our eyes, that does not mean that it is not in some sense retained.
Fortunately, Plumwood's rejection of artifacts as value-bearers is not entailed by the rest
of her view. Artifacts can be incorporated into the realm of value without contradicting any other
component of her theory. Indeed, I hope it is evident that that incorporation is itself implied by
her general view on what kind of things can be said to have a telos.
4.8 An Alternative Path: The Problem of the Biological Individual
Philosophers like Taylor and Plumwood attempt to broaden the moral community by
showing that other beings have a characteristic in common with us, the possession of which
justifies the claim that we should treat them with some respect, as autonomous individuals. The
characteristic they focus on, telos, seems to apply to all material things, if it applies to anything.
So one result of taking telos to be a morally relevant feature is that everything material in the
universe seems to be deserving of moral consideration. This might be an undesirable implication
of an ethical theory. After all, environmental ethics has developed out of a desire to change the
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world, a project which presupposes drawing distinctions for which the telos-based ethic seems to
be unable to equip us. Whether there is a problem here will be discussed in the next section of
this chapter. First, it would be only fair to Taylor, Plumwood, and the others to point out that
their view is not the only one to entail such sweeping value claims.
Another way to ground environmental ethics is through a kind of enlightened self-interest.
The two basic features of this kind of theory are an acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of the
self and a refusal to draw a sharp distinction between the self and its environment. Biological
study has long provided a basis for the latter, as evidenced by these remarks of T.H. Huxley's:
Histology then takes up the tale, and shows that the majority of animals,
including man, our primal type of individuality, are built up of a number of units,
the so-called cells. Some of these have considerable independence, and it soon is
forced upon us that they stand in much the same general relation to the whole
man as do the individuals of a colony of coral polyps, or better of Siphonophora
(jellyfish) to the whole colony. This conclusion becomes strengthened when we
find that there exist a great number of free-living animals, the Protozoa, including
all the simplest forms known, which correspond in all essentials, save their
separate and independent existence, with the units building up the body of man.
Both, in fact, are cells, but while the one seems to have an obvious individuality,
what are we to say of the other? 71
Relative to a single cell of my body, the rest of my body is no less a pan of the ecosystem
than is the sky and the earth. But then there is the problem of deciding which cells are cells of my
body; are the E. coli bacteria which live in my gut as a biologically necessary part of my digestive
system (but which do not originate with my body—
-their’ DNA is not ’my’ DNA), part of me? The
problem gets deeper as we bring in considerations of time (when does a part of my environment,
placed in my body while eating, become a part of me?) and quantum mechanical confusions over
where the properties of observers end and observed begin. Callicott is among those (he cites Paul
Shepard72 and John Seed 71 as others) who see in these ecological and physical considerations an
egoistic basis for valuing the environment not merely instrumentally but intrinsically.
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How to account for the value of 'others'—human others and now nonhuman
natural others—has been the principal problematic of nonegoistic ethics. 74
If quantum theory and ecology both imply in structurally similar ways in both the
physical and organic domains of nature the continuity of self and nature, and if
the self is intrinsically valuable, then nature is intrinsically valuable. 75
As Callicott observes, the intrinsic value of the self is usually taken as an unproblematic
given in most ethical theories (even those theories which are not egoistic in the usual sense). This
environmentalist strategy, if viable, has the dual advantage of (1) grounding environmentalism in
a widely-held axiological assumption and hence (2) not forcing environmentalists to come down
on narrower theoretical disputes (e.g., utilitarianism or deontology?) at the outset, where the
problem is simply getting the environment included in ethical debates as something valuable in
itself.
The result of this concept of nature as ’extended self 6 seems to be that every material
thing has intrinsic value. As Seed puts it,
There is an identification with all life. Then follows the realization that the
distinction between 'life' and 'lifeless' is a human construct. Every atom in this
body existed before organic life emerged 4,000 million years ago. Remember our
childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks?
Rocks contain the potentiality to weave themselves into such stuff as this.
We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a
condescending air? It is they that are the immortal part of us. 77
This conception of the extended self recognizes no culture/nature distinction; even a soda
bottle is, after all, 'rock.'
4.9 The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Junk
Now would be a good point at which to mark where we are and whence we came. We
have gone through a number of answers to the question 'who and what deserves moral
consideration?' The traditional and still dominant answer is 'humans and nothing else.' The
mainstream animal liberationist's answer is 'animals possessing a certain level of consciousness.'
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Some environmentalist philosophers answer 'everything that lives (including ecosystems).'
Plumwood's answer is 'everything except artifacts.' My modification of Plumwood's view answers
'everything,' as does, or so it would seem, the shared view of Callicott and Seed. By 'everything' I
mean everything that has, had, or will have a material existence. We seem to have arrived,
Sorites-like, at a perverse and impractical axiology. Having been motivated by concern for the
environment to reappraise the way we value the world, we have ended up valuing everything,
which, paradoxically, seems to undercut the very motives with which we began. Even the most
destructive factory emissions are made of what Carl Sagan reverentially calls 'star stuff.'
Leopold, Callicott, Rolston, Plumwood, etc. must accept that it is possible for there to be
something bad in the world; the possibility follows from its actualization as indicated in these
philosophers complaints about past and present environmental conditions as brought on by
humans (it also follows from, in Rolston's case, judgments about phenomena, such as cancer and
malaria, which do not have their origins in human behaviours). We might have thought, like
Moore and the Routleys, that we could choose one world over another on the basis of a difference
in intrinsic value. But if Plumwood and Callicott are right, and if the conclusions I drew from their
theories really follow, then either every thing is already intrinsically valuable (Plumwood
modified)—not just humans, to be sure, but also not just sentient creatures, and not just living
things and ecosystems and 'natural' rock formations but also soda bottles, aerosol cans, factories
and so on; or everything is a pan of an intrinsically valuable whole, nature, my 'extended self
(Callicott).
As presented so far, these theories do not seem to be terribly helpful in any practical way.
Let us begin with a confusion (or potential confusion) in Callicott's view. We can present his view
argumentatively as follows:
(1) The self is intrinsically valuable.
(2) If (1), then nature is intrinsically valuable.
(3) .-. Nature is intrinsically valuable.
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What is leftover from this argument, even if we accept it, is the problem of the value of
parts versus the value of wholes. Callicott has the same problem here as in his argument from the
intrinsic value of the whole of nature (discussed above). He cannot go from the conclusion of this
argument to any claims about the intrinsic value of particular parts of the world. The most ardent
apologist for God's creation can, without obvious contradiction, assert that the existence of certain
kinds of people (murderers, etc.) is intrinsically bad, even if such people serve as parts in a good
whole (perhaps like ugly parts of a beautiful painting, or dissonances in a musical composition).
Furthermore, all apologists will assert that the existence of such people should be prevented, by
character-building or what have you. More mundanely, even if line (1) is true, it does not follow
that every part of me is of positive intrinsic value (e.g., my ulcer). Now, if the extended-self view
of nature cannot help us to establish the intrinsic value of parts of nature, then it is difficult to see
of how much practical help it can be. After all, all of our interactions are with particular parts of
the whole.
Plumwood’s difficulty is different. The conclusion of her teleological view (as modified by
me) is, like Callicott's, not suggestive of any environmental imperatives. Factories and war
machines and cities exhibit telos (on her broad reading of the term), so there is nothing to do, as
far as telos is concerned, but to respect these as much as anything else. But certainly either (as
her own environmental activism suggests) not all tele are to be respected, or possession of a telos
confers some, but not in all cases equal intrinsic value. In either case, the prominent place of telos
in her axiology must be playing second (at best) fiddle to some other criterion (and possibly more
than one) on the basis of which we can rank competing tele (e.g., that of the rain forest versus
that of Brazilian beef ranchers).
The difficulty is not just in separating out malevolent human activity vis-a-vis the external
environment. What is Callicott to do with the fact that a cancerous tumor is part of me? What is
Plumwood to do with the fact that the tumor exhibits a telos? What other axiological criteria
would each of these philosophers appeal to in justifying its destruction? The same problem arises
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in the case of the species of bacteria which causes malaria. I use these two examples because they
are mentioned by Rolston, who as far as I can tell is the only environmental philosopher to express
a concern with this problem of figuring out how to understand and what to do with, as he calls
them, "bad kinds. It is difficult to be sure, but he seems to claim that there are two different
ways in which something could be considered a bad kind. First, an organism cannot be a good
kind without situated environmental fitness.'79 Second, ’one might find examples of organisms
with a situated environmental fitness that seem bad arrangements.'80 Unfortunately, he cannot
think of an illuminating example of the first sort of bad kind, and he explains away his only
example (the malaria-causing microbe) of the second. He also claims that there are 'deformed
organisms in nature, bad organisms of their kind, and even monstrosities that have no natural
kind, unfitted for any habitat.' But again he gives no examples, and again he makes excuses for
these supposedly bad kinds ('even mutants and monsters play their roles'82 ). All we are left with
are suspicions regarding his grasp of the meaning of the word 'kind.'
In fighting the mainstream view that denies intrinsic value to anything but humans (or
comparably conscious creatures), environmentalists tend to be blind to the fact that, unless
goodness is defined into nature, distinctions between good and bad events in nature must be
drawn. I think that this blindness bom of zeal provides another answer, in addition to those she
herself offers, to Joni Seager's question regarding the absence of environmentalist interest in the
campaign against hunting. 83 The uncritical idolization of non-human nature not only rules out
any qualms about predation, but demands, as Callicott and Rolston both seem to believe, a
predation-positive attitude (I examine critically their predation-based anti-vegetarian arguments in
Chapters 2 and 3). More strange still is their refusal to admit that even pain is an intrinsic evil.
Rolston, p lOlf.
Rolston, p. 102. Another expression in the same paragraph from which this is taken might be helpful: I
take Rolston to be saying that 'x has situated environmental fitness' means 'x has an ecosystemic role which
meshes with the kind of goods to which x is genetically programmed.'
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Pain is a bad thing in humans or in animals. But this fools us until we distinguishbetween intrinsic and instrumental pain. Instrumental pain has contributory
reference to further goods; intrinsic pain has no such reference. Intrinsic pain is abad thing, absolutely; but only instrumental pain is characteristic of nature, where
intrinsic pain is a nonfunctional anomaly. Pain is routinely instrumental in
ecological defenses, captures, and transfers of goods, and the pains imposed in
agriculture are homologous. They are not intrinsic pains; they must be judged in
their instrumentality and with no presumption against innocent suffering
.
84
Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if our
appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology. Pain in particular
is primarily information. In animals, it informs the central nervous system of
stress, irritation, or trauma in outlying regions of the organism. ..An arctic wolf in
pursuit of a caribou may experience pain in her feet or chest because of the rigors
of the chase. There is nothing bad or wrong in that .85
Rolston s remarks are puzzling in their apparent self-contradictoriness, and he shares with
Callicott a confusion (or perhaps ignorance is a better word) over the concepts intrinsic and
extrinsic value (a confusion bound to cause trouble to an ethicist). We are all witness to pain's
positive extrinsic value, that is, to its expediency for the realization offurther ends that we value
(e.g., the preservation of our health, as when the pain of a newly-inflicted wound brings it to our
attention so that we can give it care). But what makes pain such a terrific motivator is precisely
the fact that it is itself a felt evil; that is, considered intrinsically (or in itself), pain is an evil. It is
nothing new that that which is intrinsically evil (bad in itself) can be extrinsically good (have good
effects, such as communicating desired information, as in the case of a cyclist who wants to 'feel
the bum'), and vice versa. All that Callicott does is remind us that pain is extrinsically good; he
does nothing to further an argument that it is intrinsically good, and so when he concludes by
saying that 'there is nothing bad or wrong in that' we are entitled to point out that yes, there is
nothing extrinsically bad or wrong in that. However, there is something intrinsically bad, and it is
having all those wondrously good effects. Rolston seems to suffer a deeper confusion in his claim
that all pain in nature is instrumental, not intrinsic. These are not exclusive categories, and indeed
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wherever there is pain of positive instrumental value there is pain of negative intrinsic value, for
all pain is of negative intrinsic value. 86
Another problem arises when philosophers such as Callicott and Rolston (and Plumwood,
when it comes to artifacts) contradict themselves by leaving out of their sweeping lists of goods
that which is naturally human. They make it seem as though human activities are supernatural
inventions to be despised to the extent that they are not analogous to the activities of anything
else in nature. One particularly troubling example is Callicott's disdain for human attitudes of
sympathy and the actions that sympathy inspires toward non-human (and especially wild)
animals. He characterizes the animal liberationist's concern with animal suffering as
uncourageous, prophylactic, sugar-coated, artificial,' 'self-indulgent,' 'soft,' and (most tellingly)
anti-natural. He and Rolston and even Taylor are opposed to humans' aiding wild animals in
distress (Rolston and Taylor make allowances when species are endangered because of human
activity). The following scenario should suffice to drive home the unacceptability of the
environmentalists' stand on this issue. Imagine that the mountain gorilla has, due to diligent
efforts by conservation groups and African governments, achieved a healthy and viable wild
population. Then imagine that a painful and fatal virus begins to sweep through the various
gorilla families, decimating them. According to the pro-pain, pro-death ethic espoused by
Callicott, and the Kantian theory worked out by Taylor, humans should not intervene. The holism
of Rolston might permit intervention but does not require it.
If it is ever the case in our contemporary world that the imminent extinction of a
whole species is due to entirely natural causes, we should not try to stop the
natural sequence of events from taking place in order to save the species.... And
when it comes to instances of bacteria-caused diseases, almost everyone has a
tendency to be on the side of the organism which has the disease rather than
86 One might object that there is no such thing as pain without an object and, following Moore and Brentano,
cite as an example of a good kind of pain pain in someone else's misfortune. This is parallel to Mill's desire
to rank pleasures qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Whether there is some one thing 'pleasure' or 'pain'
is a dispute that lies outside the main concerns of this dissertation. However, the issue might not be of great
import where we are speaking of the kind of pain (physical pain, psychological terror) to nonhuman animals
that animal liberationists wish to avoid and which Callicott here seeks to argue is good
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viewing the situation from the standpoint of the living bacteria inside the
organism.
Humans have no duty of benevolence to preserve rare species from natural
extinction, although they may have a duty to other humans to save such species as
resources or museum pieces. 89
Presumably, we should also throw out our birdbaths and birdfeeders.
It seems to me that such views entail an odd sort of devaluing of what human beings are.
Indeed, environmentalist philosophers often write with the conviction that humans are at best a
disposable pan of the landscape or at worst a malignancy. They hold a similarly negative view of
no other animal. They have no praise to offer humans, not even when humans act out of
compassion for other animals. This is revealing. It shows up their views as simplistic and deeply
flawed naturalism, a foundation which underwrites an a priori rejection of uniquely human
activity in nature. Every animal consumes other animals or plants, but only of humans is it typical
to take pity on members of other species in the wild and act accordingly. Why should we regard
such charity as any more disruptive than predation, such life-saving as any less valuable than
natural death? To these questions the environmentalists have no answer.
That is no reason to reject their claim that sentience is not a necessary condition for moral
considerability. That claim is perfectly consistent with a rejection of their anti-humane, anti-
interventionist, anti-vegetarian theses. Which is to say, the fundamental claim of
environmentalism is compatible with the fundamental claim of ethical vegetarianism. I hope that I
have shown this in my refutation of each group's arguments against the other in these last two
chapters. As I see it, the fundamental mistake common to each group has been an adherence to a
monistic axiology. Each group (again, with the exception of Regan) posits one necessary quality
(pleasure, preference-satisfaction, rationality, preservation of the biotic community) as being
intrinsically valuable or as making something worthy of moral consideration. This leaves the
animal liberationist in a world ofjunk (plants, rivers, ecosystems, planets, etc., all of zero intrinsic
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value), and traps the naturalistic environmentalist in more or less subtle misanthropy (seeing
uniquely human activity as essentially alienated from or destructive to the biotic community).
Monistic ethical theories are easily refuted, as Callicott himself seems to recognize.
Moral philosophy historically has striven for theoretical unity and closure often
at considerable sacrifice of moral common sense. Consider, for example Kant's
deontological dismissal of the moral value of actions tainted with 'inclination,'
even when the inclination in question is wholly altruistic. Or consider the morally
outrageous consequences that some utilitarians have been led to accept in order
faithfully to adhere to the theoretical foundations of utilitarianism. 90
Yet, for the sake of that same theoretical unity, and in particular to avoid 'moral
incommensurability in hard cases,' Callicott immediately dismisses Mary Anne Warren's attempt to
show that animal liberationism and environmentalism are compatible if we accept that there is a
variety of values. Now, the study of hard cases is important in ethics, but one might question how
important it is to let them drive one s theorizing. In my view, there are too many easy cases, too
many possible win-win solutions to (prima facie) conflict, to worry so much about the hard (often
tragic) cases. I also do not believe that across-the-board commensurabilty is possible, and so I
reject the necessity of theoretical unity. Perhaps this is a controversial claim, but here is not the
place to argue for it.
1 will close this chapter by commenting briefly on a somewhat different commensurability
problem, but one related to how the problem of ethics and nature has been discussed here. In
general, the problem is formulated as that of finding intrinsic value in non-sentient nature. The
word 'value' might make us think of numbers and commensurability, and some of these
philosophers (especially Rolston) do speak in these terms, but I think that this is a mistake. Here
is why. Suppose that every living thing and natural object has intrinsic value. Those values are
either commensurable or they are not. If they are, they are either all equal, or they are not.
Taylor subscribes to the egalitarian view. Egalitarianism not only underwrites his unacceptable
claim that one should be indifferent between the existence of a bacteria and the existence of a
vu
Callicott, p. 50. Taylor, after Kant, also rejects the value of acts done from inclination, but Callicott
overstates the case. The presence of inclination does not 'taint' an act which is also done from duty. Indeed,
Taylor makes the case that we have a duty to develop our inclinations so that they match our duties
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gorilla but also raises the possibility that two bacteria are of greater value than one gorilla.
Rolston subscribes to a hierarchical view, but as we saw in the previous chapter that raises a
similar question: how many gazelles is a cheetah worth? And that seems unanswerable. So, both
the hierarchical and egalitarian axiologies break down on the quesiton of commensurability.
Even if they were commensurable, such comparisons would prove of minimal use in
ethics. The intrinsic value or inherent worth of some object (rather than some state of affairs)
serves as notice that it is not ontological junk, that it must be taken into account by moral agents
such as ourselves. Little more than that is implied by such value. We do not use mere
comparative calculations of the worth of things in order to determine how we should act with
respect to them. We look to the relations between ourselves and others as well. This is one
reason why my duties to my own children are different from my duties to children in South
America. Such relations also obtain between ourselves and nonhuman beings. These relations
must be invoked by ethical vegetarians. Recall Porphyry's seventh objection to the Sorites
argument against vegetarianism: ’meat entails an injustice to a kindred creature.' A simple
comparative calculation involving the intrinsic values of myself and some other animal cannot by
itself serve as the foundation for this basis for vegetarianism. This is no different from the facts in
a case of interhuman ethics.
The same can be said for plant life. Here are two reasons why it is wrong to have even
just an attitude of disregard for plants. First, plants are our relatives. Assuming that DNA-based
life has made just one uninterrupted appearance on earth, we and plants share a common
ancestry. So, we should have something like a feeling of community with them. Second, plants
allow us to live. Not only are they important as food, but they replenish the oxygen in our
atmosphere. So, we should have feelings akin to gratitude toward them. Note that a feeling of
gratitude goes beyond just valuing plants as resources. Similar things can be said about non-living
natural objects and ecosystems.
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Of course, these views do not originate with me. I examined similar views in Native
American ethics in the preceding chapter.
So far, I have shown that environmentalists fail to argue successfully against
vegetarianism (Chapters 2 and 3). I have also shown in the present chapter that the animal
liberationists do not make their case against the moral significance of non-sentient life (and
natural objects), which might have prima facie claims on us on the bases of teleology, relatedness,
and/or reciprocity. In the end it seems that differences between environmentalists and animal
liberationists rest on mistakenly exclusive axiological assumptions. The two camps can give up
these assumptions without damaging their respective agendas. Even so, there is some concern
that their practical implications come into conflict with the needs and aspirations of human
society. The relationship between environmentalism, vegetarianism, and movements for social
justice is examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
ANIMALS IN UTOPIA
5.1 The Crisis Mentality
One finds in environmentalist literature philosophers justifying or motivating the
development of an environmental ethic by appealing to something like the following argument:
We of the west, or the north, or the Occident, or the ruling classes, engage in environmentally
destructive practices. A certain way of perceiving and evaluating the non-human world
legitimates these practices. Therefore, in order to change these destructive practices we must first
find new ways of perceiving and evaluating the non-human world.
These philosophers claim that the rejection of anthropocentrism is one of the minimal
conditions for achieving a sustainable environment. They further argue that anthropocentrism
itself is embedded in all current ethical theories. Such theories are not merely implicated in the
current destruction of the environment; they cannot help but excuse that destruction. Therefore,
traditional western ethical theorizing must be rejected.
This line of reasoning invites a paradox. When I read this argument I want to ask, 'Why
should we adopt a new land of ethics?' The answer is: this is necessary to save the environment. I
then ask, 'Why do we want to save the environment?' Two particularly obvious answers come to
mind. The first answer is that if we do not save the environment we will destroy ourselves. But if
this is the reason we should adopt the 'new, environmental' ethic, then it seems that we have not
jettisoned the old ethic at all. It underwrites the 'new,' which turns out to be just an extension of
the old. To put it into familiar terms I will turn again to Mill. As I mentioned in the previous
chapter, Mill believed that a right is something that society ought to defend me in the possession
of. Why ought it? Because of the general utility the object of that right affords. To motivate
environmental ethics on the basis of human need is like saying that the environment should have
rights because of the utility to humans afforded thereby. Needless to say, this is as
anthropocentric as it gets. To have only utility-based rights is to have no rights at allfsee Chapter
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4), and to be a non-human with only human-utility-based rights is to be especially impoverished.
There is also something rather unsatisfying about moulding one's ethical beliefs in this way in
order to meet one's needs-i.e„ to believe something (here, an ethical theory) not because one
believes it to indeed be correct, but because one believes it to be expedient. On top of that, the
needs in question are human needs, which returns us to anthropocentrism.
The other answer to the question,
'Why do we want to save the environment?', is that we
want to save it because it has inherent worth, or because we owe it to the environment (one does
not owe a debt of gratitude to one's parents merely because they have inherent worth)—that is,
any answer to the effect that it is something we must do, at least in pan, for the sake of the
environment itself. If we have come to believe this, equipped as we are with the standard ethical
theones, then it does not seem that those ethical theories lead inevitably to human chauvinism.
Those who are trying to work out new ethical theories, theories which are environment-friendly,
are obviously doing so in the absence of such theories. But how did they come to have
environment-friendly views? It seems that being equipped with conventional ethical theory does
not deter one from holding ’green’ views. If this is so, then the reason for rejecting the standard
theories that such rejection is necessary if we are to value the environment and behave in an
environmentally responsible manner—is false.
So, when addressing from an environmentalist standpoint the question of ’why reject
conventional ethical theorizing?' we find one answer which is itself anthropocentric and another
which indicates that somehow immersion in conventional ethics does not determine one to human
chauvinism. The first answer is unacceptable, and the second answer tells us that our
presupposition must have been false. Indeed, ethical theories such as Paul Taylor's Kantian system
of environmental ethics seem to give the lie to this belief and to give good reason to believe that
the ends of environmentalism, animal liberationism, and other radical or reformist causes can be
spoken to by a modest shift in axiologies rather than a total rejection of entire ethical theories.
And yet this paradox of reform crops up again in the problem of motivating modest shifts in old
axiologies! My wish is not to defend the viability of old theories. I merely want to point out this
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interesting puzzle, which occurs to me as I ponder the crisis mentality apparent in the
introductions of so many papers and books on environmental ethics.
As far as the environment goes...well, anthropocentrism, biocentrism-^loes it really
matter what our motives are so long as we are willing to launch into a program to save the
environment? If the velocity with which environmentalist philosophers broke into a number of
mutually critical schools of thought in the seventies is any measure, the answer is yes.
The topic of this chapter is environmentalist philosophies which explicitly address the
relationship between environmental issues and interhuman issues. I present, briefly, the general
views of deep ecologists and ecosocialists and the focal points of their antagonism. I will then
critique them both from a vegetarian standpoint. I believe that both of these schools have
neglected human-animal relationships in constructing their environmental-social utopias, and they
have done so at the expense of the coherence of their programs. I will then show how
ecofeminism can answer my critiques, effectively serving as the bridge between what one might
call ecological utopianism and animal liberation. Finally, I will look at a feminist argument against
vegetarianism and address the questions it raises about ethical vegetarianism's relationship to, and
potential complicity in, interhuman injustice.
5.2 Deep Ecology
Deep ecology is an environmental philosophy with many affinities to the kind of
environmentalism that I have focused on so far. Sometimes Leopold and Callicott are referred to
as deep ecologists. However, there is a difference between these two and the deep ecology
'orthodoxy.' The difference that is relevant to the subject of this chapter is that, whereas Leopold
and Callicott express little interest in interhuman affairs, deep ecology as laid out by its founder
Arne Naess is explicitly concerned with the implications of politics, economics, etc. for
environmentalism. This is one of its chief virtues; its chief vice (and one of two main reasons I
have not addressed it thus far in this dissertation) is a tenacious obscurity.
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The deep ecology view has been laid out on two occasions in lists of tenets:
List I:
1
. Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational
total-field unage.
2. Biospherical egalitarianism.
3. Principles of diversity and of symbiosis.
4. Anti-class posture.
5. Fight against pollution and resource depletion.
6. Complexity, not complication.
7. Local autonomy and decentralization. 1
List II (the 'deep ecology platform):
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth
have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These
values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human
purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these
values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to
satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life
requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and
the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be
deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling
in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher
standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between
big and great.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly
or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. 2
1
Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep,' pp. 95-98 The explanations that follow are given along with the list
2
Devall and Sessions, p 70. The deep ecology platform is the product of a collaboration between Naess
and Sessions, The following explanations of II. 6 and II. 7 are from p 73.
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Social values are for the most part restricted to points 3, 4, 6, and 7 of list I and to points
6 and 7 of list II (note that in II.4 the requirement for a population decrease is expressed only in
terms of nonhuman needs; I will touch on the problems with the population issue in the
ecosocialist critique of deep ecology). The diversity called for in 1.3 includes 'diversity of human
ways of life, of cultures, of occupations, of economies,’ and hence signals deep ecology’s opposition
to economic, cultural, and military domination. The anti-class posture in 1.4 is supposed to follow
from 1.3, inasmuch as class antagonisms encourage homogeneity (except inasmuch as 'the
exploiter lives differently from the exploited'). Naess' explanation of 1.6 is obscure. He says that
'the complexity-not-complication principle favours division of labour, not fragmentation of labour.
It favours integrated actions in which the whole person is active, not mere reactions.’ Presumably,
this is an expression of opposition to the assembly line, and by ’division of labour' Naess refers to
the idea that different people will have different skilled jobs. The desire for local autonomy in 1.7
follows from the fact that 'increased local autonomy...reduces energy consumption' (a conclusion
based on the energy requirements of import-export traffic) and hence pollution. Local autonomy
also presumably would protect the diversity desired in 1.3. II.6 follows not only from II.1-II.5, as
Naess and Sessions point out, but from the values in list I as well. Regarding II. 7 they only say
that 'Some economists criticize the term "quality of life" because it is supposed to be too vague.
But on closer inspection, what they consider to be vague is actually the nonquantitative nature of
the term. One cannot quantify adequately what is important for the quality of life as discussed
here, and there is no need to do so.' I believe this reluctance to say more about the quality of life
issue is unfortunate; I will come back to this in the context of the deep ecology-ecosocialist debate.
I will conclude this section by noting the gulf between (1) the deep ecologists' understanding of
the complex relations between environmental issues and social concerns and (2) the various
degrees of separation between these two spheres ’recognized’ by other environmentalists:
Social philosophers, with justice and charity praised in moral society, cannot tell
environmental ethicists what is good and bad in amoral ecosystems, nor what is
right and wrong when humans deal with ecosystems. That is [a] category
mistake.
3
3
Rolston, p 181
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Family obligations in general come before nationalistic duties and humanitarian
obligations in general come before environmental duties. 4
And then there is Taylor's desire to deny rights to non-persons (which he takes most, if
not all, non-human animals as well as plants to be) but then to allow that such entities could be
conceived of as having rights but not in the same sense that humans have rights. 5 Deep ecology
gives the lie to such desperate separations between the concerns of interhuman and human-
nonhuman ethics.
5.3 Social Ecology
Deep ecology diagnoses the cause of our environmental ills as anthropocentrism. It then
goes on to recognize that dropping anthropocentrism will entail some changes in social relations.
Social ecology, or ecosocialism, diagnoses the cause of our environmental ills as our social
relations themselves. In the words of prominent anarchist ecosocialist Murray Bookchin, 'nearly
all our present ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems...To make this point
more concrete: economic, ethnic, cultural, and gender conflicts, among many others, lie at the
core of the most serious ecological dislocations we face today.'
6
Furthermore, even 'the idea of
dominating nature has its primary source in the domination of human by human and the
structuring of the natural world into a hierarchical Chain of Being.' 7
As far as we know, the first people to write about the connection between environmental
degradation and exploitative social relations were Marx and Engels. Here are just two examples:
The social science of the bourgeoisie, classical political economy, is predominantly
occupied only with the directly intended social effects of human actions connected
with production and exchange. This fully corresponds to the social organisation
of which it is the theoretical expression. When individual capitalists are engaged
in production and exchange for the sake of the immediate profit, only the nearest,
most immediate results can be taken into account in the first place. When an
individual manufacturer or merchant sells a manufactured or purchased
commodity with only the usual small profit, he is satisfied, and he is not
concerned as to what becomes of the commodity afterwards or who are its
purchasers. The same thing applies to the natural effects of the same actions.
4
Callicott, p 94.
5
Taylor, Respectfor Nature
,
p. 254
' Bookchin, 'What is Social Ecology9 ', p 354
7
Bookchin, 'What is Social Ecology9 ', p 365.
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What did the Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of
the mountainsides and obtained from the ashes sufficient fertilizer for one
generation of very highly profitable coffee trees, care that the tropical rainfall
washed away the now unprotected upper stratum of the soil, leaving behind onlv
bare rock?
8 y
The long production time (which comprises a relatively small period of working
time) and the great length of the periods of turnover entailed make forestry an
industry of little attraction to private and therefore capitalist enterprise, the latter
being essentially private even if the associated capitalist takes the place of the
individual capitalist. The development of culture and of industry in general has
ever evinced itself in such energetic destruction of forests that everything done by
it conversely for their preservation and restoration appears infinitesimal
.
9
The ecosocialist view is that this state of affairs is legitimated in pan by a free market
ideology which excuses the anti-environmental excesses of capital on the basis of the market's
being a fair game in which capital and labour compete with themselves and each other and in
which raw materials are the 'free gift of Nature to capital .' 10
Unless we realize that the present market society, structured around the brutally
competitive imperative of 'grow or die,' is a thoroughly impersonal, self-operating
mechanism, we will falsely tend to blame technology as such or population
growth as such for environmental problems. We will ignore their root causes,
such as trade for profit, industrial expansion, and the identification of 'progress'
with corporate self-interest . 11
Bookchin's vision of an adequate alternative to the present market society reads strikingly
like the first list of points of the deep ecology position (above). His recommendations include
decentralization, use of alternative energies, organic agriculture, 'versatile industrial installations,'
recycling, 'production of high-quality goods that can last for generations,' 'substitution of creative
work for insensate labor,' and 'the leisure to be artful and engage in public affairs.' In addition,
Bookchin advises an anarchist politics modeled after (improvements on) Athenian democracy and
communal control over the means of production. Parochialism is to be checked by having the
local communities participate in a confederacy of interdependence.
1 "
x
Engels, p. 295f.
9
Marx, cited in Parsons, ed., p. 184
10
Marx, cited in Parsons, ed., p 171.
11
Bookchin, 'What is Social Ecology?', p 355
12
Bookchin, 'What is Social Ecology?', p 370f.
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5
-4 Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology
It is a truism in religion and politics that the more two groups' views have in common, the
more cantankerous their relationship. Deep ecology and ecosocialism are no exception.
Deep ecologists seem to have two main objections to ecosocialism, and these are
presented clearly by deep ecologist Warwick Fox in The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its
Parallels' (in Michael E. Zimmerman, ed„ Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical
Ecology [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993], pp. 213-232). Fox accuses ecosocialism (as
represented by Bookchin) of being anthropocentric and unrealistically deterministic.
Advocates of these approaches say in essence: 'Since the real root of our problems
is...capitalism, for example, we must first get our interactions between humans
right (...with respect to the redistribution of wealth...) and then everything else
(including our ecological problems) will fall into place.’ Any form of direct
concern with the question of the relationship between humans and the nonhuman
world is thus trumped by concerns about the resolution of specific interhuman
problems. The nonhuman world retains its traditional status as the background
against which the significant action—human action—takes place. 13
Bookchin...correctly observes that it is possible for a relatively ecologically benign
human society also to be extremely oppressive internally (he offers the example
of ancient Egyptian society), and yet, on the other hand, he fails to see that the
reverse can also apply—that is, that it is possible for a relatively egalitarian
human society to be extremely exploitative ecologically. For Bookchin, to accept
this latter point would be to argue against the basis of his own social ecology,
since in his view a nonhierarchical, decentralist, and cooperative society is ’a
society that will live in harmony with nature because its members live in harmony
with each other’...Bookchin...insists far too much that there is a straightforward,
necessary relationship between the internal organization of human societies and
their treatment of the nonhuman world. 14
Bookchin replies to these criticisms in ’Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and
Fox,' but his reply is focused rather narrowly (though justifiably) on his own writing. I would like
to take this opportunity to offer a reply not tied to a particular version of ecosocialism. Instead, I
would like to show that Fox's criticisms are in part inconsistent with the deep ecology he defends.
The first thing to notice is that ecosocialism is no more anthropocentric than deep ecology
itself. The list of priorities which Fox attributes to ecosocialism—first, solve capitalism, then all
else will follow—is a misleading caricature of ecosocialist priorities and strategy, as I think is
13
Fox, p 221
14
Fox, p. 220
evident even in the very brief presentation in the above section. It is precisely because
ecosocialism, like deep ecology, acknowledges the entanglement of interhuman and human-
nonhuman affairs that there is in fact no meaningful or effective way of prioritizing one over the
other. It is not mere sloganism on the pan of ecosocialists to claim that fighting against pollution
and resource depletion entails fighting against a particular ethic of the marketplace and against a
conception of private property (whether one recognizes that this is what one is doing or not). For
Fox to reject this proposition he would have to reject deep ecology point 1.5, replacing it perhaps
with a call to (1) ask nicely if the owners of property and the means of production would please
stop polluting and wasting resources while (2) holding that it is in the end entirely up to them
(morally as well as legally).
Fox's charge of determinism is simply disingenuous, for he admits in the same paragraph
that one may certainly speak in terms of certain forms of human social organization being more
conducive to certain kinds of relationships with the nonhuman world than others.' It is only then
that he complains that Bookchin insists far too much that there is a straightforward relationship...',
signaling what is an uncharitable and virtually ad hominem argument. Let us suppose that
capitalism is 'merely' conducive to, rather than determinate of, ecological disaster. Then let us
consider the extant to which it is conducive. That is, let us note the actual relationship between
capital, the market, and the abuse of the Earth. Whether this is determinism or just 'conducivism'
the prescription which follows is the same: reject the unrestricted market.
Such are two possible replies to deep ecology's criticisms of ecosocialism. Some of the
content of the ecosocialist dissatisfaction with deep ecology has already been hinted at. Put more
bluntly, deep ecology as a school has developed a pathological reluctance to take clear stands on
issues of social and political policy. Naess and Rothenberg's less than three pages on The Deep
Ecological Movement and the Big Political Issues' 15 speak volumes in virtue of their brevity. In
those short pages they consider the affinities of deep ecology with capitalism, socialism,
communism, and anarchism, and end up with no conclusions. The depth of the discussion is
15
Naess and Rothenberg, p 156
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sounded when they explain socialism's ecologically good and bad points by listing respective
socialist slogans. I call this ’pathological' not to condemn with mere words but to indicate what
the prognosis is for the patient. Deep ecology's refusal to engage in social critique is in direct
practical contradiction with its purported goals. The result is, at best, an incoherent program. At
worst, it is implicit (not merely tacit) approval of social injustices.
To take just one example: deep ecology point II.4 becomes the target of much ecosocialist
criticism to the effect that deep ecology is simplistic and insensitive. Indeed, not much critical
work needs to be done to support this accusation after the deep ecologists have incriminated
themselves. While at least some deep ecologists seem to recognize the inverse correlation
between quality of life and population (McLaughlin, p. 182), even they seem blind to the causal
relationship between the high quality of life/low birth rate of westerners and the low quality of
life/high birth rate among those people in the Third World who are propping up the former with
their cheap labor and abhorrent working conditions (in some cases slavery—e.g., the condition of
child workers in the Pakistani rug industry). Sometimes this blindness comes across in language
which seems to assume that we are all just 'doing our own thing':
Considering only human numbers overlooks the importance of styles of life that
humans adopt [my emphasis], A person living in an industrial area places far
greater stress on the biosphere than does a person living in the Third World [not
to mention the stress the former person places on the latter person]. 16
At other times this blindness comes across in meager, vague, but dark hints at suggestions for
policy:
It is important...that such attitudes [favouring a reduction in human population]
should be known by people at large. Otherwise there is little prospect that the
groups with a reduction as a distant goal will press for appropriate changes in
taxation and other tools of influence. 17
Just who is to be taxed, and why? A baby tax? The racist and classist (remember
Thatcher's poll tax) implications of such a suggestion, at the domestic as well as global level, are
such that it is hard to seriously believe that this is what Naess and Rothenberg have in mind. And
if not this, what then? An alternative would be to change the social relations so that First World
16
McLaughlin, p 216.
l7
Naess and Rothenberg, p. 142.
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affluence is not riding on the Third World's back (and so that analogous relations in the domestic
sphere are altered as well). Addressing this last suggestion requires (as ecosocialists recognize) a
substantive critique of international capitalism's relation to both global poverty and global
pollution. These relations are concerns outside of the interest of the deep ecology platform,
although the symptoms and the need to do something radical about them are given lip-service to in
1.3, 4, 7 and 11.6 and 8. Of course, given their endorsement of governments’ having policies
limiting population, and their belief that economic and technological changes conducive to
population reduction cannot be effected in time, they might not, if pressed, preclude sterilization
as an emergency measure. This is not just a nightmare found in distopian science fiction. It is a
crime that has been practiced even in the United States with the sanction of the legislatures, the
courts, and of course the medical establishment. 18 Will deep ecologists take a stand against this
solution to their favorite problem?
So how do the deep ecologists propose getting from here to there? One answer follows:
A term that is useful here is ’naturalist,' in its original, deep romantic sense
(Sessions and Devall, 1985, pp. 79ff). We engage not teachers as we know them
today but instead people who have internalised the deep ecological norms, even if
a small minority, and make them more central in the day-to-day dealings of
communities. It is here that such naturalists, by their very example, can get
people aware of things that they never thought of before, and they will thus help
with internalising of norms in the larger populace. 19
Bookchin questions the viability of such ecological proselytizing without complementary
efforts for change in social relations:
Can we blame working people for using cars when the logistics of American
society were deliberately structured by General Motors and the energy industry
around highways? Can we blame middle-class people for purchasing suburban
homes when cities were permitted to deteriorate and real-estate hucksters
merchandised an 'American Dream' of subdivisions, ranch-type dwellings, and a
two-car garage? Can we blame blacks, Hispanic peoples, and other minority
groups for reaching out to own television sets, appliances, and clothing when all
the basic material means of life were denied to them for generations?
2"
18
'Most of the dissenters felt that sterilization would be a good thing for the defective or mentally diseased,
but that it did not apply to their cases—such complaints only as one would expect from a mentally
unbalanced person ' Gosney and Popenoe, p xiv
19
Naess and Rothenberg, p. 159f.
20
Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society, p 39
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Naess and Rothenberg speak the truth when they write, 'In short, there is clearly both in
capitalist and socialist politics things which can be modified and used in sane ecopolitics, but
essentially green politics will be something deeply different.'21 Indeed, it will be something
deeply different, but will that be...nothing at all?
5.5 Vegetarian Critique of the Two Ecologies
The title of this chapter is ’Animals in Utopia,’ yet the reader will have noticed that not
one word about animals has been said until now. This is because the issues of animal welfare and
animal rights go almost untouched by either deep ecology or social ecology. How will the
vegetarian critique of these two systems of environmental ethics differ from the critique of the
animal-insensitive mainstream? The answer is that the failure of environmentalisms to address
the animal rights issue involves them in self-contradictions. This section is dedicated to picking
out of each view whatever might indicate a stance on the issues of animal rights, animal welfare,
or vegetarianism. Each set of ’pickings’ is then followed by a critique of that movement’s failure to
deal adequately with those issues.
5.5.1 The Vegetarian Critique of Deep Ecology
Deep ecology pretends to be sensitive to the sufferings of nonhuman animals and to favor,
as in 1.2, an egalitarianism between the species. However, when it comes down to specifics deep
ecology is as weak on the issue of human-animal relationships as it is on the issue of (interhuman)
social relationships. So, for example, 1.2 says 'biospherical egalitarianism—in principle. The "in
principle" clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and
suppression.'
22
Naess does not explain what he means by 'realistic praxis' and 'some killing.'
Avoiding such explanations undercuts the meaningfulness of deep ecology.
For example, hunting is implicitly condoned by Naess throughout his work, although he
takes exception to needless suffering. He says that 'it is a serious matter when animals are
21
Naess and Rothenberg, p. 160.
22
Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep,' p 95
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submitted to painful experiments in order to test the chemicals used, for example, in food
colourings. Human beings are closer to us than animals, but there is no unsatisfied vital human
need driving the food cosmetic industry.' Is an unsatisfied vital need driving the beef industry? Is
an unsatisfied vital human need driving hunting at all times in all places? Deep ecology's answer
is hard to discern as Naess and Rothenberg are loath to take a substantive stand on what counts as
a vital need:
The term 'vital need' is vague to allow for considerable latitude in judgement.
Differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in the
structures of societies as they now exist, need to be considered. Also the
difference between a means to the satisfaction of the need and the need must be
considered. If a whaler in an industrial culture quits whaling he may risk
unemployment under the present economic conditions. Whaling is for him an
important means. But in a rich country with a high standard of living whaling is
not a vital need.
23
Presumably, in keeping with II. 3, this last point can be made with respect to any use of
nature, not just whaling. 'A rich country with a high standard of living' does not exist merely by
the grace of God. The people in that rich country 'interfere' with naturefas Naess and Sessions
misanthropically put it, invoking the same duality between humans and nonhumans that their
'biocentricism' supposedly disqualifies) no less than the whaler does. We can make this point with
a parody of the argument above: if a farmer in an industrial culture quits farming he may risk
unemployment under the present economic conditions; farming is for him an important means;
but in a rich country with a high standard of living farming is not a vital need. The implication in
this case is that fanning would be wrong in this context, just as the implication in the original case
is that whaling is wrong in some contexts. The original argument seems to be vacuous.
Vital need' is too problematic a concept to lean on uncritically. It cannot be called upon
to pinch hit for specifics regarding the proper relationship between humans and animals. Henry
Salt noted this over one hundred years ago when he wrote (reading 'necessary' for 'vital'):
It may be said, and with truth, that the perilous vagueness of the word 'necessary'
must leave a convenient loop-hole of escape to anyone who wishes to justify his
own treatment of animals, however unjustifiable that treatment may appear; the
vivisector will assert that his practice is necessary in the interests of science, the
23
Naess and Rothenberg, p. 30.
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flesh-eater that he cannot maintain his health without animal food, and so on
through the whole category of systematic oppression
.
24
Other deep ecologists have followed Naess and Rothenberg in failing to come to grips
with the animals issue. Devall and Sessions devote one brief paragraph sympathizing with 'the
callous way technological society treats nonhumans .'25 Then they devote another brief paragraph
to criticizing animal liberation philosophy (with no references, no philosophical charity, and no
substantive argument), charging it with leading to human chauvinism. They devote a third brief
paragraph criticizing animal liberation philosophy for not acknowledging the moral standing of
non-sentient beings. This concludes Devall and Sessions' discussion of human-animal
relationships. It is all of one page in length, at the end of which one has hardly even a vague idea
of where they stand on animal exploitation itself. One only knows that they do not like the animal
liberationists' approach; Devall and Sessions follow their mentor in offering no alternative
approach to the same issues. McLaughlin goes through the same routine when he criticizes animal
liberationism for being based on an individualist ethic; no alternative is offered except for a brief
endorsement of Callicott's distinction between domestic and wild animals, as though that
distinction entails any particular policies with respect to either . 26
Having lambasted the deep ecologists for failing to take any noticeable stand on behalf of
animals, I must now bring attention to the exception which proves the rule. Like all self-styled
New Age prophets, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet and deep ecologist Gary Snyder rides on the
spiritual gravy train with an eclectic collection of non-western traditions and peddles them out of
context. An excellent example of this is the following poem and its companion essay:
SONG OF THE TASTE
Eating the living germs of grasses
Eating the ova of large birds
the fleshy sweetness packed
around the sperm of swaying trees
The muscles of the flanks and thighs of
soft-voiced cows
24
Salt, p 106f.
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Devall and Sessions, p 54.
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the bounce in the lamb's leap
the swish in the ox's tail
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Eating roots grown swoll
inside the soil
Drawing on life of living
clustered points of light spun
out of space
hidden in the grape.
Eating each other's seed
eating
ah, each other.
Kissing the lover in the mouth of bread:
lip to Up . 27
This homage to burgers, lambchops, and ox tail soup apparently derives its inspiration
from 'people who live entirely by hunting, such as the Eskimo, [who] know that taking life is an
act requiring a spirit of gratitude and care, and rigorous mindfulness .'28 But the orgiastic
celebration of flesh-eating that is Snyder's poem and essay divorces itself from any considerations
of context or differences in needs between Eskimos in Alaska and Iowans in the grain belt. On the
contrary, Snyder seems to think that merely borrowing certain attitudes and rituals from Naive
Americans will suffice to excuse our (speaking as a non-Indian) own consumption of meat:
How to accomplish [an understanding of non-harming as an approach to all of
living and being]? We can start by saying Grace. ..To say a good grace you must
be conscious of what you're doing, not guilt-ridden and evasive. So we look at the
nature of eggs, apples, and oxtail ragout. What we see is plenitude, even excess,
a great sexual exuberance...
Snyder's uninhibited disclosure of his feelings for the meat on his table is admirable, but I
fail to see how saying grace turns meat-eating into a harmless activity.
The shallowness of New Age culture sounds like thunder in writings like Snyder's. The
general view seems to be that some crystals, poetry, and nods to women and indigenous peoples
will suffice to give a ceremonial stamp of approval to the exploitation of animals (sort of like going
to a notary public, only much more expensive, as anyone who has been in a New Age store
knows). I agree with Dolores LaChapelle that ritual is or should be an important part of our fives.
27
Snyder, in Devall and Sessions, p 12
28
Snyder, in Devall and Sessions, p 12f.
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However, I am disturbed by the uncritical and naive way in which this is usually discussed in
connection with animal consumption
.
29
The mere presence of ceremony does not legitimate
indigenous peoples’ consumption of animals anymore than going through a funeral ritual would
legitimate burying someone alive. A ritual is just one part of an entire context in which some
action is appropriate. I am not living in an Eskimo-like context, and the borrowing of their rituals
in order to somehow associate myself with their culture will not suffice to establish the propriety
of my borrowing their diet. An objection along these lines was urged by Salt:
It does not follow because an Eskimo, for example, may appropriately wear fur, or
a Red Indian feathers, that this apparel will be equally becoming to the
inhabitants of London or New York; on the contrary, an act which is perfectly
natural in the one case, is often a sign of crass vulgarity in the other. Hercules,
clothed triumphant in the spoils of the Nemean lion, is a subject for painter and
poet; but what if he had purchased the skin, ready dressed, from a contemporary
manufacturer?
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I have shown why I think that deep ecology has been lax in its responses to the concerns
of animal liberation. The problem, though, runs deeper than a mere lack of interest (Snyder's
deep interest in meat-eating notwithstanding). The absence of a clear stand on the vegetarian
question entails the absence of a clear stand on deep ecology itself, for vegetarianism offers deep
ecology the otherwise unspoken means to the latter's ends. To have no stand on vegetarianism is
to have no stand on land use, availability of food, quality of life, the population question, and the
ethics of human-nonhuman interaction at the level of individuals.
Vegetarianism in practice means less land for grazing and more efficient use of land in
growing food (grains need not be inefficiently converted into cow flesh). This in turn allows for a
decrease in land set aside for large fields and other necessities of the meat industry (e.g., feed lots
and slaughterhouses) and an increase in wildlife populations and diversity. The more efficient use
of land makes it possible to feed more people using fewer resources. Both the increase in
accessibility of nature and the availability of food are conducive (together with changes in
relations of distribution) to the goal of improving the quality of life, which in turn is conducive to
29
Including LaChapelle's example of ceremony in connection with the consumption of salmon See her
article 'Ritual is Essential,' in Devall and Sessions, pp 247-250.
30
Salt, p 83.
131
a (non-oppressive) decrease in birth rates. The stand against cruelty is also a stand for better use
of other resources such as those science and education resources (including the scientists
themselves) which are devoted to the use of animals as laboratory equipment. As Marjorie Spiegel
notes, 'Billions of tax-dollars are spent each year to literally torture animals—supposedly for our
benefit—while many humans in this country lack access to even basic health care.'31 Finally,
vegetarianism offers concrete suggestions for an ethical practice that expresses and develops the
kind of sensitivity to nonhuman values and suffering to which deep ecology only pays New Age lip
service.
5.5.2 The Vegetarian Critique of Social Ecology
Social ecology is even more disappointing than deep ecology on the animals issue. Like
deep ecologists, ecosocialists take little interest in human-animal relations; the reason this is more
disappointing is because social ecology in so many respects represents the practice to deep
ecology's theory. The situation is so bad that, with the notable exception of Ted Benton,
ecosocialist writings (in my experience) do not even offer up deep ecology’s lip service to animal
suffering; there is nothing to cite.
Ted Benton is the exception, but his otherwise sophisticated analysis of animal oppression,
which contains also a thoughtful critical analysis of socialism's inadequacies with respect to the
animals issue, is marred by the surprising appearance of two arguments against vegetarianism.
Consider how remarkably contradictory these two arguments are with respect to socialism in
general and ecosocialism in particular:
The rights argument [e.g., of Regan] is very difficult to square with the practice of
killing animals for food at all—most advocates of animal rights think that it
implies an obligation to vegetarianism (I think they are wrong about
this
—
growing vegetable crops involves habitat changes which cause the deaths of
animals which would otherwise live where crops are grown, so that the rights of
these animals have to be put into the balance, too: it is a fact about the human
predicament that we cannot live without causing the deaths of other animals).
This passage is footnoted thus:
11
Spiegel, p 62.
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Benton, p 159f.
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Quite independently of this general argument, it is also clear that the modem
agn-food' system implicates virtually all food production in animal abuse, in ways
which make the option of vegetarianism increasingly difficult to sustain. See, for
^^
p
^
e,
5
J
33
Erlichman
’
Vegetarians Face Dairy Dilemma,' Guardian, 18 October
I will deal with the footnote's argument first. The article by Erlichman is unavailable to
the present author; it is unfortunate that Benton did not summarize its main points. Benton's own
argument, however, seems to go like this:
(1) Modem methods of food production are animal abusive.
(2) If (1), then (2b) we cannot be vegetarians.
(3) If (2b), then it is OK for us not to be vegetarians.
(4) .'. It is OK for us not to be vegetarians.
There are two problems with this argument, both arising from ambiguity. First of all, line
(1)
is actually too vague to count as meaningfully true or false. The Archer Daniel Midlands
Company might be abusing animals in its production, but the organic farmers over in the next
county are not.
Secondly, time is brought in as a factor in line (1) and then dropped. But the
(hypothetical) truth of (1) has no straightforward bearing on the moral obligation of
vegetarianism in either the past or the future. Either the time factor must be dropped from (1), or
it must be introduced in the other premises. It cannot be dropped, because it is not true that all
past food production was animal abusive. So it must be introduced in the other premises (I
change the word 'modem' to 'current' for reasons of grammar) thus:
(1) Current methods of food production are animal abusive.
(2) If (1), then (2b) we cannot currently be vegetarians.
(3) If (2b), then it is OK for us currently not to be vegetarians.
(4) It is OK for us currently not to be vegetarians.
This argument, even if sound, only addresses vegetarian practice and does no damage to
ethical vegetarianism as a moral doctrine. There is nothing odd (indeed, everything reasonable)
33
Benton, p. 237, n.24.
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about saying to oneself, The owners of production have fixed things so that, no matter how I try
to avoid it, the satisfaction of my needs implicates me in animal abuse. Well, maybe I cannot be a
practicing vegetarian in the full sense right now, but 1 can join with others to alter this situation so
that the animals can be free of their oppressors (including this reluctant one!), and I and those
who are like-minded can be free to be neither oppressor nor oppressed (forced to support the
system of abuse).' That Benton, a radical philosopher, fails to see this is most surprising. Would
he have a poor but well-informed American renounce the cause of Third World labour just because
she herself might be able to afford no better than clothes from K Mart, which stocks almost
nothing but imported items produced in singularly exploitative conditions? Of course not. This
comparison brings out a problem with (2). If vegetarianism is taken to be a progressive ideology,
and one which excuses the killing and even eating of animals where it is unavoidable, the inability
of a person to control all the political, geographical, and economic factors in her life in such a way
as to avoid these activities does not preclude her from being an ethical vegetarian any more than
the analogous situation precludes the K Mart shopper from being a Marxist. So much for that
argument.
The other argument is slippery. One way to formalize it is like this:
(1) Humans cannot live without causing the deaths of other animals.
(2) If (1), then (3).
(3) Vegetarianism is not obligatory.
Line (1) is an empirical claim, and is doubtlessly true (except in very science-fictiony
scenarios!). For line (2) to be true, vegetarianism would have to just be 'the practice of not
causing the deaths of other animals.' But this is not what it is. For argument's sake, let us
consider vegetarianism as the doctrine that humans should not engage in the needless killing or
eating of other animals. Then line (2) says 'if humans cannot live without causing the deaths of
other animals, then it is OK for humans to engage in needless killing and eating of other animals.'
There is no comparison between the killing of indigenous animals involved in ploughing, sowing,
and reaping fields of human-destined grain and the killing of indigenous animals involved in
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ploughing, sowing, and reaping the many more fields involved in the production of enough cow-
and pig-destined grain to feed the same number of people as that first field would. Then add to the
second toll the millions and millions of cows and pigs and chickens that are killed—that indeed are
deliberately bred in massive numbers year after year for this specific fate. I conclude that to
compare the incidental animal deaths involved in the production of several tons of tofu with the
intentional and massive slaughter involved in the production of several tons of hamburger would
be laughable were it not so tragic.
These considerations suggest another criticism, one that applies to both Benton's explicit
anti-vegetarianism and to other ecosocialists’ lack of commitment either way. It is inconsistent to
be concerned with social justice and not critique at least the inefficiency entailed in feed-grain
production (one might also add a critique of the conditions, physical and psychological, of
slaughterhouse workers 44 ). Make no mistake: the very expression 'feed-grain' is self-accusatory.
We are not using cows to convert human-inedible grasses into cow-flesh, rather we are using them
to convert huge amounts of perfectly edible grain into far fewer amounts of meat.
Benton's program is largely negative, showing up the inadequacies of both liberalism and
socialism with respect to the animals issue. While he makes almost no references in Natural
Relations to ecosocialism, his critique of Marx from the animals issue standpoint is a good
historical starting point and still applies to contemporary eco-socialists like Bookchin (however
much he may distance himself from Marxists) and David Pepper. Some reference will be made to
that critique in dealing with the next question: why has socialism in general and ecosocialism in
particular ignored the animals issue?
5.5.3 Past Connections
Socialism has anthropocentric, even if environmentally conscious, roots in Marx and
Engels. Their environmentalism is predicated on an indirect concern with appropriate behavior
toward nature which rides on their direct concern with appropriate behavior between humans.
14 Adams and Proctor-Smith, p 300f
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This attitude toward the environment is still manifest among ecosocialists, and no where more
shamelessly than in the works of David Pepper, who asserts a 'Marxist socialist, monist,
anthropocentric position of egalitarian development and growth through human labour and
scientific ingenuity, to satisfy materially limited but ever richer human needs through democratic,
collective, planned production that emphasizes resource conservation, non-pollution, recycling and
quality landscapes.'
35 He proclaims proudly (on behalf of whom?) that 'eco-socialism is
anthropocentric (though not in the capitalist-technocratic sense) and humanist. It rejects the
bioethic and nature mystification.’36
The problems begin with Marx's tendency to view humans as different in kind from other
animals. Benton notes the following two elements supporting human/nature dualisms in the 1844
Manuscripts: first, 'the use of the human/animal contrast as Marx's central device in the ethical
critique of the estrangement of labour under regimes of private property1
;
second, 'the specific
content Marx gives to his vision of human emancipation as involving the "humanization of
nature".’
3
' Benton has in mind passages such as the following:
The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish
itself from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of
his will and of his consciousness... Estranged labour reverses this relationship, so
that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life-activity, his
essential being, a mere means to his existence .
38
On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes
everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers—human
reality and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers—that all objects
become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and
realize his individuality, become his objects. 39
So, animality is a state to be avoided, and nature is a thing to be appropriated. What
could be more anthropocentric than to devalue animals and regard the value of nature as merely
the value of utility (including here the value of study and aesthetic appreciation)? Furthermore,
because there is no denying (indeed, much affirmation in the Manuscripts') the many
35
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commonalities between humans and nonhumans, especially nonhuman animals, human essence
must be not only different from but above the animal part of the human (otherwise an animal-like
existence would be merely different, not necessarily of less value).
Man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal
functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in
dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be
anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human
becomes animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human
functions. But in the abstraction which separates them from the sphere of all
other human activity and turns them into sole and ultimate ends thev are
animal .40
’
Benton brings to our attention at least three unfortunate consequences of Marx’s
conceptions and relative evaluations of animals, particularly where there is an identification of
physical need with animal need. First, there are two problems centered on humans themselves:
This suggests a denial of the complexity and diversity of the emotional,
psychological and social lives of other animals. Such a denial renders merely
rhetorical Marx's characterization of history as ’nature developing into man,’ and
cuts off two significant sources of insight into human nature and history. The
first, which would require giving serious theoretical content to the idea of 'nature
developing into man,' would be an inquiry into the prehistorical origins of the
human species, and the processes of our differentiation from other primate
lineages [such a project cannot be enlightening, says the dualistic Marxist view,
because there is no shared essence between modem humans and our ancestors]
.
The second, in part dependent for its rational justification on the first
(that is, a recognition of the kinship of humans and other animals), would be a
comparative psychology and ethology [rather than just comparative physiology]
in which what is genuinely distinctive about human beings could be viewed in the
fight of what is shared between human and non-human animals . 41
The third problem is intertwined with the first two but more directly relevant to the issue
of our moral obligations to other animals:
If, under regimes of private property, humans five a merely animal existence [and
this is considered bad, and is one of the motivators of the critique of capitalism]
,
what space is left for a critique of the condition of animals themselves under
regimes of private property?
42
As the writings of Pepper indicate, these difficulties do not begin and end with Marx.
Even Murray Bookchin, who seems (unlike Pepper) to recognize a broad range of moral
40
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patients, avoids any direct treatment of animal rights. Although he is often at pains to distance
himself from Marx, this unfortunate omission is due to the fact that he buys into this same duality
of the human and nonhuman, referring to the two realms as 'second' and 'first' nature, respectively.
First nature is the (we could say 'mere') physical or animal aspect of our existence; 'second' nature
is that which is distinctively human.
It is a disappointing fact that social progressives have for the most part ignored animals.
It is particularly sad when we consider those occasional exceptions in the nineteenth century
which somehow never took off to have influence over progressive movements in our own time. I
am thinking particularly of socialist Henry Salt, who believed that there was an intimate
connection between justice for humans and justice for animals. I am thinking also of the various
utopian communitarian movements, like the Shakers, who included vegetarianism in their social
ideal.
44
It is not clear that the Shakers' diet was predicated on a concern for the welfare of the
animals themselves, and Salt never pursued the justice for animals-justice for humans connection
to any great depth except to point out the Kantian line about cruelty to animals translating into
cruelty to humans (it is clear, though, that Salt did not deny, as Kant did, that animals actually
have rights). Nevertheless, vegetarianism could have played a significant role as part of a general
culture of resistance to domination, urbanization, mechanization, etc. Vegetarian socialists could
also have appealed to anarchist Peter Kropotkin's ethological studies of animals not only to fight
against the competitive norm, for which his book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1989) was much-needed ammunition against Spencerian social darwinists, but
43 He writes approvingly of nonWestem attitudes toward nonsentient objects of nature, noting that in 'this
early technical imagination, . . . work was distinguished by its capacity to discover the "voice" of substance, not
simply to fashion an inert "natural resource" into desired objects ' Even when claiming that 'we are at a
hopeless epistemic distance from such attitudes, Bookchin betrays his belief in the intrinsic value of all
aspects of nature: 'We know quite well that ores do not reproduce themselves in exhausted mines, that ivory
does not conceal an animate being, and that animals do not obligingly respond to hunting ceremonies But
these fancies may serve to inculcate a human respect for nature and cause people to cherish its bounty as
more than exploitable "natural resources'" (Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom , p 233f. ).
44
Then there is Edward Carpenter, a friend of Salt's. Carpenter was an active in 'vegetarianism, feminism,
Fabian Socialism, prison reform, anti-pollution legislation, nudism, and sexual freedom [including] defences
of homosexuality as a legitimate natural preference'—Gregerson, p 79
138
also as an opening salvo in a fight against the artificial separation of the lot of people from the lot
of animals, as the book addresses interspedes cooperation as well as intraspecies cooperation.
I present here a section of a remarkable speech which was given at a meeting of the
Massachusetts Soriety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals on March 30, 1869. The speech
was given by New England Transcendentalist James Freeman Clarke. To me, this speech
represents a lost opportunity; with almost no alterations (there is just one occurrence of the word
'animal') Clarke could have been speaking of the relation of capital to labour:
What is Cruelty?
Brother Kirk has told us about cruelty—that it is the love of inflicting
pain. Let me add that it is bom from the sense of power. It is the diabolical
feeling which grows up in the human heart out of the love of power and its
possession. If you give men power, they love to see it exercised, and then
sometimes comes this corrupt love of inflicting pain. But I do not think that most
of the cruelty inflicted in our community arises from that source. I do not think it
is so devilish as that. I believe it oftener comes from the other motives that have
been spoken of again and again to-night. If there is anything infernal about it, it
is the infernal love of money; it is because men are in such a hurry to get rich that
they sacrifice everything else to that. If they can get a little more pay by letting a
poor animal suffer, they will do it. They do not want to hurt him; they do not
care anything about it, one way or the other. They had just as lief he would not
suffer. It is a matter of pure indifference. All they want is to get their heavy load
carried, and be paid for it. All they want is to get their money for the white flesh
of calves. It is the love of money.
45
5.5.4 The Present Obstacles between Vegetarianism and the Two Ecologies
It is one thing to trace the history (or lack of it) of animal concerns in socialism and other
progressive and communitarian movements. Another question is, why the lack of concern now?
Prioritization is the problem. People do not see the animals as deserving of the kind of
attention that, as things now stand, we have not adequately granted to our fellow humans.
Just as Nero fiddled while Rome burned, many in the West agonise over the fate
of seal pups and cormorants while human beings elsewhere starve or are
enslaved.
46
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However, in The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror,
1989) Marjorie Spiegel argues against the practicality of separating animal liberation from human
liberation:
Any oppression helps to prop up other forms of oppression. This is why it is vital
to link oppressions in our minds, to look for the common, shared aspects, and
fight against them as one, rather than prioritizing victims' suffering. 4,
Spiegel's book contains numerous photographs and sketches starkly illustrating the
similarities between the treatment of blacks in antebellum America and the treatment of animals
today. She knows that people will be taken aback by comparisons between human and animal
suffering precisely because many believe that the greater worth and obvious injustice involved in
the first case makes such a comparison odious. Some people, for example, find even the
expression 'animal liberation' offensive precisely because it represents an attempt to put the cause
for the alleviation of the animals' condition on a par with the causes of oppressed human groups
(e.g., women’s liberation) by using language that draws attention to the similarities. On the other
hand, this is not always the reaction of opponents; at least one philosopher finds the concept of
'animal liberation' appalling precisely because he finds the concepts of ’women’s liberation' and
’black liberation’ appalling.
48
Spiegel argues that prioritization is a mistake. She notes that it 'often leads to infighting'
and traps us into 'actively struggling to prove to our oppressors...that we are similar to our
oppressors.' The first factor lets the oppressors divide and conquer, the second lets them
propagandize and recruit. This is not to say that, as individuals we should not choose to devote
most of our efforts to one particular movement. And it is not to deny that success on one front
might sometimes be a prerequisite for success on another. Rather, it is to criticize the kind of
prioritizing that attaches to false dilemmas
—
'it’s either us or the animals!' This kind of prioritizing
erroneously characterizes liberation as a zero-sum game.
47
Spiegel, p. 26.
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Levine, ’Philosophical Vegetarianism.' E g., Levine writes that 'anyone who perceives women's liberation
as the boundless self-assertion of its female protagonists and the grotesque self-abasement of its
male
protagonists will appreciate Singer's analogy,' p 15.
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Why do people prioritize in this way? I think one answer might be a lack of imagination
and information. The information readily available to most persons about meat is confined to
information about meat as a potential purchase; the facts surrounding the waste of grain and the
conditions of slaughterhouse workers (to name just two direct human concerns) are not included
in the advertising of billion-dollar hamburger chains and poultry distributors. By 'lack of
imagination I mean neglecting the fact that, even if there is no causal connection between the two
forms of oppression, every liberating movement can learn from the others about the many guises
of oppressive practice and how to resist them.
Another reason for the neglect of animals is the simple fact they do not have the power of
speech nor the means of (politically recognizable) protest. Hence, like working and exploited
children all over the world, their issues are easy to ignore.
5.6 Ecofeminism: A Radical Response to the Critique
Ecofeminists as a group have made one of their central concerns the examination of the
relationships between the many sites of oppression. Ecofeminists have different approaches to
studying the problem of human/nature relations and vary with respect to what they believe are
the most fundamental causes of the abuse directed toward women and nature. However,
ecofeminists share a basic insight. As spelled out below in Karen J. Warren's 'minimal condition
account,' that insight has exhibited a theoretical potential that goes beyond a narrow examination
of patriarchy vs. woman and patriarchy vs. nature:
As I use the term, eco-feminism is a position based on the following claims: (i)
there are important connections between the oppression of women and the
oppression of nature; (ii) understanding the nature of these connections is
necessary to any adequate understanding of the oppression of women and the
oppression of nature; (iii) feminist theory and practice must include an ecological
perspective; and (iv) solutions to ecological problems must include a feminist
• 49
perspective.
There are at least two different methods of categorizing philosophers' various approaches
to joint woman/nature oppression, but any attempt will necessarily simplify what people are
4<)
Warren, 'Feminism and Ecology,' p. 4
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actually doing in the field. For example, Plumwood divides ecofeminist theorists into three
groups:
1
. Those who locate the problem for both women and nature in their place
as part of a set of dualisms which have their origin in classical philosophy and
which can be traced through a complex history to the present.
2. Those who would locate the problem for both women and nature in the
rise of mechanistic science during the Enlightenment and pre-enlightenment
period.
3. Those who would offer an explanation of the link based on difference, e.g.
on sexually-differentiated personality formation or consciousness. 50
However, on this grouping, Plumwood finds some ecofeminists fall into more than one
category. For example, we find Ariel Kay Salleh and Elizabeth Dodson Gray in both (1) and (3). I
believe Susan Griffin could likewise be associated with both groups. Another method is to
categorize ecofeminists along the lines of the nearest view in feminist ethics generally. Thus,
following Merchant51 we can identify the most prominent schools as liberal ecofeminism, Marxist
ecofeminism, social ecofeminism (after Bookchin), socialist ecofeminism, and cultural
ecofeminism(Plumwood's third group). These labels are limited in their usefulness. The positions
overlap and ecofeminist philosophers rarely proclaim their allegiances by referring to themselves
with these labels. While Marti Kheel might be overstating the case when she says that, among
ecofeminists, 'no single ethical theory is sought at all,'
52
it nevertheless is apparent that
ecofeminist philosophers tend to bring to bear on their analyses of human/nature relations eclectic
assemblages of 'the insights of ecology, feminism, and socialism.’
53
Greta Gaard identifies as the
singular vision that unites ecofeminists the acknowledgment of 'the framework that authorizes
these forms of oppression [i.e. the forms that are the concern of socialists, animal liberationists,
ecologists, and feminists] as patriarchy, an ideology whose fundamental self/other distinction is
based on a sense of self that is separate, atomistic.'
54
These three—ecology/feminism/socialism
form a natural alliance by virtue of their shared opposition to that disconnected sense of self (here,
50 Plumwood, ’Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments,' p 121
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inconveniently, we must exclude liberal feminism). Ecofeminists have also been attentive to the
issues of racial and cultural domination. I will try to illustrate these aspects of ecofeminism by
way of a brief presentation of the ecofeminist critique of deep ecology. First, though, I would like
to point out one area of social criticism in which ecofeminism, particularly in its 'cultural' aspect, is
somewhat lacking.
5.6.1 The Margins around Ecofeminism
Prominent philosophers who are at least partially affiliated with the cultural ecofeminist
camp include Susan Griffin, Elizabeth Dodson Gray, and Ariel Kay Salleh (Merchant identifies
Salleh with social ecology, but Salleh’s critique of deep ecology depends on some of the
assumptions usually associated with cultural ecofeminism). Cultural ecofeminism rests on
difference theory (see Plumwood's third grouping, above). As explained in Plumwood's discussion
of the views of Dodson Gray, difference theorists emphasize the embodiment of human beings,
although not in a way that reduces psychology to biology:
The need of the male child to disown the primary sexual identification with the
female parent and to differentiate himself from the female results in the
formation of masculinity in negative terms, by exclusion, and especially by
exclusion of nurturance. The resulting personality must kill what is tender,
emotional and dependent, and has a need for mastery and control, to be active
and transforming with respect to nature...
Different bodily and reproductive experiences of women—of limitation,
of orientation to others, and of nurturance—result in different, less damaging
attitudes to nature and a different psychology and personality. 55
The problems with this view as a foundation for ecofeminism are rehearsed regularly in
the literature. Plumwood urges two objections: the difficulty of using this view to 'explain the
higher cultural value attached to the masculine side of the various dualisms, since difference is not
automatically inferiority1
;
and the fact that the view 'suffers from excessive scope of explanation,
since the differentiating reproductive experiences it appeals to are apparently culturally universal,
but the feature of hostility to nature is not.'
56
There is also the danger, noted by Merchant, that
women's own perpetuating of the woman-nature connection will only bolster the assumptions of
55 Plumwood, 'Ecofeminism,' p 129
v, Plumwood, 'Ecofeminism,' p 130f
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an ideology that devalues nature and, through identifying women with nature, keeps them in roles
it likewise devalues
.
57
Furthermore, 'this special relationship of women to nature and politics
makes it difficult to admit that men can also develop an ethic of caring for nature .’58 These are
just a few of the objections in the literature.
There is another problem with this view, and it is unintentionally brought to light by
something Seager says just before she defends difference theory.
Given the obvious fact that there are class, race, income, and status differences
among women within and between countries, it is at first glance difficult to
imagine how we can talk about a distinctive 'women’s' contribution to
environmentalism without falling into the simplistic essentializing and
universalizing that the notion of a 'women’s perspective' often engenders
.
59
While Seager is ready to recognize the reality of these differences as a challenge to
difference theory, the very formulation of the problem seems to assume a bipolar gender ontology
which marginalizes those who fall outside of traditional categories of sexual orientation, and/or
gender identification, and/or social role identification. The margin is unintentionally fortified not
so much by the mere inclusion of the following remarks but by their inclusion without any
discussion of the point I am raising:
Male-assimilated women are still the most successful corporate
leaders—otolaryngologists even report that women coming up through the ranks
of male-dominated organizations tend to force their voices into lower octaves as
their status rises .
60
Janis Birkeland makes almost the exact pair of claims:
Some mistakenly construe ecofeminism as conceiving of women as a 'homogenous
whole' (in opposition to men) without making adequate distinctions between
different races, nationalities, classes, and so on.. .The notion that women could
have some similarities in experience and consciousness across national and class
boundaries, due to certain shared conditions, is especially troublesome to those
who reduce social problems to the existence of classes . 61
We have seen women adopt 'masculine' personal processes to varying extents
when they wish to be part of a power structure, and, more optimistically, we have
seen some men become caring, gentle, and nondominating .62
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Ariel Salleh says something that has similarly marginalizing implications:
The suppression of the feminine is truly an all pervasive human universal. It is notjust a suppression of real, live, empirical women, but equally the suppression ofthe lemirune aspects of men's own constitution which is the issue here .63
It seems to me that the way the problem is phrased would be veiy discouraging to a
woman who does not feel that she identifies with the 'essential woman' theorized by these
ecofeminists. For not only does the mainstream patriarchy challenge her sense of self-worth by
(whether overbearingly or subtly) making her feel ill at ease for not fitting in with its conception
of what a woman is, but the cultural ecofeminist critique likewise unfairly challenges her self-
worth by not acknowledging her position and thus implicitly associating her with the opposition.
Of course, this is only in the absence of a more sophisticated presentation of the issue of social
construction of gender, and given their reluctance to embrace biological reductionism the way
might be open for philosophers of the cultural ecofeminist school to somehow reformulate their
hypothesis accordingly. However, this task must not be taken on as a slight adjustment to bring in
those who are in the margins, for that approach would itself, it seems to me, assume either the
kind of double-gendered conception of persons implied in Salleh’s remarks or a kind of gender
continuum, with pure masculinity one limit and pure femininity the other. The second is a
tempting way of bringing in everybody, since the operating assumption would presumably be that
no one is at either end but rather falls somewhere in between—a potentially liberating conception
for men who feel totally vested in patriarchy. I used to embrace this continuum view myself until
I realized that both it and the double-gendered conception assume that there is a set of purely
masculine and a set of purely feminine characteristics against which we can 'rank' a person. It
63
Salleh, p. 344 Although I turn a critical eye to Salleh's claims, I also support her recognition of the need
to make more explicit the fact that liberation is always liberation of the oppressor as well as the oppressed
This is too often a merely parenthetic point in progressive critiques (see for example Plant, pp. 158-159).
By bringing more attention to it and showing how systems of oppression contribute as well to the alienation
of the oppressor, progressives will do a better job of avoiding the implication that movements on behalf of
the oppressed can be analyzed in a standard game-theoretical model (one group of self-interested rational
agents against the other). One way to approach this is to encourage allies themselves (e g., feminist men) to
bring in more subjective discussions about their motivations for (and rewards of) putting their positions of
privilege at the disposal of oppressed groups. This is particularly relevant to animal rights theory and
activism The primary beneficiaries of the animal liberation movement are not the activists themselves.
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seems doubtful that gender-identification, sexual-orientation, and social role identification are
going to allow for that kind of uni-dimensional quantification.64
Whatever problems the difference-theoretical trend in ecofeminism has it is only one
source that ecofeminists have mined not only for their critique of existing systems of domination
but also for their critique of their environmentally progressive ideological neighbors, the deep
ecologists.
5.6.2 The Ecofeminist Critique of Deep Ecology
Ecofeminists have praised with qualification the groping intuitions and aspirations that
seem to motivate deep ecology, inasmuch as there are hints here and there of social concerns,
hints of a substantive critique of human/nature duality, etc. However, ecofeminists have also
found much that is unsatisfactory, even offensive, in deep ecology philosophy and practice. I
believe that three main criticisms can be pulled out of the writings of such ecofeminists as Val
Plumwood, Ariel Kay Salleh, Marti Kheel, and Joni Seager. I rely here primarily on the last of
these, but the gist of these criticisms can be found in the writings of the other three and of other
ecofeminists.
5.6.2. 1 Critique of the totalizing 'Self
The identification of oneself with all of nature, as spoken of by John Seed (above) and
Andrew McLaughlin and Ame Naess (below), is problematical.
More precisely stated, the ultimate norm of Ecosophy T [Naess' term for deep
ecology] is Self-realization. In Naess' system, Self is not understood as being the
same as self, but rather includes everything. To expand one's identification
outward from one's self to other humans is to move toward Self. To go further
toward an identification with all of nature is to identify with Self. This norm of
Self-realization 'thus includes personal and community self-realization, but is
conceived also to refer to an unfolding of reality as a totality.' [Naess, p. 84] This
all inclusive sense of realization is an endorsement of the self-realization of
all
—
people and the rest of nature. Given a sense of the interconnectedness of all
64
To see why this is a fundamental problem, try the following experiment: Pick up a ruler. Write the words
'pure masculinity' at one end and the words 'pure femininity' at the other. Now, what on earth are you going
to write at the 6-inch mark? 'Perfect 50/50 transgendered'9 'Hermaphroditism'? I suspect that there is no
answer that is not ridiculous.
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existence, the realization of each is connected to the self-realization of all
others.
65
Ecofeminists have identified at least two problems with this view. First, in ignorance of
the difference between the dominating role of men in history with respect to both women and
nature, it calls on women to continue to forget themselves (Naess small 's') and to give up a sense
of self which women throughout history and down to the present time have been propagandized
against developing in the first place. As Seager notes, 'if anyone needs practice at selflessness, it is
not women.'
66
The second problem is one of self-defeat, and has been remarked on in the previous
chapter. It is difficult to square the total identification with the universe with the concrete aims of
deep ecology, as Plumwood notes.
The analysis of humans as metaphysically unified with the cosmic whole will be
equally true whatever relation humans stand in with nature—the situation of
exploitation of nature exemplifies such metaphysical unity equally as well as a
conserver situation, and the human self is just as indistinguishable from the
bulldozer and Coca Cola bottle as the rocks or the rainforest. 67
Plumwood admits that there does seem to be some indication that deep ecologists—Naess
in particular—do not mean to subsume individuality entirely, but on the whole deep ecology
'seems to reflect a desire to retain the mystical appeal of indistinguishability while avoiding its
many difficulties.’68
5. 6. 2.2 Critique of the Diagnosis of ’Anthropocentricism'
Perhaps the deepest problem of deep ecology is its critical starting point, the claim that
the fundamental problem in human/nature relations is human anthropocentrism. The assumption
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67 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery’ ofNature , p 1 77f. See the previous chapter for problems with
Plumwood's dismissal of artifacts. The unwieldy axiology that falls out of my modification of her theory
presents a similar problem, but one that might be solvable by appeal to relations That solution is not
available to this view, since the most valued relation in the deep ecology theory is the identification of
self
with everything (achievement of ’Self-realization) Plumwood offers an extensive critical analysis of this
aspect of deep ecology, albeit one which goes beyond the main concerns of this dissertation. See
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery' of Nature , pp 1 65- 1 89.
6X Plumwood, Feminism, p 179
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is that some monolithic set of human values has led the human race to drive other species to
extinction and obliterate diverse habitat for purposes of monocultural agriculture (e.g. burning
forests in Brazil to create fields for cow-destined grain), or just out of accidents arising from
carelessness bom of lack of interest in habitat issues (e.g. oil spills). I have touched already on
deep ecology's lack of adequate analysis of social problems; the ecofeminist critique of
anthropocentrism effectively identifies the basis of this lack. Here I will present just two specific
concerns of deep ecology which ecofeminists claim are better diagnosed as the result of
androcentrism.
First, there is deep ecology's favorite issue, population. As I noted previously, the absence
of any concrete suggestions by the deep ecologists, coupled with their desire for 'government
programs' of some kind, should suggest to anyone some rather disturbing scenarios, including
revisitations of past programs of sterilization. Ecofeminists highlight this vague stand as a danger
to women and especially to women in the Third World; once again, the blame can be placed
squarely on deep ecology's simplistic anthropocentrism.
Intervening in reproduction always means, above all, intervening in women's
fives, in female reproductive organs, and in the exercise of individual reproductive
freedom. Population control always implies the exercise of centralized
authority—a government, often aided by international development agencies (all
of which are dominated by male actors)—in imposing restrictions on women’s
reproductive activities.... Women have been subjected to mass sterilizations,
without consent—in Puerto Rico, in India, in China. Unbridled racism and
rampant sexism are intertwined with the politics of international population
control. If nothing else, this recent history of flagrant human rights abuses in the
name of population control makes its advocacy by predominantly white, male,
First World environmental groups particularly dubious .
69
Not only does blaming overpopulation on a nonspecific humanity create dangers for
women; it also blinds deep ecology to the causes of overpopulation (e.g., oppressive, imperialist
economic practices which of themselves are a greater threat to the environment), and hence to
long-term, freedom-enhancing solutions (e.g., enhanced quality of fife through equitable
participation of women in education, business, and government).
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A second failure arising from the anthropocentric diagnosis is the absence of a substantive
deep ecology critique of hunting. Altering only slightly Kathleen Barry's remarks on the
international traffic in women, Seager writes:
Considering all the men who are hunters, poachers, fur 'farmers,' hunting
suppliers, hunting guides, skinners, trappers, furriers, fur designers, consumers
buying furs for women, importers of exotic animals, hunting-lodge owners, safari
leaders, trophy collectors, ivory carvers, aphrodisiac users and ivory-dagger toters,
one cannot but be momentarily stunned by the enormous male population
engaged in the destruction of wildlife. The huge numbers of men engaged in
these practices should be cause for declaration of an international
emergency...But what should be cause for alarm is instead accepted as normal
male behavior.
Wildlife preservation and the protection of animal species are high on the
agenda of most mainstream environmental groups. But while environmental
groups take up the issue of animal extinctions in their save-the-elephant, save-the-
panda, or save-the-tiger campaigns, they seldom take on the issue of hunting per
se...Whatever the underlying cause, it is instructive to note the disjuncture
between the enthusiasm for environmental campaigns that identify women as
culprits in the fur trade, and the absence of environmental analysis that would
make clear the complicity of men in the slaughter of the world's animal
populations .
70
Seager’s suspicion that hunting has become too ’normalized’ as a part of male culture to be
a viable candidate for critique from the male-dominated deep ecology school is supported by Marti
Kheel’s analysis of the enthusiasm for hunting in the writings of philosophers Randall Eaton, Jose
Ortega y Gasset, and Aldo Leopold. Kheel might have added Gary Snyder to her study; compare
his attempts at eroticizing meat-eating (’a great sexual exuberance. ..a giant act of love’) with
Eaton's claim that 'the hunter's feeling for his prey is one of deep passion, ecstasy and
respect....The hunter loves the animal he kills .'71
Again, besides being a failure to address cruelty to animals, deep ecology's
anthropocentrism-based analysis of species-extinction is as diluted as the cruelty-based analysis of
animal exploitation. Just as Clarke realized that claims of some lack of character on the part of
humans generally could not serve as the foundation for a results-orientated program against
animal abuse, deep ecologists must realize that the same holds true with respect to species-
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extinction. Both are driven largely by the greed of particular people, not the animal-hatred of all
humanity.
5.6. 2.3 Critique of Deep Ecology Culture
Finally, problems are raised by the sort of practice that has come to characterize deep
ecologist activism. Earth First!, the first deep ecologist activist organization, seemed to be
represented by men who had vested themselves in the Marlboro-Man, Grape-Nuts image of the
outdoorsman as eminently masculine. Seager writes, Their common practice of using women-
identified terms as taunts, such as calling their critics 'wimps,' 'sops,' or 'effetes,' panders to a
blatant sexist and homophobic bias—as though the worst thing in the world is to be womanly.'72
Seager goes on to quote Earth First !er Edward Abbey's 'attack' on Murray Bookchin: ’Fat old
women like Murray Bookchin have nothing to fear from me.'73 Seager also cites an Earth First!
essay rationalizing the exclusion of women from decision-making roles. 74 Not surprisingly, deep
ecologists fail to acknowledge their values as being based on traditionally feminist consciousness;
Seager cites an article by Sharon Doubiago in which Doubiago notes that deep ecologists are
willing to claim almost any source of environmental inspiration as long as it is male-identified
('intuitionists, mystics, transcendentalists...'). This includes an 'invocation of "native ways of
being" [which is] distressingly shallow.'75 Perhaps the most distressing characteristic of deep
ecologist culture has been the embracing of the famine in Ethiopia and the AIDS virus as earth's
salvation, and the advocacy of racist US immigration policies, all by prominent Earth First!ers. 76
Seager expresses disappointment in what she sees as the promise inherent in deep ecology
as conceived of by its founder.
In his germinal article, Arne Naess, the 'father' of deep ecology, expressed
concerns about inequalities within and between nations. But his concern with
social cleavages and their impact on resource utilization patterns and ecological
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destruction appears to have gotten lost in the translation, because it is all but
invisible in the later writings of deep ecologists. 77
However, to the extent that the feminist critique of deep ecology philosophy applies to
Naess, and to the extent that my own critique of deep ecology is based in pan on a fair
representation of Naess, then it would appear that Naess' own anthropocentric diagnosis of our
problematical relations with nature, as well as his own reluctance to come to grips with the
concrete implications of his ecological views, left deep ecology open to an ideological crapshoot
when it came down to the question of what to do.
5.6.3 Ecofeminism as a Vegetarianism
Ecofeminists do often write of nature, as deep and social ecologists do, in a way that lacks
specificity and does not address the animals issue directly, e.g. Carolyn Merchant's The Death of
Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).
That particular tendency of some ecofeminists to implicitly subsume animal exploitation under the
treatment of the issue of the exploitation of nature is the subject of criticism by Greta Gaard. 78
However, unlike the body of the deep and social ecology literatures, ecofeminist literature has
grown to include many direct challenges to factory farming, the fur industry, and the eating of
animals, and vegetarianism seems to be turning into a kind of ecofeminist norm, and perhaps even
a norm of radical feminism generally.
79
This might be creditable in part to feminist philosophers'
sensitivity, bom of the totalizing concept of 'man' and its accompanying erasure of the experiences
of that part of 'mankind' sometimes known as ’women,’ to the fact that oppression always has
particular sites—e.g., the relationship between husband and wife, between scientific institutions
and female subjects. It is also found at particular sources—e.g., capitalist norms and epistemic
assumptions about what women are as well as evaluational assumptions about their worth (to the
extent that these can be separated). Ecofeminists also recognizethe fact that different forms of
oppression are mutually reinforcing (see the discussion of Spiegel, above, as well as Adams
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analysis of similar connections between meat production and the exploitation of women in The
Sexual Politics of Meat and Neither Man Nor Beast). This sensitivity has almost made the
expression ecofeminism' a misnomer (to ecofeminists' credit) inasmuch as ecofeminists have well-
noted not only the differences between men and women with respect to degree of complicity' in
the abuse of nature but also the difference between First and Third World peoples.
It is no surprise, then, that much ecofeminist writing is devoted to sophisticated, detailed
critique of the consumption of animals as, to put a slight twist on a statement by Carol J. Adams,
the most intimate way in which most Westerners interact with nature. 80 Animals are not kept
down by some amorphous force called humanity. Individual animals are abused in specific ways
for specific purposes by particular people at particular times and places. Ecofeminism's interest in
identifying and critiquing those particulars gives it, as a progressive environmentalism, strengths
that the other ecologies lack, both from the vegetarian standpoint and the standpoint of
environmental concern. If one believes that a fully progressive vision must address human/nature
relations, the critical assumptions of ecofeminism have a number of advantages over deep ecology
and social ecology and are more amenable to the view that progressivism entails not only
environmentalism but also vegetarianism (for an example of the latter entailment see my critique
of Benton, above).
5.7 A Feminist Argument against Vegetarianism
Vegetarianism cannot be held a priori exempt from the possibility of being connected to
oppressive mindsets and practices. A fondness for animals has often gone hand-in-hand with
cruelty, or attitudes of cruelty, to people: Schopenhauer and women, Wagner and Jewish people,
Hitler and everybody. Such is the success that people have in divorcing one sphere of relations
and its 'code' from another.
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'The eating of animals is the most pervasive form of animal oppression in the Western world, representing
as well the most frequent way in which most Westerners interact with animals
' Adams, 'The Feminist
Traffic in Animals,' p 196.
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In her article 'Should Feminists Be Vegetarians?' {Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and
Society 19:2, pp. 405-434) Kathryn Paxton George goes one step further than pointing out that a
commitment to vegetarianism might not prove anything about one's commitment to social justice.
I close this chapter on ’animals in utopia’ with a critical examination of George's argument that
certain scientifically grounded claims about the nutritional needs of women, non-caucasians,
infants, etc. prove that ethical vegetarianism is arbitrary and privileges white male Westerners in
the prime of life. Here 1 come to the defense of vegetarianism. I do sympathize, however, with
some of George's concerns, and by the end of this section it will be clear that her arguments raise
some important questions about our concepts of virtue and social responsibility.
Her first argument runs as follows (formalized from pp. 415-417):
(1) The vegetarian diet is a health risk for all humans except men of 20 to 50
years of age in industrial countries.
(2) Not everyone likes plants as an item in their diet.
(3) If (1) and (2), then (4).
(4) .'. The moral rule requiring vegetarianism systematically imposes greater
burdens on some people.
(5) If (4), then (6).
(6) .’. Ethical vegetarianism is wrong.
The justifications of line (1) are, as I mentioned, based on nutritional studies cited in
George's paper. The main dangers of veganism (no animal products at all in the diet) are (1)
vegan diets are too low in energy and too high in bulk for infants and toddlers, and (2) the
calcium needed by adolescent girls occurs in almost unusable form in plant sources. The main
danger of a lacto-ovovegetarian diet seems to be that it includes no good sources of iron in the
quantities required by young children and pregnant women, for which, if George's representation
is accurate, there is no substitute for beef.
George says that the claim in line (2) may appear trivial, but food preferences are partially
genetic in origin and are not 'easily or completely amenable to education.
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The burdens that (1) and (2) imply (if vegetarianism is true) are supposed to be clear.
Accepting and complying to the norms of vegetarianism puts a burden of risk on those mentioned
in the justification of (1) and a burden of unpleasant living on those mentioned in (2). George also
points out that (2) implies an additional burden on those involved in food preparation, which
itself is 'a burden that is disproportionately borne by women not only in our society but worldwide
as well.'
Now, the fact that a moral norm puts a burden on someone is no reason to reject it.
Keeping a promise is occasionally a burden, as George points out, but such occasional burdens are
not evidence against the norm.
81 What is unacceptable, and George claims that 'traditional moral
theory’ supports this, is a norm which 'would systematically require self-sacrifices not required of
others in circumstances beyond one’s own control' (my emphasis).82 Since (4) shows that ethical
vegetarianism is such a norm, it is unacceptable, hence line (5).
As I said earlier, I am not going to argue about claims based on nutritional studies.
However, line (1) depends not only on the truth of such studies, but on the claim that there are no
other viable alternatives (in addition to balanced vegetarian diets) to meat-eating, such as dietary
supplements. George makes just this claim.
Supplementation, however, especially for multiple dietary requirements, carries
significant risks for many people because of toxicity, low availability, and
interactions among supplements.83
Oddly, though, the problems she catalogs in her footnote to this passage are so tangential to the
issue at hand that it is hard to count them as evidence for a claim that dietary supplements are
simply not a viable alternative to meat-eating. For example, she notes the presence of heavy
metals in some supplements and the dangers of 'ingestion of improper amounts of some minerals.
The first problem is solved by competent, responsible manufacturing, the second by consumer
education. These issues should be addressed whether or not the world goes vegetarian. But to
say that they are arguments against the eventual use of such supplements is like saying
the
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Corvairs hazardous design or drivers' failure to use seatbelts are arguments against the use of
automobiles.
Georges concern that 'the availability of such supplements presupposes. ..a sophisticated
medical and nutritional understanding by policymakers and consumers' seems misplaced coming
from someone whose own arguments find their foundations in the medical establishment.
Perhaps we should simply agree that people do need to be educated in this way about their own
bodies.
Leaving questions about line (1) aside, do (1) and (2) entail the proposition that 'the
moral rule requiring vegetarianism systematically imposes greater burdens on some people? To
answer this question we must first answer this one: what is the moral rule, at least the one
George has in mind, requiring vegetarianism? She writes:
The [traditional theoretical] arguments for ethical vegetarianism pick out as
relevant the capacities for sensitivity to pain and sufficient intelligence so that
suffering can matter to the being. These features about animals and the supposed
fact that few humans need meat or animal products for health or survival, coupled
with the value claim that we ought to reduce suffering or respect rights, produce a
moral rule requiring vegetarianism.
Singer, Regan, and virtually all other philosophers defending the moral
status of animals claim animals are our equals and that we may not kill .them for
food.
84 [emphasis added]
I gather that the italicized section represents what George takes the moral rule requiring
vegetarianism to be; I have included the previous paragraph mainly to show the context in which
it appears and thus justify my interpretation. But there are two problems with referring to this as
the moral rule requiring vegetarianism. First, this blanket rule, formulated as it is like an
unconditional practical imperative (like 'thou shalt not kill') is endorsed by no animal liberationist
with whom I am familiar. All—and George points this out on the same page—allow that,
depending on circumstances, killing animals for food may be permissible. For example, she
mentions that 'Singer's utilitarian position would permit these consumptions for persons who have
85
a strong welfare interest (say, for reasons of ill health), but these would be exceptional cases.'
But if we take utilitarianism seriously (it is not the view that bringing about the outcome with the
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most happiness is always permissible; rather, it is the view that bringing about the outcome with
the most happiness is always obligatory), then obviously there will be cases where such use of
animals is not merely permitted but in fact obligatory.
So much for the first problem with George's presentation of the moral rule requiring
vegetarianism. The second problem is a failure to distinguish between first-order and second-
order principles. If the moral rule requiring vegetarianism really were 'we may not kill animals for
food,' then (4) would be true. But George's rule is actually, as she seems to understand, derived
from the more basic rule 'we ought to reduce suffering [utilitarianism] or respect rights
[Kantianism],' coupled with facts about us and animals (which are empirically discovered). As a
more specific and practical rule, We may not kill animals for food' comes with an understood
ceteris parabis clause, as does, arguably, 'thou shalt not kill.’ But, more fundamentally, because
vegetarians derive their principles of behavior with respect to animals in part from empirically
discovered information (the facts about us and animals), application of those principles (for which
George's rule is but a rough and ready guide) is not expected to be outwardly uniform. On the
other hand, the more fundamental principles from which vegetarianism is derived are expected to
be outwardly uniform in their application. Utilitarian vegetarians, for example, do not demand
that everyone in all circumstances refrain from eating animals, but they do demand that everyone
act so as to increase happiness. From the utilitarian perspective, the rule requiring vegetarianism
is not really 'we may not kill animals for food' but more accurately 'we may not increase suffering
unnecessarily.' If that is so, then, from at least one traditional moral perspective, vegetarianism
does not demand, systematically, that some humans risk their health (= their happiness) on a
vegetarian diet. So, there is reason to believe that line (3) is false.
One might object, saying that a different version of line (3) is available. This one has an
antecedent based on what I have said above, which seems to point out that vegetarianism might in
fact place more burdens on those who do not need to eat animals. These people (according to
George, men between twenty and fifty in industrialized countries) would be prohibited from
eating meat because their consumption of meat has the unique (or so George claims) quality of
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entailing unnecessary deaths of animals. They would have to suffer through watching the vast
majority of people enjoying animal flesh. At fancy restaurants they would be confined to the salad
bar.
This reveals the problem with line (5). It is not difficult to derive sound, secondary moral
principles which systematically place burdens on some people rather than others. For example,
adults have systematically more responsibility for the welfare of children than vice versa. Humans
have responsibility for the welfare of animals, but there is almost no reciprocal responsibility. Yet
these systematically differential burdens are not reason enough to reject the fundamental
principles on which they are founded.
It is appropriate to mention here that George uses the word 'arbitrary' and its correlates
several times in her arguments against ethical vegetarianism, for example in the expression
'arbitrary moral burdens.’ She never offers an explicit definition, but she seems to think that an
arbitrary moral burden is one which is 'greater...for some groups because of aspects about
themselves that cannot be changed and are thought to be neutral to the interests served by the
rule'
86
—in which case I hope I have already shown that such burdens are not actually points
against an ethical theory—and that an arbitrary belief is one that is held with 'no good reasons.'8 '
The second use of 'arbitrary' only applies to vegetarianism if, as George asserts, 'the nutritional
claims [that meat is not necessary in the human diet] are mistaken’ and these claims are 'the
primary support for ethical vegetarianism.'88 But, again as George admits, the nutritional claims
are only partly mistaken. Furthermore, to consider those claims as the primary support for
vegetarianism is to overstate the case. The basic principle of ethical vegetarianism is that the
suffering and dignity of non-human animals matters; and that is why unnecessary killing and
eating of non-human animals is usually wrong. Even if all of George's claims about the necessity
of eating meat were true, there would still be such a thing as the unnecessary consumption of
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animal products, unnecessary either in quality (veal) or in quantity (the heart-endangering
amount of beef eaten in the United States). So vegetarianism would not be an arbitrary belief.
A third use of 'arbitrary occurs where George states that 'there is another reason to think
that the moral rule of ethical vegetarianism rests on arbitrariness,' and goes on to explain that
studies on the health benefits of vegetarian diets have all been done on men.89
Vegetarian diets appeal to men's self-interests because these diets can be quite
low in fat and may reduce men's incidence of heart disease. Although powerful
lobbies continue to press for meat consumption, the power struggle takes place
entirely on male terms. The debate entirely overlooks possible differences in the
effects of wholesale adoption of restrictive dietary practices (whether they be all-
plant or heavily dependent on meat consumption) on women and children, as
well as on people of color, old people, and people living in other cultures.90
George's point about the medical establishment's neglect of women is well-taken. However, this
bit of bad science does not undermine vegetarianism by making it arbitrary. Rather, when we see
that women's health issues with respect to diet have been overlooked, we are simply left in a
position to demand redress on that point. Again, it might indeed be true that some people may
have to consume some meat, but this does not mean vegetarianism is false. Again, vegetarianism
is the position that the unnecessary killing and eating of nonhuman animals is wrong. If a white
male does not have to eat meat, and indeed benefits by not eating meat, then he should not eat
meat. The irresponsibly restrictive studies of the medical establishment might at least be useful in
establishing the truth in this case.
There is a fourth use in George's article of the word 'arbitrary: 'Moreover, these
[traditional] arguments for ethical vegetarianism may be accused of arbitrariness because they can
be shown to appeal to and serve the interests of the dominant class in retaining power and
privilege.'
91
It would be best to consider this use in light of two more arguments of George's
which criticize evaluative repercussions of vegetarianism on women and non-Westem cultures.
George gives an argument which can be formalized as follows (from p. 425):
(1) If vegetarianism were adopted universally, then 'excused
1
classes (those
who must eat meat and so would be excused from the prohibition against
^George, p. 423.
90
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eating meat) would still suffer feelings of responsibility for the evil
associated with killing and eating animals.
(2) If vegetarianism were adopted universally, then excused classes would
suffer social condemnation.
(3) The excused classes in (1) and (2) consist of women and children.
(4) If (1), (2), and (3), then (5).
(5) Vegetarianism causes women to be viewed as a moral underclass.
(6) If (5), then (7).
(7) Vegetarianism is false.
Let us assume, as we have done throughout, that George's nutritional claims are all true.
As I have been arguing, such claims do not militate against vegetarianism, which only prohibits the
unnecessary killing and eating of animals. George admits that vegetarianism can allow for the
physiological risks which have assumed, up to this point in her paper, such a prominent place in
her arguments against it:
If the main concern were about risk, advocates for animal rights such as Regan
could simply respond that, if women need milk or meat, they have a valid moral
excuse (based on the [i.e., Regan's] Liberty Principle) from a duty not to kill or
harm animals. Women whose health would be jeopardized or whose fetuses
would be injured are excused from a duty to make themselves worse off for the
sake of another.
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This acknowledgment should suffice to establish that, if vegetarianism were universally
adopted, some people would indeed be excused from adopting an entirely vegetarian diet.
George's justification for line (1) is that even 'a person who kills in self-defense still feels
responsible even if not culpable for a killing.'
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In a footnote, George says that 'one is responsible
for an action if she or he caused it to occur.'
94 Now, there does not seem to be anything wrong (or
evaluatively interesting) about feeling that one caused an action to occur if in fact one caused it to
occur. Here we would be left with an interpretation of line (1) which is too weak to do the work
required of it in line (4). The notion of 'feeling responsible' that George is getting at must be a
little different. Perhaps it is a feeling of misplaced responsibility. There is a sense in which the
92
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person killing in self-defense is not responsible—the sense in which someone else's action limited
her own options (given her reasonable desire or instinct to go on living). Similarly, there is a
sense in which the member of the excused class is not responsible—the sense in which her options
were limited at conception (she must eat meat by virtue of having a certain land of physiology, for
which she of course can bear no responsibility). When a person in this kind of situation realizes
that her own responsibility is thus qualified, she is more able to let go of that feeling of culpability
which carrying the entire burden leads to. George would seem to agree with this, but it is
apparently not enough for her, for she feels that something is going wrong here (hence line (l)'s
appearance in the fourth premise). She does not indicate what an appropriate attitude toward
one's necessary killing and eating of animals should be, but evidently it is not a feeling of
responsibility. Perhaps, in an unvegetarian world, the excused classes avoid that feeling of
responsibility, since there is a veritable orgy of flesh consumption going on around them on the
part of unexcused classes. But that does not mean that those who eat meat should not feel some
sense of remorse at having to depend upon other animals for their needs. As George herself
admits, 'killing or harming any animal is an evil .'95
I would suggest that such feelings as some Native Americans express toward having to kill
animals are appropriate and not in themselves a problem for the excused classes. Rather, the
problem would be with their feeling uniquely responsible. They would be mistaken to suppose
that it is they and only they among humans who are responsible for the deaths of the animals they
must eat. This would be a mistake because the people we are talking about are (speaking as a
man) our mothers, sisters, wives, daughters, and young sons, etc.—people on whom we depend,
who make our lives what they are, and whose health and happiness are of as much interest to us
(men) as our own. A society the members of which are interdependent, or rather which know
they are interdependent, would take on the responsibility of necessary animal suffering
collectively.
95
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So, while line (1) might be true, the question is would it be true for the excused classes
only? If animal liberation can be part of larger, communitarian ethic, then the answer is no. This
leaves line (1) untouched, but gives us reason to deny (2), which George justifies only by saying
that 'we do not ordinarily know the reason's for a stranger's actions.'96 This is an overstatement.
We all can tell with some degree of confidence why strangers in a mall or at school say and do the
things they do. In addition, the main excused classes that George talks about are readily
identifiable. Furthermore, a communitarian ethic (and communitarianism is perfectly compatible
with animal liberation) is one that has far less of the element of suspicion than does Hobbesian
individualism. Which is to say, there would be no reason to suppose that, rather than vilifying
strangers who eat meat, in such a world one would quite naturally assume that that person had to
eat meat.
Line (4) raises the following question: given an ethical ideal, what are we to do about the
fact that some people, for reasons or causes for which they are not responsible, might not be able
to reach that ideal? Do the reasons and causes excuse them from reaching that ideal, or, if they
have gone as far as they can in light of those reasons and causes, have they in fact reached the
ideal? Consider this analogy: Is the best student the one who does the best work, gets the best
grades, etc. (a typical A student, say); or is the best student the one who does the most they can
with the talents and opportunities they have (this could be a C student)?
Aristotle believed that a virtuous person, to be virtuous, needed to be in felicitous
circumstances. One cannot be just without other people to be just to; one cannot be wise without
leisure time in which to engage in philosophy; and so on. There is no praise left over for those
who fail to be virtuous through no fault of their own (no community, no leisure time). We feel the
same, I think. A person who grows up in a rough inner-city neighborhood with poorly financed
schools might become a criminal because of the lack of educational and vocational opportunities
and other misfortunes of a life so situated. The best he can be, in terms of virtue, might be
courageous, as in a courageous burglar. We might excuse his behavior because he is not
96
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responsible for the condition of the school district, the local economy, etc., but, having attained all
the virtue (say, lots of courage) he could in light of his circumstances, we do not take the further
step and praise him for being virtuous. He seems to be, because of the material circumstances of
his upbringing, destined for a kind of moral underclass.
George has the same concern for women in a vegetarian world. They would seem to be,
because of the material facts of their physiology, destined for a kind of moral underclass. If the
best people in a vegetarian world are those who (among their other virtues) cause the least pain
and death to other animals (human and nonhuman), then women would be systematically
excluded from the class of the best. As in the case of the inner-city youth, we might excuse them,
but we would not go so far as to say that they are among the best just because they do the best
they can.
If George's concern is valid, it is relevant even now, when the virtuous option of a truly
comprehensive vegetarian practice is closed to all but the upper middle class by virtue of the cost
of cruelty-free and organic products at the market. To illustrate the difference I have included a
list of prices from a large, mainstream grocery store chain and a smaller chain of stores
specializing in cruelty-free and organic products (table 1). This is a small list; a month's worth of
groceries would show the burden of shopping at the latter to be still disproportionately greater for
someone on a lower income. That is, for someone making $800 a month, the difference between
four such trips is the difference between spending 10% of her income on shopping mainstream
and spending 20% shopping organic and cruelty-free. For someone making $3000 a month, the
difference as a percentage of income is only the difference between 2.6% and 5.3%. Furthermore,
the 'exclusivity' of the cruelty-free, organic 'culture' at these shops can be discouraging. The
percentage of employees at the local organic chainstore who are white approaches the 100% mark
over three years. It is no wonder that they felt they had to pay lip service to diversity by posting a
sign which read: ’Our stores are "inclusive." Everyone is welcome. We value diversity—whole
foods are for everyone.'
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Table 1. Prices of some groceries (Juiy 30 , 1995). Where units differ, the figure in parentheses is used.
Organic or Cruelty-Free Non-Organic, Non-Cruelty-Free
apples 1.49/lb. 1.29/lb.
lettuce 1.19 each 1.00/two (=.50 each)
tomatoes 2.29/lb. 1.29/lb.
cantaloupe
.98/lb. (est 1.5 lb. = 1.47 each) .80 each
milk 1.99/.5 gallon 1.39/.5 gallon
hand soap .99/one 4-oz. bar 2.49/four 5 oz. Bars (= .50/one
4 oz. bar)
shaving lotion 4.99/8oz. 1.39/lloz. (=1.01/8oz.)
aftershave 6.99/9oz. 4.79/7oz. (=6.16/9oz.)
toothpaste 2.29/4oz. 1.49/5oz. (=1.19/4oz.)
mouthwash 3.99/1 6oz. 3.29/32oz. (=1.65/16oz.)
shampoo 4.75/18oz. 1.99/15oz. (=2.39/18oz.)
sandwich bread 2.49/24oz. 1.49/two 20oz. loaves
( = .89/24oz.)
cheese slices 4.39/lb. 2.39/lb.
TOTAL (1 unit each item) 39.31 21.45
Here again, though, I would simply challenge the legitimacy of ranking individuals by
their virtue when we are all involved in what each of us is doing. We cannot lord it over the
young criminal; the system that allows us the luxury of considering an act of theft unthinkable is
the same system that makes theft a viable choice for him. We cannot lord it over those who
cannot afford a lifestyle which is cruelty-free, organic, etc.; the system that allows us the luxury of
not having to make hard choices is the same system that forces those choices on them. In other
words, whatever we attain in 'virtue' is predicated on their not being able to achieve the same.
Arguably, we are no more virtuous than they; their deeds are our deeds, and vice versa.
Something along similar lines has already been said with respect to diet. The ideal is not
achievable by individuals
;
if there is a biological need on the part of some people for meat, it is a
need of all of ours.
I conclude that George has not successfully argued against ethical vegetarianism.
However, her arguments militate against an individualistic interpretation of virtue and against
smug complacency on the part of individual vegetarians, especially those of priviliged classes.
CHAPTER 6
CLOSING RANKS
6.1 Animals in Utopia. Part II
I have argued that the issues of vegetarianism, environmentalism, and social justice are
interconnected, that irresponsible environmental practices, immoral treatment of animals, and
unjust social systems prop each other up. What I have yet to examine, though, are concrete
answers to the question of how our moral commitments in all three of these areas can be
coordinated (remember that social and deep ecology ignore the animals issue, and ecofeminism is
primarily a critical program). It would be irresponsible for philosophers like me to simply demand
urnvers al vegetarianism now, when, as I have documented, that lifestyle is currently inaccessible to
so many.
On the other hand, we cannot just walk away and let, for example, indigenous peoples
have at the whales and the seals just because these marine mammals constitute the best available
resource for these groups; at least, we cannot do so without a lot of thought beforehand. The
same can be said about the destruction of the Brazilian rainforest. The two most obvious concrete
issues are, on the one hand, the rights or intrinsic value or autonomy of, as well as our sympathy
for, the animals and plants in question, and on the other hand the similar rights, value, and
autonomy of, as well as our sympathy for, the humans involved. But how shall we weigh the
interests of nonlocals in local wildlife? Sometimes nonlocals are concerned over a preservation
issue, as when people outside of Asia become concerned about the impending extinction of tigers
in the wild. At other times the concern is over cruelty. Witness the unhappiness of people around
the world when they found out that fishermen are drowning thousands of dolphins in their tuna
nets every year.
Generally, environmentalists have downplayed issues of cruelty because they are not
interested in animal liberation. They have downplayed issues of social justice because they have
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diagnosed the root cause of environmental devastation as anthropocentrism, thus indicting
humanity collectively. Nevertheless, at least two environmentalists have made at least some
attempt to negotiate the competing claims of animals, humans, and the environment. In this
chapter, I examine and criticize those attempts. Then I look at the possibility of veganism and its
Eastern foundations as a basis for a comprehensive ethic which takes into account each of the
three issues. In the end it will be seen that all three of the attempts at a comprehensive ethic fail.
6.1.1 Callicott on Midglev
It would be most fitting to begin with Callicott's sketch of a unified animal liberationist-
environmentalist-social justice ethic, an ethic suggested to him in part by his reading of Midgley
and explained in his paper 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again.’ 1
Callicott sees the way out of the apparent conflicts between these three demands in 'the logic of
biosocial moral theory,’ which grounds ethics in the sentiments and in their degree of variation
from one circle of relationships to another.
From Midgley’s biosocial point of view, we are members of nested communities
each of which has a different structure and therefore different moral
requirements. At the center is the immediate family. I have a duty not only to
feed, clothe, and shelter my own children, I also have a duty to bestow affection
on them. But to bestow a similar affection on the neighbors' kids is not only not
my duty, it would be considered anything from odd to criminal were I to behave
so.
2
Callicott goes on to observe that we have duties to our neighbors that we do not have to
other citizens, to citizens that we do not have to human beings in general, and to human beings in
general that we do not have to animals in general.
The impression one gets up to this point is of a series of concentric circles, like rings in a
tree. However, Callicott follows Midgley in denying that the relationship between the relationships
is so simple. His first example is of pets, who are animals to whom we owe duties not owed even
to most other humans; but since this is on account of their being 'surrogate family members,' the
1
Callicott, pp. 49-59.
2
Callicott, p. 55
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example seems to actually fit the concentric-circles view. A better example is that of someone
depriving 'one's children of a trip to Disneyland or [giving] them fewer toys at Christmas in order
to aid starving people on another continent.’3 Here, a sacrifice of the interests of an inner circle is
made for the benefit of an outer circle.
The results for animals are as follows. Humans do not live in a species-homogenous
community but in a mixed community of humans and animals. The extent to which animals
participate in that community depends, for Callicott, on whether the animals in question are (1)
pets, (2) barnyard animals, or (3) wild animals:
Pets merit treatment not owed either to less intimately related animals, for
example to barnyard animals, or, for that matter, to less intimately related human
beings...
Barnyard animals... [may be used] for work or even.. .for food so long as the
keeping and using of such animals was not in violation—as factory farming clearly
is—of a kind of evolved and unspoken social contract between man and beast...
Wild animals are, by definition, not members of the mixed community and
therefore should not lie on the same spectrum of graded moral standing as family
members, neighbors, fellow citizens, fellow human beings, pets, and other
domestic animals.4
Callicott goes on to explain that 'wild animals, rather, are members of the biotic
community' and duties to them might therefore lie derived from an ecological description of
nature—-just as our duties and obligations to members of the mixed community can be derived
from a description of the mixed community.' 5 That is, duties to wild animals are dictated by the
Leopoldian land ethic (examined in the previous chapter) whereas duties to pets and barnyard
animals, like interhuman duties, are not.
There are a number of problems with Callicott's scheme. Some I addressed in previous
chapters: the argument that exploitation of barnyard animals is justified by virtue of their breeding
was criticized in Chapter 2, and the idea that duties to the environment are magically revealed by
a simple 'ecological description of nature' was criticized in Chapter 3. It is worth adding here that
3
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Callicott's claim that the latter holds true of interhuman ethics is in need of support. It is not clear
to me that this kind of naturalism is what the view he is attributing to Midgley adds up to.
Callicott's treatment of the issue of pets seems correct, particularly his point that we owe
duties to animals that we do not owe to humans less intimately situated. However, the treatment
is also inadequate, since we owe duties to other humans, in certain situations, over and above
duties to our pets.
Callicott's view of the place of barnyard animals signals a radical departure from his
treatment of domestic animals in 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair .'
6
There, his view of
domestic animals equates them, Kant-like, with things—artifacts like tables and chairs. Having a
social contract, even an unspoken one, with a table or chair seems a little odd (at least, given the
disparaging view of tables and chairs implicit in Callicott's earlier remarks)—hence Callicott's
earlier claim that liberation for farm animals is a meaningless concept. So it seems we may infer
that Callicott has revised his view of barnyard animals in this respect. He must have revised his
view in another respect, though. For while earlier he seems to be disgusted with the very
existence of such 'unnatural' artifacts, here a quite different attitude is exhibited by virtue of the
context in which he says that 'to [wrongly] condemn the morality of these roles—as we rightly
condemn human slavery and penury—is to condemn the very being of these creatures."
This idea of an 'evolved and unspoken social contract between man and beast' needs some
explaining. Somehow I doubt that the animals would be pleased to know the conditions of this
unspoken contract. Although food animals in ideal conditions (conditions which are virtually
nonexistent at this time) might get some benefit from the association, the nature of the
relationship is less like a contract than an elaborate deception, a point made in poetic fashion by
Hardy, who wrote of a (fictional) stuck pig's 'glazing eyes riveting themselves on Arabella with the
eloquently keen reproach of a creature recognizing at last the treachery of those who had seemed
6
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his only friends. It would indeed be an irony that some of those animals who are part of the
mixed community' get the benefit of the slaughterhouse. But beyond being ironic, 1 believe that it
is wrong, and that Hardy does a better job than Callicott of characterizing the nature of the
'contract,' if there is one, between humans and food animals. If a contract is present, it is a
contract that we sign for the very purpose of breaking. In other words, if the concept of a 'mixed
community has some kind of moral impact, then Callicott is mistaken about what that impact is in
the case of barnyard animals: the 'mixed community' concept does not justify the exploitation of
food animals. Rather, it condemns that exploitation as a systematic betrayal of the trust of
community members.
The wild animals fare almost as poorly as the barnyard animals. A couple of
inconsistencies should be noted. First, Callicott claims that ’whatever moral entitlements a being
may have as a member of the biotic community, not among them is the right to life. Rather, each
being should be respected and left alone to pursue its modus vivendi—even if its way of life causes
harm to other beings, including other sentient beings.'9 First, I do not see any appreciative
difference between one theorys requirement that we respect a creature's right to life, which
Callicott says does not exist in the case of wild animals, and another theorys requirement that we
leave the creature alone (for the creature's sake, not ours) to pursue its life ways, which is a moral
burden Callicott is willing to saddle us with. Second, the claim that this burden is on us even
where the creature we are discussing is a threat to other sentient beings is absurd. Surely, this is a
misstatement by Callicott, who I have no doubt would not hesitate to blow away a great white
shark heading in the direction of some children playing in the surf. What is more important, he
would rightfully consider himself justified in doing so. The problem attaches not just to animals
who are a direct threat to us; some, including Callicott and myself, would say that, if it is a matter
of survival (at least) it is all right for a human being to not leave to its modus vivendi an animal he
8
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or she could kill and eat. Obviously, some work needs to be done in reconciling the ethics of the
biotic community with the ethics of the mixed community.
These problems, while they point to deeper issues, might simply arise from speaking a bit
too loosely. The more interesting objection is to an asymmetry in the lists of human communities
on the one hand and the mixed human-animal communities on the other. What I mean is this: As
the circles of nested communities go outward, they end, as far as humans go, with human beings
in general. So, even total strangers of the variety Homo sapiens are part of some moral community
of which I am a member (thus Midgley's justified admiration for the story of the good Samaritan).
That is, they lie 'on the same spectrum of graded moral standing . 1 However, animals only appear
in the more intimate, domesticated circles. On Callicott's view, wild animals (animals who are not
townies) drop out of the mixed community picture altogether
,
10
although presumably humans and
other highly intelligent beings (e.g., Martians) similarly situated would not. Why am I to consider
myself a member of the same mixed community as a Galapagos cattle rancher but not a member
of the same mixed community as the wild birds at my bird feeder? Callicott would say that yes,
you are a member of the same mixed community as the rancher, but you are only a member of the
same biotic community as the wild birds, and your duties toward them are, well to 'act naturally’
(i.e., either ignore them or kill and eat them). The reiteration of the distinction would not count
as an explanation of the exclusion of the latter from the mixed community; nor does Callicott's
claim that wild animals are 'by definition' excluded offer any insight. It is not apparent what
definition he has in mind, unless it is the unilluminating 'x is wild = x is not a member of the
mixed community.'
It might be worth noting that, if people had always done what Callicott believes is their
duty as dictated by 'ecological ethics,’ then we would not have mixed communities of humans and
10 As they do in Animal Farm as well. Midgley points out that, in Orwell's novel, the principle All Animals
are Equal' 'refers only to farm animals. In the first flush of revolution, these animals do suggest, and
uncertainly agree, that rats are comrades. Attempts to act on this idea, however, peter out almost at once,
and the only other outside candidates ever named are rabbits. Foxes, badgers, hedgehogs, deer, mice, voles,
weasels etc And the whole tribe of wild birds, as well as everything smaller, are simply forgotten.' Midgley,
p. 72.
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animals in the first place. Such communities arise out of people taking animals out of their
natural niche and bringing them into the human community in some way or other.
Calhcott's attempt to resolve the competing claims of environmentalism and animal
liberation (and social justice, but this is not his focus) runs into two main problems because of a
failure to thoroughly integrate mixed community ethics and ecological ethics. First, the separation
of the two spheres is untenable. It is as though I can stick with (what Callicott takes to be
contractual ) mixed community ethics within the city limits, and then (what Callicott takes to be
dog-eat-dog ) ecological ethics out in the country. As I pointed out in my criticism of Rolston, there
are no such clear-cut boundaries between the cultural and the natural. Second, Callicott fails to
incorporate the concentric circles of mixed community ethics into ecological ethics; this failure
results in confusions such as the idea (supposing that we can have duties to trees) that I have no
duties to the big shade tree in my backyard that I do not have to shade trees everywhere (those so
inclined can replace the shade tree example with some local wild animal whose presence they
have enjoyed or otherwise benefited from).
I believe that there are two other mistakes that have thrown Callicott off consistently in
his treatment of animal liberation. First, his failure to think of rights as requiring reference to the
particular persons involved (different people have different rights with respect to different people)
inspires the fear that animal liberation must mean equal rights for all animals. But the expression
'equal rights' does not mean a whole lot without some clarification. No one is suggesting that I set
a dog dish out for the local coyotes; this is a right that the family dog in particular has against me
in particular. Nor do the coyotes in the canyon have a right against me to rescue them in a flood.
These distinctions are only too familiar; when I say that immigrant children have the same rights
as my children, I do not mean that they have a right to expect me to pick them up from school. To
offer up the red herring of 'equal moral consideration or equal moral rights for animals, required
by the logic of extending the prevailing moral paradigms'” (Callicott's emphases signal the
"Callicott, p 55
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repugnant implication) is to subscribe to the most uncharitable interpretations of those paradigms
and to uncritically take philosophers like Singer and Saponztis as representative of what post-
liberation practice would look like. It is uncomfortably reminiscent of the paranoia of same-sex
bathrooms offered up as a reason to not support the Equal Rights Amendment.
The second mistake that Callicott makes over and over again is to reduce humans' natural
behavior to the satisfaction of physical needs like nutrition. It never seems to occur to him that
the very reason why we have these problems with figuring out what to do with barnyard animals
and family pets and local wolves is that humans are naturally interested in the welfare of the
animals (and other species and natural objects) around them. We are the animal that most
intervenes in the fives of other animals, sometimes for the sake of the other animals themselves.
Furthermore, this aspect of our nature does not even itself make us different in kind from the
other animals: Galapagos land iguanas signal to birds when they want the birds to pick mites off
of them; Galapagos seals tease marine iguanas by pulling repeatedly on their tails while they try to
swim away (the seals do not eat or maim the iguanas); the famous cuckoo leaves its eggs for other
birds to hatch; herder ants maintain a 'stockyard' of insects which secrete a sweet nectar (the ants
even transport the insects themselves). We are simply the interventionists par excellence. I do not
mean to suggest that whatever comes naturally to humans is good. However, for a naturalistic
ethicist like Callicott, this observation causes problems. Non-consumptive interest in and affection
for both wild and domestic animals seems to be universal among cultures, including the kind of
cultures (his so-called 'savages') Callicott wants to look to for guidance in modeling a natural
lifestyle. So-called 'primitive' cultures domesticate animals today and in the past were responsible
for domesticating not only food animals but also work animals and household pets such as cats,
parrots, and monkeys.
When we see that humans just are naturally interested in the other animals, we see too
that only an improbably narrow conception of what will count as natural human behavior can
underwrite Callicott's earlier dim view of domesticated animals and his unending prescription of
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an ecological ethic which would prevent (via the 'shrinkage of the domestic sphere' and the
respect for other animals' 'modus vivendi') both the domestication of any more species and any
other non-consumptive intervention into animals' (and plants') lives.
6.1.2 Taylor
Taylor does not treat animal liberation and environmentalism as separate, competing
agendas. He does focus on wildlife rather than what he calls the 'bioculture'—'that aspect of any
human culture in which humans create and regulate the environment of living things and
systematically exploit them for human benefit' (e.g., agribusiness, laboratories, pets), but unlike
the earlier Callicott he believes that such creatures, however internally modified, still have goods
of their own and inherent worth. His general view on the proper treatment of domestic animals
therefore does not differ in land from his view on the proper treatment of wildlife, in contrast to
both the earlier Callicott and the later, Midgley-influenced Callicott. Indeed, Callicott's tripartite
division of human-animal relationships does not seem to have much purchase in Taylor's system,
and Taylor says that 'it is a truth of fact and not a value judgment that all the living organisms
being used in any society’s bioculture are entities that have a good of their own. They can be
benefited or harmed. In this manner they are exactly like wild animals and plants in natural
ecosystems.'
12
Furthermore, 'the fact that the animals and plants being dealt with in a society's
bioculture are valued instrumentally does not settle the ethical question of how they should be
treated.'
11
The requirements Taylor then lightly touches on are really just applications of his
general principles of resolution between the competing interests of humans and wildlife, such as
the principle of minimum wrong. So, for Taylor, laboratories and slaughterhouses (were they
necessary) are not arenas of human-animal contact with a set of rules different from that in
12
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nature. Rather, they are subsumed under nature as simply particular sites of such contact, with all
the rules of environmental ethics in place. 14
This view has a certain attraction by virtue of its comprehensiveness and simplicity with
respect to the animal liberationist-environmentalist debate, but such simplicity comes at a cost.
The unity of the view is enabled by Taylor’s strict egalitarianism, which I criticized in the previous
chapter. The downside of this egalitarianism can be seen again in the context of Taylor’s
discussion of pets:
In the case of having an animal as a pet, people do willingly accept certain
responsibilities for the animal's well-being. This is because they care about it and
want to help it lead a healthy, happy Me. The pet owner's sense of responsibility
is concomitant with her or Ms love for the pet.
Something subtle is going on in these three sentences; or perhaps I should say that
something subtle is not going on. Taylor is not claiming here that pets actually exert stronger
claims on us than do other animals. He is merely pointing out a fact about human psychology,
that our willingness to do right by our pets is helped by our love for them. Such feelings do not
actually affect what our duty is:
As was pointed out in connection with human etMcs, our duties toward other
persons do not depend on our feeling love or affection for them, but hold
regardless of such personal contingencies. 16
We may want to help certain species-populations because we like them or
because they are beneficial to us. But the Rule of Non-Interference requires that
we put aside our personal likes and our human interests with reference to how we
treat them.
17
Of special importance for practical considerations, we are duty-bound not to
intervene in behalf of those creatures that happen to be beneficial to us...To
respect nature is to be willing to take the standpoint of each orgamsm, no matter
what its species, and view the world from the perspective of its good. None
makes a greater claim on our sympathy than another.
18
14 Given Taylor's Rule of Noninterference, our adopting his ethical system would seem to call into question
the continued existence of the bioculture The rule says that we have 'two sorts of negative duties, one
requiring us to refrain from placing restrictions on the freedom of individual organisms, the other requiring a
general "hands off" policy with regard to whole ecosystems and biotic communities, as well as to individual
organisms'—Taylor, Respectfor Nature
, p 173. Callicott has the same tension in his view (above)
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Taylor bases his case for vegetarianism not on sympathy for animals nor on barnyard
social relations. No animal has any more of a claim against us than does any plant, according to
Taylor's egalitarian biocentrism. Taylor believes that the only reasons to eat vegetables rather
than animals are (1) that making animals into food might involve suffering on the part of the
animal, an intrinsic evil not met with in the consumption of plants (presumably, it would be all
right to eat animals if no suffering were involved), and (2) that a vegetarian diet requires less
plowed land, thus allowing for more room for other species to live. 19 Taylor would deny entirely
the moral legitimacy of Callicott's concept of nested communities based on sympathy. The shade
tree problem which points out the weaknesses of Callicott's environmental ethics (above) points
out the weakness of Taylor's entire ethical system as well, unified though it may be: it is simply
too egalitarian to be tenable. The proposed indifference to, e.g., the benefits my shade tree has
conferred on my family and the proposed indifference to, e.g., my affection for it make for an
animal liberationist-environmental ethic that is both objectionable and impractical.
Taylor does spend an entire chapter on the problem of the competing claims of humans
and wildlife, but he incorporates a number of unfortunate assumptions. First, his entire analysis is
based on the assumption of a just social system, 70 thus precluding any meaningful discussion
about the effect of environmental policy on the possibility of social justice. This assumption is
attached to another, namely that environmental justice can be divorced from social justice. Taylor
believes that human ethics is separate from environmental ethics, and that 'the differences
between them lie in the content of their respective systems of norms.’
21 He is concerned that we
not confuse 'the two domains of ethics.'
22
At one point Taylor is explicit about the practical fallout
of this assumption:
Nor can we avoid the issue by arguing that in the long run the interests of humans
and the good of wild animals and plants coincide. Large numbers of organisms,
species-populations, and communities of life can be destroyed for the sake of
19
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benefiting humans, and if care and foresight are taken, the future of human life
on Earth could still be assured. 23
No doubt, such destruction is earned out for the 'benefit' of humans, but this seemingly
straightforward proposition is burdened with a number of ambiguities. First, we can destroy the
environment for the sake of such benefits, but without actually bringing them about. That is, we
may be mistaken about whether what we are doing is beneficial to us or not. Second, there is the
problem of identifying who the humans are that these practices are benefiting. Benefits for those
of us alive now may come with costs to those living in the future.
Furthermore, the mistakes alluded to in the first ambiguity are not just the obvious ones
like not knowing that such-and-such development of a riverside district will result in an increased
rate of soil erosion and unhealthy waters downstream. These are the obvious dangers to physical
health to which attention is usually called, as I discussed in the first section of the previous
chapter. We must not forget, though, that mistakes are also made about what sort of life
constitutes a good life for the whole human being. Here what is usually neglected is the
psychological. Taylor's claim carries with it the implication that the interests of Homo sapiens can
be met on a future Earth where humans live their entire lives in climate-controlled buildings for
want of natural oxygen and ozone layer. I do not believe that this is true. Indeed, I would go so
far as to say that even if those future people are acclimated to such a deprived existence, it still
does not fulfill their interests, for the issue here is welfare-interests. They would be better off,
even if they do not know it, living on a vibrant, exciting, diverse, life-filled planet. Even having
experience machines (or 'holodecks' a la Star Trek ) which would make it possible to experience
realistic, holographic, representations of nature would not suffice since, as I argued in Chapter 3,
the veridicality of our experiences is important to us.
Incidentally, we can extrapolate into the future on the basis of our own experience. Isn't
life in the Eastern United States that much less interesting since by the 1940s farmers had
completely decimated with the simple shotgun the only parrot native to this continent, the
23
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Carolina Conure, which used to occur abundantly in thick flocks everywhere east of the
Mississippi? Arent our imaginations that much poorer on account of our not being able to witness
the moa, the largest bird of the modem era, all twelve species of which were wiped out by the
first people to arrive in New Zealand? The ten-foot long, half-ton manatees and dugongs extant
are beautiful marine mammals, but we of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been
deprived of the most magnificent Sirenian of all, the twenty-foot, six-ton Stellar's Sea Cow of the
Bering Sea, killed off by 1768. We have also missed out on the utterly alien dodo, the Tasmanian
wolf, and the world's only flightless sparrow (we are lucky enough to have some short film clips of
the last Tasmanian wolf). Of course, these are all animals that humans have had a hand in killing
off. Natural extinctions also deprive us of experiences that would have made our lives richer, such
as of the pygmy mammoths which survived on Pacific Rim islands until as recently as about 3000
BCE.
I hope that in the previous chapter I succeeded in arguing that all injustices are connected;
that would be enough to counter Taylor's assumption that they are not. In addition, though, we
can conclude that social justice is not compatible with environmental devastation for perhaps the
most obvious of reasons. Environmental devastation entails depriving future generations of a
physically and spiritually healthy environment. If people deserve to live in a healthy environment,
then when we destroy the environment we are making it the case that future generations do not
get what they deserve. If a just state of affairs is one in which everyone gets what they deserve,
then environmental destruction would be an injustice to future generations.
The injustice to future generations can also be put in nakedly utilitarian language. As I
noted above, we can imagine a future generation of humans living on a barren planet with
holographic substitutes for nature. Maybe the pleasure those humans would get from those
artificial trees and birds would equal, quantity-wise, our own (I doubt it), perhaps due to the fact
that they do not know what they are missing (they know these things are not real, but they have
no acquaintance with the pleasure of experiencing the real McCoy). Still, in the language of a
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utilitarian like Mill, the quality of the pleasure would be inferior. The pleasure of experiencing
real nature is intrinsically superior to the pleasure of experiencing artificial nature, and that
superiority of quality cannot be measured by the intensity of the pleasure itself. I believe Mill
would say that, inasmuch as it denies future generations the intrinsically superior experience,
environmental devastation is wrong.
Taylor's errors arise from a fundamental mistake similar to one of Callicott's. Now, unlike
the latter, Taylor does not prescribe a 'shrinkage of the domestic sphere' and a 'return' to hunter-
gather cultures—on the contrary, he recognizes the value of continued technological
achievement—so that he cannot be charged with reducing human welfare- interests to physical
interests like nutrition. However, in his demand that we give as wide a berth as possible to the
autonomy of other animals and plants he does overlook one facet of a good human life, a facet
which goes beyond both physical survival and the achievements of what we might call 'interhuman
culture.' This is the fact that humans naturally take a non-consumptive interest in other animals,
an interest which exhibits itself in study, in aid (from bird feeders to helping beached pilot whales
back into the sea), and in the desire for animal companions. To divorce ourselves from animal
contact to the extent that Taylor's system seems to prescribe is to do the kind of injustice to
ourselves that Taylor wants us to avoid doing to other animals, an injustice attached to a kind of
unnatural interference in our own lifeways. Taylor seems to regard every event in nonhuman
nature as good, even the (hypothetical) natural extinction of a highly developed species like the
mountain gorilla, and to regard any human intervention (aside from satisfaction of basic needs
and some cultural values) as a prima facie wrong—even intervening to save a species threatened
by natural extinction. This erroneous view is attached, I believe, to both his devaluing of the role
of emotion in ethics and his (related) liberal slant on what constitutes social justice. Human
emotional responses to other animals have no currency in Taylor's system. Some might regard this
as a virtue of the system; I have argued previously that it is a defect. His views on social justice
include the following:
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People do not have a subsistence right to an income or employment beyond what
is required for the necessities of life. However, they do have a liberty right to
choose their own vocation and to earn an income beyond the subsistence level
under social conditions in which fair equality of opportunity is extended to
everyone.
24
The right to subsistence is a positive right insofar as it includes the right to be
given assistance when in dire need through no fault of one's own. A condition of
dire need is here understood to be one in which a person will not be able to do his
or her fair share in making available to those in dire need what is required to
sustain life.
25
I will not spend a lot of time criticizing Taylor's views on human rights. I will only point
out two questions that the statements above raise. First, what defines the range of choices among
which I can exercise my right to choose my vocation? Is it defined by the jobs already available in
the market, thereby making my right to choose nothing but a right to choose from among equally
unsatisfying hourly-paid jobs in national chainstores? Second, what constitutes 'dire need through
no fault of one's own'? In the US in 1995 many are saying that the very inability to survive in the
Darwinian labor market is nobody’s fault but one's own. This view of human rights is deliberately
formulated to exclude the kind of sentiment that we associate with communal ties. It is as bad for
the animals and plants as it is for humans. I conclude that Taylor's system is unified with respect
to animals and plants and even, to some extent and despite his own hesitations, humans, but it is
unified in a manner that does not do right by humans nor by their wild beneficiaries and
benefactors.
6.1.3 Ahimsa. Jainism, and Veganism
Another more or less unified ethic of human, animal, and environmental justice is that
called veganism. I am not sure if veganism has had greater success than animal liberationism or
vegetarianism in inspiring its followers with a single, shared vision; for purposes of this discussion
I will rely primarily on Victoria Moran's book. Compassion: The Ultimate Ethic (Wellingborough.
Thorsons, 1985). One thing is certain, though, and that is that many vegans strive for a unity in
24
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their treatment of animals, the environment, and other persons. This is in keeping with the tenets
of Jainism, from which many vegans have derived, either directly or indirectly, their inspiration.
The most distinguishing feature of veganism is the diet that vegans consider to be the
most ethical. It precludes not only meat, but also all dairy products, eggs, and honey (Moran
notes some disagreement among vegans on this last prohibition). However, there is more to
veganism. Like many vegetarians, vegans do not wear leather or silk, but vegans also take a dim
view of wool. (I will present the rationale behind these additional prohibitions momentarily.)
Also like many vegetarians and other animal rights activists, vegans are opposed to the cruelties
and indignities suffered by animals in laboratories, circuses, and sports such as dog and horse
racing. So, like vegetarians, vegans' ethics include a special concern for the welfare of nonhuman
animals. However, what makes veganism of interest to us in the context of this chapter is that it is
not focused solely on sentient life:
The Golden rule applies not only to our conduct with fellow humans but to the
animal kingdom and, inasmuch as is possible, to the plant world and the earth
itself.
26
Veganism is one thing and one thing only—a way of living which avoids
exploitation, whether it be of our fellow men, the animal population, or the soil
upon which we rely for our very existence. 2 '
[There is] the need to be certain that taking life, even that of a plant, is really
called for .
28
Although [vegans] live from plant products, they are opposed to wanton
destruction even of these and are sensitive to taking from the earth only as much
as they need and returning to it all they can .
29
In connection with this last point, Moran points out that the vegan diet is also better for
plant life than is the diet of meat-eaters, since 'vegans...are not responsible for all the vegetation
consumed by animals they might otherwise have eaten, and thus they kill far fewer plants in the
final analysis than do omnivores .'
30
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Vegans also have concern for social justice, and an important case for veganism is the
amount of food an all-vegetable diet makes available for humans. At the same time, there is
acknowledgment of the problem of 'unequal distribution of control over agricultural
resources...that can hardly be solved by mass vegetarian conversions.'31 There seems to be a
special concern about the recurring phenomenon of war. Some vegans believe (and I would tend
to agree) that the indifference to the consumption of flesh cannot help but prop up the war
mentality, whereas the moral abstention from meat would have the opposite effect. Moran cites a
number of vegan pacifists. 32
What is the common philosophical foundation for all of these concerns? It is the principle
of ahimsa, or nonviolence. All the major Eastern religions include vows of nonviolence, but
probably the Jainist interpretation of ahimsa has had the most influence on vegans, through
Raychandbhai Mehta's influence on Gandhi and the latter's influence on the West generally (the
word ’nonviolence’ does not appear in English until the historical emergence of Gandhi made a
translation of ahimsa necessary). Indeed, the founder of the American Vegan Society, H. Jay
Dinshah, explains veganism by way of six principles he calls 'Pillars of Ahimsa.'33
Jainism itself includes five vows for monks and nuns (the vows are less strict for
laypersons):
The monks and nuns take the five 'great vows' (mahavratas)
,
pledging to abstain
from (1) injuring life, (2) false speech, (3) taking what is not given, (4)
unchastity, and (5) appropriation. A sixth vrata ('vow') consists of abstaining
from taking food and drink at night: it is evidently aimed at avoiding injury to
insects, which might go unnoticed in the darkness, and thus is a consequence of
the first mahavrata .
34
The vratas are not directed specifically at either human or animal life; Jainism thus offers
a unified human-animal morality (continued in the popularity of pacifism in vegan circles). Also,
ahimsa 's target is not just the avoidance of killing, but of any injury of any kind, even insult. Thus,
31 Sussman, cited in Moran, p 45.
32
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veganism is a stand against any activity which results in any undue harm, and vegans believe that
dairy, egg, honey and wool production email such harm. That is, their complaints go beyond the
protest of the particularly cruel methods of factory farming as it happens to currently be practiced
(although of course they join in protests against such conditions). How does their view differ from
that of mainstream vegetarians and animal liberationists? Some specific answers to this question
will round out this brief explication of veganism; it will be followed with some criticism.
The vegan case against eggs can be summarized in three main claims. First, 'to eat a
fertilized egg is in effect to consume a chicken before it is bom.' Second, 'unfertilized eggs, the
products of a bird's sexual cycle, can hardly be regarded as natural food’ for people. Third, no one
will 'support hens past their prime,' nor will anyone support the surplus of male chicks (when eggs
are hatched to produce another generation of layers ).
35
The vegan case against dairy products is based on the inhumanity of separating mother
from calf prematurely, the artificial induction of maturity in young females, and the same
problems facing the egg industry of supporting surplus males and older, non-productive animals .
36
The first two of these problems might not be inevitable, but the second two plague factory-farming
and (attempted) cruelty-free farming alike. Also, there is the point that although milk and egg
production are more efficient uses of land than is meat production, they are still not as efficient as
the production of grains for direct human consumption .
3
The complaint against honey seems to be specifically against commercial harvesting,
which results in injury and death to bees due to rough handling and also in substitution of the
bees' honey with com syrup (commercial harvesters do not just take the excess honey). These
38
factors do not seem to be inevitable in beekeeping.
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The objections to wool are also specifically against the wool industry. Right now, wool is
mostly a by-product of mutton, and those animals which are not killed for meat must nevertheless
suffer rough handling (including spillage of blood) and the danger of death from cold.39
It would seem that, under the right circumstances, honey and wool would be acceptable,
and the reason for refraining from these products now would be much like Frey's reasons for
refraining from meat products (Frey is a meat-eater)—i.e., as a protest against the current practice
rather than against the intrinsic nature of the product. The only serious objections to eggs are the
three problems egg production has in common with milk: the surpluses of males and older,
unproductive females, and the relatively inefficient use of land. But I think that these problems
are only problems when one has bought into a certain approach to production, namely the
centralized, profit-driven approach. A corporation in America certainly does not want to take on
the profitless task of maintaining even one unneeded male chick. However, that should not
influence how we imagine a practice closer to the ideal. For my own part, I would like to think
that the cost of the feed for a few roosters bom from the occasional hatched clutch would be more
than outweighed by all the consumable eggs produced over the years by the hens from the same
clutch. I would like to think that the same can be said of the upkeep of the occasional male calf (I
do not know if the employment of goats instead of cows would make this less or more costly, but
it is worth investigating). The point is, when Moran asks the question 'who would pay for the
upkeep' of such animals, she seems to assume that the 'who' has to be the same kind of 'who'
running things now. The possibility of local, subsistence-oriented production challenges that
assumption.
The issue of the efficient use of land is the strongest objection to egg and dairy
production. However, the strength of the objection varies with the significance of eggs and dairy
products in the diet. The more nearly primary a place in the diet such products are to occupy, the
greater the strain on the land. This can be mitigated by agreeing that such animal products cannot
39
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by themselves replace what is currently consumed as meat (as is feared). Also, consumption (in
connection with production) should vary from region to region, depending on whether local
conditions permit such use of the land and whether the animals can live outdoors comfortably.
If my objections to the vegan view on the use of food animals have merit, then it seems
that we are left with the vegan charge that while 'the desire of non-vegans who are concerned
about animals is for a return to traditional agricultural methods,...population numbers and
urban/suburban centralization put this hope. ..in the pipe dream category.’40
There are a number of things to say about this charge. First of all, this hands-thrown-up-
in-the-air attitude of resignation to the current state of affairs seems to render rather pointless
Moran's example of Harold and Jenny Bland, who are 'proving the point of vegan economics
generally' with their nearly self-sufficient lifestyle.41 At the time of Moran's writing the Blands
were raising two children on two and a half acres with the help of fruit trees, a garden, a wood-
burning stove, a solar oven, and a windmill. This return to small-scale living (along with the
examples of many other people) gives the lie to the pipe-dream charge.
The resignation to current trends in population growth and urbanization contradicts
Moran's interpretation of ahimsa as the principle of 'purposefully living to do the most good as
well as the least harm possible.' To shrug off population growth and urbanization is to say 'the
current practice of capitalism may go on while I do my vegan thing.' Yet both overpopulation and
urbanization are underwritten by capitalist ethics, which vegans must oppose. After all, one of the
goals of vegans is to remove, at least to a large extent, two of nature's 'gifts' to capital: land and
animals. Secondly, as already noted, the argument that we should adopt a vegan diet because it
allows more people to be fed with the available arable land is meaningless without an attached
commitment to changing the way resources are allocated.
A willingness to put up with social injustices is a seductive possibility for veganism
because, if Moran's presentation of the vegan position is representative, veganism has, just like the
40
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environmentalist ethics of Calhcott and Taylor, overlooked the question of what constitutes a good
life for a person. Again like Callicott and Taylor, the emphasis is on what humans can put up with
or do without. Hence Schweitzer's mistaken belief that it would be better for him to walk a
distance on pavement rather than walk in a field, since the former entails a smaller chance of
accidentally stepping on insects
.
42
This is a mistake because, in fretting overmuch on the damage
he might cause to insects, Schweitzer forgets the injury he does to himself by conceiving of himself
as primarily a burden to the lifeforms around him. So, he cheats himself out of a pleasant and
stimulating walk on the earth, with the feel of blades of grass around his ankles and the sights of
swaying plants and grasshoppers leaping out of his way. He opts for the dreary walk on the
concrete instead, the perfect vision of a person who has forgotten his duty to himself.
The same tendency to forget one's duties to oneself might be informing vegan pacifism.
Based on Moran's report of vegan feelings about war, I suspect that vegan pacifists would
subscribe to Taylor's claim that 'in the domain of human ethics, we are permitted to use force
against another in defense of our life only when we cannot avoid the other's attack or escape from
the situation . ,4
(
This too is an error and a forgetting of the consideration we owe ourselves. For
while a pacifist position with respect to a given war might certainly be justified, I do not believe
that human beings are morally obligated to become refugees—i.e., to 'escape from the
situation'—when someone else forcibly invades their homeland. I am thinking of the Plains
Indians' response to European invasion and the desire of Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves
right now. I am reminded of the song 'Home,' by Roger Waters, who usually writes against war:
When they overrun the defences
A minor invasion put down to expenses
Will you go down to the airport lounge
Will you accept your second-class status
A nation of waitresses and waiters
Will you mix their martinis
Will you stand still for it
Or will you take to the hills?
44
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I cannot believe that people have a duty to put up with such an existence. Certainly, the
best thing is to be creative and find the least violent means of effective defense, but sometimes
that means is not so peaceful as Gandhi's campaign of civil disobedience. Again I am thinking of
the Bosnian Muslims. They deserve to be able to defend themselves.
This idea of 'doing without' as the primary virtue of veganism reaches its extreme in
Jainism with the notions (amenable to Abaris) that the only acceptable food is water (filtered and
drunk in the daytime) and the best death is that by starvation. Vegans do not go this far but their
neglect of the good human life, the duties we owe to ourselves, enables also their refraining from
tackling head-on the issues of social justice.
It seems to me that the positive ideals in ahimsa and veganism are best served by my
attending to the ideal of the good life for all people, not just to the least violent life for me. If the
former entail the condemnation of wool because of the suffering of animals, they entail also the
condemnation of cotton because of the suffering of people in the sweatshops of the Pacific Rim,
from Indonesia to Los Angeles. Vegans must also take a stand against the less dramatic but also
insidious suffering of those who toil in forty-hour monotony at wages below the poverty level and
without health benefits. The truth is that at this time no vegan is a 'fully accomplished' vegan, not
only because 'vinyl shoes may be cut by a machine that has a leather belt on it; there is a minute
amount of animal gelatin in photographic film,'
45
etc. but also because almost every product we
consume is mediated by the exploitation and suffering of that most ill-used of us animals, the
wage laborer.
6.2 Conclusion
I have examined the views of Callicott, Taylor, and the vegans on the question of whether
and how we can find a fit between environmentalism, animal liberationism, and social justice. I
have shown that each view is flawed. Indeed, they share at least one common flaw. They each
neglect to consider adequately the question of what counts as a good life for a person.
45
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Callicott and Taylor fail to appreciate the role that animals play in the psychological
welfare of humans. This in turn leads them to disparage or neglect the value of non-consumptive
human-animal relationships. Vegans like Moran characterize human impact on the environment
as, at best, a necessary evil. This also disparages the value of non-consumptive human-animal
relationships. All three regard, with varying degrees of explicitness, social ills on the one hand
and environmental ills and animal suffering on the other as distinct problems. At best, each camp
regards at least two of these problems as being separately resolvable. This is witnessed by Taylor's
explicit assumption to that effect, by Callicott's complete neglect of social problems, and by
Moran's view that the goals of veganism can be met without addressing urbanization and
population growth.
Yet, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, but especially in Chapter 5, the
resolution of each of these problems is not merely compatible with the resolution of the others; it
is, when we get down to the practical level, a necessary component. It is difficult to imagine how
we are going to save the environment without giving up the international trade in beef. It is
difficult to imagine how cruelty to animals will end without everyone having the economic power
to live a cruelty-free lifestyle. It is difficult to imagine how social justice will have been done
without everyone having a healthy environment in which to live.
Even if we could achieve any one of these goals independently and at the expense of the
other two, there are still reasons why we should not. As I have argued throughout this
dissertation, doing the right thing in one of these cases is not incompatible with doing the right
thing in the other two. It is clear, then, that resolving one of these problems will offer no excuses
for perpetuating the other two. At the minimum, vegetarianism, environmentalism, and social
justice offer complimentary, not competing, agendas.
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